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SUMMARY 
 
etween 1996 and 2006, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation invested over $20 million in the 
Neighborhood Improvement Initiative (NII), an ambitious effort to help three neighborhoods in the 
Bay Area reduce poverty and develop new leaders, better services, more capable organizations, and 
stronger connections to resources.  On some counts NII succeeded, and on others it struggled mightily.  
In the end, despite some important accomplishments, NII did not fulfill its participants’ hopes and 
expectations for broad, deep, and sustainable community change.  In those accomplishments and 
shortcomings, and in the strategies that produced them, however, lies a story whose relevance exceeds 
the boundaries of a single initiative.  Our goal is to examine this story in the context of other foundation-
sponsored initiatives to see if it can help philanthropy support community change and other types of 
long-term, community-based initiatives more effectively.     
 
As we began to review materials and conduct interviews, we learned of NII’s accomplishments in each 
neighborhood, including new organizations incubated, new services stimulated, and new leaders helped 
to emerge.  We also quickly discovered multiple, and often conflicting, perspectives on NII’s design, 
implementation, and outcomes that were hard to reconcile.  Some of this Rashomon effect is to be 
expected in a complex, long-term community change initiative that evolves over time with changing 
players.  Some can also be attributed to the different dynamics and trajectories in each of the three sites.   
 
We have tried to describe all points of view as accurately as possible without favoring any one 
perspective.  Moreover, we have tried to look beyond the lessons drawn exclusively from NII and to 
position all of these varied opinions within a broader field-wide perspective, wherever possible.   
 
The frustrations of NII’s participants and sponsors are mirrored in many other foundations’ major 
initiatives.  Indeed, our reviewers—who have been involved in many such initiatives as funders, 
evaluators, technical assistance providers, and intermediaries—all underscored how familiar they were 
with the challenges and pitfalls described here, both those related specifically to community change 
efforts and those pertinent to other initiatives.  Because the opportunity to discuss the frustrations 
candidly has been limited, however, they often are relegated to concerns expressed sotto voce.  So it was 
particularly important throughout the review to solicit from our interviewees1 ideas or suggestions for 
improving their work together.  We offer these along with our own observations as a way to stimulate 
further reflection and debate, because we believe that philanthropy has an important role to play in 
improving outcomes for poor communities and their residents.  Few foundations have been willing to 
contribute to this level of honest and sometimes painful public dialogue.  But by commissioning this 
retrospective analysis, the Hewlett Foundation demonstrates a desire to help the field learn and move 
forward, and we applaud that.   
 
NII’S CORE COMPONENTS 
 
NII began with six goals:  
 
1. Connect fragmented efforts to address poverty-related issues in select communities. 
2. Improve the capacity (proficiency and resources) of participating community-based organizations. 
3. Improve Bay Area community foundations’ capacity to support neighborhood improvement. 
4. Develop neighborhood leaders by creating a vehicle for increasing resident involvement in 
neighborhood planning and improvement strategies. 
5. Leverage significant public/private resources to support community improvement. 
                                               
1 Staff from Hewlett and the participating community foundations, evaluators, technical assistance providers, and 
community representatives. 
B 
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6. Provide long-term statistical evidence of changes in poverty indicators (e.g., unemployment, 
welfare dependency, vacant and abandoned structures).  
 
NII’s basic design elements included:  a one-year, resident-driven planning process; six years of 
implementation (per site), supported by grants, technical assistance, and training; designation or creation 
of a neighborhood-based lead organization to oversee implementation; local advisory committees with 
representatives from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors; partnership with community foundations 
to manage the work; site-level data collection and development of a tracking system; and a multi-site 
implementation evaluation.   
 
Hewlett turned to local community foundations to serve as “managing partners,” one for each site.  Their 
role was to: identify the local lead agency; help the lead agency create a resident-driven collaborative to 
develop and implement a neighborhood improvement plan; administer a grants program; create and 
manage an advisory committee; administer funds for training and technical assistance; and leverage 
resources.   
 
Hewlett selected three sites to participate in NII.  Mayfair began in 1996 with the Community 
Foundation of Silicon Valley (CFSV) as managing partner of what came to be known as the Mayfair 
Improvement Initiative (MII).  Key outcomes of MII’s work include physical improvements, more 
resources invested in Mayfair, and stronger organizational collaborations and neighborhood leadership.  
The use of promotores (community educators and outreach workers) helped families obtain health 
insurance and prepare their children to succeed in school.  Hewlett’s $6.3 million leveraged $9.6 million in 
additional funds for Mayfair.  In 2006, two years after the formal end of the Neighborhood Improvement 
Initiative in Mayfair, MII operates with substantial credibility and increasing capacity.   
  
West Oakland began in 1998.  The San Francisco Foundation (TSFF) served as Hewlett’s managing 
partner for what was called the 7th Street McClymonds Corridor Neighborhood Improvement Initiative.  
Unable to find an appropriate lead agency within the neighborhood to oversee the planning process, 
Hewlett asked TSFF to serve that function, too.  It took two-and-a-half years before the 7th Street 
McClymonds Corridor NII stepped into the role.  Hewlett and TSFF hired consultants to help it gain 
nonprofit status, develop signature projects, formalize grant making, and adopt community-wide 
outcomes, but mistrust of outsiders and factionalism in the community undercut the fledgling 
organization.  During this time, the 7th Street McClymonds Corridor NII made 57 grants worth a total of 
$1.6 million.  The quality of the grantmaking improved over time, but little data exist on project 
outcomes.   
 
In 2001, the executive director of the 7th Street McClymonds Corridor NII was terminated.  Internal 
politics undermined the search for a new director so thoroughly that TSFF and Hewlett decided to 
dissolve the organization.  TSFF administered a final round of grants and persuaded Hewlett to support 
six months of planning to transform a school-based health center at McClymonds High School into a 
youth and family center that integrates and coordinates health, youth development, and social services.  
The center is now in its third year of operation and is being evaluated by the University of California’s 
Institute for Health Policy Studies.  Hewlett provided support for the first two years of the evaluation. 
 
The third site, East Palo Alto, began in 1999 with the Peninsula Community Foundation (PCF) as 
managing partner and One East Palo Alto (OEPA) as the local intermediary that emerged during the 
planning process.  PCF immediately raised an additional $1.1 million and leveraged $1.5 million for NII 
implementation, but PCF leaders disagreed with Hewlett over how communities change, what the pace of 
change should be, and how best to develop civic capital.  PCF resigned as managing partner in 2002 and 
Hewlett assumed the role.  Staff and board members’ inexperience, turnovers in leadership, fatigue, and 
strife within OEPA’s board challenged the initiative in East Palo Alto.  Over time, however, OEPA began to 
focus—first on jobs, education, and crime and later on youth employment, job readiness, and leadership 
projects.  Police, public officials, and residents have joined to reduce crime through a special task force, 
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block clubs, neighborhood marches, and mentoring for at-risk youth.  Other activities produced English-
language classes for adults and after-school enrichment for children; new and stronger resident leaders, 
social networks, and community organizations; job placements and support to local entrepreneurs; and 
greater investment of public and private resources in the neighborhood. 
 
Besides the concrete benefits that NII brought to residents in each neighborhood, the initiative incubated 
or laid the groundwork for additional investments that the Hewlett Foundation made even as NII came to 
a formal end.  In East Palo Alto, for example, Hewlett has provided direct support to the Opportunities 
Industrial Center West and other providers to serve 452 youth over two summers and, with the 
Foundation’s Education Program, made significant investments in improving in-school and after-school 
program instruction and increasing parent engagement in the Ravenswood City School District.  These 
positive developments illustrate how extended follow-up can boost the long-term value of an initiative like 
NII. 
 
IMPLEMENTING KEY ELEMENTS OF NII’S THEORY 
 
As with many other foundations’ initiatives of the era, Hewlett staff did not develop a detailed theory of 
change that specified all the connections between each of NII’s six goals, the strategies to achieve the 
goals, and the assumptions underlying the connections.  But they did articulate an overall theory that  
“improvement in the physical, social, and economic conditions in lower-income neighborhoods will result 
from the active involvement of residents in community planning and decision making processes, in 
combination with a comprehensive, coordinated, multi-year strategy to address the problems that impair 
the quality of life in these neighborhoods.”  
 
Thus resident engagement was a key element of NII’s approach.  NII began with a planning process 
in which a diverse group of residents came together to develop a vision for the neighborhood and a plan 
to achieve it.  Hewlett’s only guideline for this process was that residents make up at least 51% of the 
planning group.  Like some other foundations, Hewlett did not specify the operational meaning of 
“resident-driven,” nor did it articulate a strategy for identifying and developing resident leaders who could 
ultimately take charge of NII.   
 
As time went on, NII encountered the same issues involving residents’ authority and responsibility that 
have surfaced in other community change initiatives.  Wanting to honor its commitment to a resident-
driven process, Hewlett approved all three community plans despite serious misgivings about the sites’ 
abilities to knit together a coherent approach on the basis of the numerous projects they proposed.  To 
build local capacity, Hewlett paid for technical assistance that exposed resident boards to best practices, 
supported visits to model programs, and brought national experts into the neighborhoods to stimulate 
new thinking.  But Foundation leaders grew increasingly frustrated with what they saw as a lack of 
strategic direction in all three sites, and they ultimately introduced new requirements for focus and 
approach.  This led the sites, in turn, to question the Foundation’s commitment to resident priorities and 
decision-making. 
 
A second element of NII’s approach was the creation of a neighborhood intermediary.  Although 
Hewlett did not set out to establish new intermediaries, by the end of the planning period each of the 
neighborhood boards, in concert with its managing partner, had determined that it needed to create a 
new nonprofit organization.  Most of our interviewees consider the neighborhood intermediary a good 
vehicle for accomplishing NII’s community change goals but are critical of how NII implemented the 
intermediary strategy.  It took a great deal of energy and technical assistance to create and nurture 
these new entities’ capacity for basic functions like creating a mission statement and by-laws, electing a 
board, locating and hiring staff, regranting funds, etc.—let alone to develop their strategic capacity, 
which typically grows only through trial and error, experimentation, and revision.  NII’s neighborhood 
intermediaries struggled because they lacked strategic capacity, and Hewlett struggled to find ways of 
helping them become more strategic within NII’s timeframe.  Some participants now say it is 
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unreasonable to expect ambitious results within six years from a start-up organization with an 
inexperienced board.   
 
Connecting neighborhood improvement efforts to the larger region was a third element of NII’s 
approach.  Recognizing that low-income neighborhoods often are isolated from external resources and 
expertise, Hewlett required each site to establish an Advisory Committee composed of diverse movers 
and shakers from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to provide expertise, access, strategic advice, 
social connections, and additional resources.  This approach reflected recent thinking about the 
limitations of change strategies that focus solely within the neighborhood, and it was well received 
throughout NII.  The Advisory Groups and the technical assistance that sites received to “think regionally” 
gained traction from time to time within NII and produced some important partnerships between the 
neighborhood intermediaries and regional organizations.  The overall impact was limited, however, 
because the sites had so much on their plates that they were unable to benefit as consistently or deeply 
as they would have liked.  
 
A SHIFT IN HEWLETT’S APPROACH 
 
In 2000, a leadership change at Hewlett brought a heightened focus on articulating clear objectives and 
measuring progress toward them.  The result was that Hewlett staff applied an explicitly outcomes-
based framework to NII in late 2001.  It included restructuring around a small number of community-
wide outcomes, cornerstone projects developed to address each one of these targeted outcomes, and the 
development of logic models specifying target populations, project outcomes, and performance 
measures.  Hewlett arranged for substantial technical assistance to help sites develop the new 
framework, with the idea that pursuing results was not optional but the choice of what the outcomes 
would be, and what strategies sites would use to achieve them, was up to the local partners.   
 
Hewlett staff felt great pressure to demonstrate positive results, and they conveyed that sense of 
urgency to local partners.  In their view, the sites had shown very little in terms of any tangible results 
and little promise in terms of choosing strategies and interventions that plausibly would lead to such 
results in the future. 
 
The changing paradigm did not sit well with NII’s managing partners, local lead agencies, or 
neighborhood partners, however, and it became a lightning rod for problems in the relationship between 
local NII partners and Hewlett.  From Hewlett’s perspective, the amount of money being invested in NII 
justified closer attention to whether the initiative was on track to achieve positive results.  Furthermore, 
the idea of targeting outcomes wasn’t entirely new to NII; nor was the initiative sailing smoothly before 
the intervention.  The dysfunctional dynamics within West Oakland and East Palo Alto left “little, if any, 
indication that these communities would achieve any of our shared goals” without intervention, a Hewlett 
source says. 
 
From the sites’ perspective, the new framework changed the rules of the game midstream.  The effect 
played out differently in each neighborhood, however.  Mayfair had been functioning long enough with 
strong local leadership that it was able to incorporate some changes without derailing its direction and 
momentum.  West Oakland’s significant internal challenges limited the energy it could bring to respond to 
Hewlett’s request.  The negative dynamics were most intense in East Palo Alto, the site that was 
“youngest” and where Hewlett ended up taking on the managing partner role.  In all sites, however, the 
difference in perspectives between how Hewlett and other NII participants experienced the adoption of a 
more explicitly outcomes-based framework illustrates the Rashomon effect described earlier.  And in all 
sites, angst over how the outcomes framework was introduced overwhelmed the discussion about what 
outcomes should frame the work.   
 
When differences like these are not resolved, they spill over into other dimensions of the initiative.  For 
example, many of Hewlett’s collaborators saw the changes as a direct challenge to one of NII’s core 
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elements, the critical role of residents in driving the work.  Clearly, both Hewlett and the sites wanted the 
work to generate positive outcomes and wanted residents to play a role in achieving them, but each had 
a different perspective on how to connect resident engagement to outcomes.  Unfortunately, two factors 
limited NII’s ability to advance the field’s knowledge on this point.  First, NII’s original theory of resident-
driven change was not fully tested.  We do not know, for example, whether the sites would have 
eventually gotten to outcomes on their own, in their own way, if Hewlett had not intervened, or what 
those outcomes might have been.   
 
Second, NII doesn’t provide a good test of the value of an outcomes framework.  Even though Hewlett 
allowed residents to select the outcomes they wanted NII to produce, the introduction of the framework 
midstream was experienced by sites as changing the rules of the game and, in some cases, as 
disrespecting resident voice, which ultimately limited the degree to which participants embraced it.  
Further, we know from other initiatives that it takes significant time and effort to build capacity for self-
evaluation and outcome tracking in a new community organization.  Expecting NII’s nascent local 
organizations to develop this capacity midstream, even with substantial assistance, yielded only modest 
success.   
 
MANAGING CHANGE: COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS AS PARTNERS 
 
Hewlett’s choice of community foundations as NII’s managing partners offered several advantages for 
both parties.  Hewlett could partner with a foundation that was closer to the community, had substantial 
fundraising capacity, and would be working in the community long after Hewlett moved on.  The 
community foundations, meanwhile, would gain dedicated human and financial resources to augment 
their work in the neighborhoods.  Both parties invested substantial amounts of time and resources, 
resulting in some positive outcomes in the target neighborhoods.  But the relationship between 
sponsoring foundation and managing partner was often difficult and sometimes untenable.  The 
challenges were neither Hewlett’s nor the community foundations’ alone but characterized the way each 
party related to the other, often to their mutual disadvantage.   
 
Challenges included differences in foundation goals, capacities, and cultures; role confusion; the power 
dynamics typical of grantor/grantee relationships; and lack of clarity about mutual responsibilities and 
accountabilities.  Hewlett expressed disappointment that the community foundations seemed to lack 
strategic capacity and had trouble meeting NII’s financial management and reporting requirements.  The 
community foundations, in turn, often felt that Hewlett did not treat them as respected partners and 
lacked a commitment to (and strategy for) building the community foundations’ capacity, which was one 
of NII’s stated goals.   
 
The following observations aimed at improving the quality of the partnership are based, in part, on what 
we heard from Hewlett and community foundation staff as well as other interviewees:  
 
• Make sure the sponsoring foundation’s and the community foundation’s board and staff are clear and 
in agreement internally about the initiative’s goals, strategies, risks, and timeline for achieving 
results. 
• Treat the community foundation as a fellow change agent rather than as a technician.  
• Take time to understand each other’s goals, capacities, and cultures. 
• Bring the community foundation into the initiative early enough to develop a shared vision for 
change. 
• Address the dynamic that unequal power brings to the relationship. 
• Establish a tone of mutual respect, transparency, and shared risk-taking. 
• Build the relationship between institutions, not just individuals.   
• Clarify roles, mutual accountabilities, and rules of engagement. 
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CAPTURING CHANGE: EVALUATION AND LEARNING IN NII 
 
Community change initiatives are notoriously hard to evaluate because of their complexity, broad scope, 
dynamic nature, and vulnerability to uncontrollable variables.  Deciding what to measure, how to measure 
it, how to collect the data, and how to interpret the results is a challenging process that involves many 
tradeoffs of rigor, practicality, and resources.  Nonetheless, every community change initiative offers an 
opportunity to assess progress toward goals, to help participants learn better strategies, and to build 
knowledge within the field of community change.   
 
NII’s evaluation grew to encompass an implementation study and performance data tracking. The 
first was very similar to that of other community change initiatives at the time: the evaluator reviewed 
documents, observed site activities, interviewed key stakeholders, and then produced rich and detailed 
descriptions of how NII unfolded in each site, along with an assessment of strengths and weaknesses and 
recommendations to advance the work going forward.   
 
Initially, Hewlett gave its managing partners responsibility for establishing and tracking performance 
indicators at each site.  By 2001, however, it was clear that none of the sites had a robust data tracking 
system.  Concurrently, the Foundation’s new president and board were asking about NII’s impact and the 
“statistical evidence of changes in poverty indicators” described in NII’s design.  Concerned that the 
initiative could be undermined by the lack of uniform data collection, Hewlett staff hired a second firm to 
take responsibility for collecting performance data. 
 
The evaluators found it very hard to integrate the two evaluations.  Moreover, they shared a major 
dilemma:  The broad theory behind the initiative was that an “empowered” community would figure out 
what strategies work best to turn the corner on poverty, but there was no conceptual framework or 
pathway to link that theory with outcomes.  The large number of projects—many of which served only a 
handful of residents or did not target the same residents repeatedly to achieve a cumulative effect—made 
demonstrating population-level results or linking strategies to specific outcomes out of the question.  A 
more robust and unifying theory of change might have helped NII shift from a narrowly programmatic set 
of outcomes to a focus on the community-level results to which the initiative ultimately aspired.  Finally, 
both evaluation teams struggled to identify and measure community capacity outcomes. 
 
Neither evaluation strategy pleased most of the people most of the time, although at different times 
among different subsets of NII participants, each was deemed valuable.  However, Hewlett staff would 
have preferred more analytic, less descriptive reports with recommended changes that were more tightly 
linked to the analyses, and they were disappointed that the performance data did not generate a deeper 
level of analysis.  The evaluators, in turn, felt that Hewlett’s expectations for evaluation were constantly 
shifting and sometimes unrealistic, and they were not prepared or inclined to modify the basic design of 
the evaluation midstream in the initiative.   
 
Many of these challenges are familiar ones for community change initiatives.  When queried about ways to 
address them, we heard the following: 
 
• Establish at the outset an evaluation framework and a shared agenda for learning about community 
change. 
 
• Draw upon the expertise and varied perspectives of an external advisory committee for evaluation 
and learning, throughout the life of the initiative. 
 
• Don’t start implementation without a shared definition of success and how it will be measured.  This 
is not a call to specify outcomes prematurely or to cleave rigidly to obsolete measures of success; it is 
simply a recognition that, more often than one would hope, foundations and their partners do not 
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make explicit at the outset their assumptions about what changes they hope to see in the target 
communities or how they expect to know whether such changes have occurred. 
 
• Allow room for the definition of success to shift and evolve as people learn what is possible and 
effective, as relationships deepen, and as the work matures. 
• Recognize, measure, and track a full range and continuum of outcomes, including changes in 
capacities and behaviors, instead of categorizing results as processes vs. products or rejecting “soft” 
outcomes.    
 
• Don’t confuse outcomes thinking with outcomes measurement.  It is very useful for people think in 
terms of the outcomes they want to achieve, but it is equally important not to let the challenges of 
measurement narrow the scope of legitimate outcomes or the results that matter.   
 
• Recognize that grantees may not have capacity to  track progress toward outcomes, and they may 
not be able to provide data to the evaluators charged with collecting them.  It is often necessary to 
build grantees’ (and communities’) capacity around data and evaluation. 
 
• Put mechanisms in place to explicitly support learning (e.g., evaluation and other information 
collection, reporting processes, time for relationship- and trust-building, facilitated opportunities for 
learning and reflection). 
 
• Match evaluation tools to their purposes.  For instance, a cross-site database is most useful if sites 
are tracking their progress with numeric measures; otherwise, narrative reports may be more useful. 
 
• Position evaluation as a tool for improving practices and nurturing the change process as well as for 
gauging outcomes.  At a minimum, this means (a) establishing the expectation that evaluation data 
will inform and guide participants, in real time; and (b) having a process and dedicated time for 
sharing results with practitioners, so that data can be used in meaningful ways. 
 
• Consider a phased approach to evaluation, linked to phases in the initiative’s own evolution and the 
iterative process of learning while doing. 
 
• Tap residents’ indigenous knowledge while also sharing good ideas gleaned from other communities 
and initiatives.   
 
• Ensure that foundation staff, as well as grantees, understand evaluation’s requirements and 
limitations. 
 
• Be realistic about what can be done to capture the initiative’s results, given the nature of community 
change and the available time and resources.  
 
• Model the learning process at all levels.  Hold everyone, including funders and partners, accountable 
to the same standards for clarity on outcomes.  
 
• Promote learning across sites and among partners, not just within discrete pockets of activity. 
 
• Cultivate a flexible learning stance. 
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SUPPORTING CHANGE:  SUFFICIENT AND APPROPRIATE RESOURCES 
 
NII’s experience suggests four essential resources for foundation-sponsored community change 
initiatives:  
 
Resource 1:  A long timeframe for change.  Hewlett’s timeframe for NII (one year of planning and 
six of implementation per site) was generous for its day.  In theory, it gave local partners leeway to 
tackle recalcitrant issues, build the necessary relationships and capacities before taking action, and 
involve people and organizations that had never participated in this type of work before.  In reality, 
however, the angst around adopting an outcomes framework disrupted the work so thoroughly in at least 
one site that NII essentially had to start anew.  Furthermore, although each NII site had a year-long 
planning phase, none of the sites was ready to begin when its planning period ended.  Observations 
about this resource include: 
 
• Initiative funders, managers, and implementers need to agree on a reasonable expectation for how 
long it will take to do the work.  If the timeframe doesn’t allow enough time to get the work off the 
ground, it may not be worth launching the initiative. 
 
• The timeframe should ensure sufficient time for new ideas and behaviors to take hold and for 
participants to ride out the rough spots, without making such a long commitment that it removes the 
immediate pressure to get results.  
 
• Talking explicitly and repeatedly with participants about the rationale and strategy for the timeframe 
may help to keep expectations in line with reality.  
 
• The transition from one phase of the initiative to the next (e.g., from planning to implementation) 
should be determined by whether the site has reached essential milestones rather than by arbitrary 
timelines. 
 
• Within a timeframe, the sequencing of activities is important.  In particular, an emphasis on 
relationship building and small, tangible successes can pave the way for bigger achievements. 
 
• A long timeframe alone won’t always get to the right results.  If the initiative is struggling too hard, 
for too long, on too many levels—if essential milestones are unreachable and relationships irreparable 
with the amount of time and money available—it may be time to end the initiative, change grantees, 
or adjust the amount of funding (up or down).  Each foundation has a unique set of factors to 
consider when contemplating whether to cut losses and end an initiative, including its broad 
organizational priorities, alternative options for using the money, and whether the funders’ long-term 
credibility can weather negative publicity in the short term.   
 
Resource 2:  An adequate amount of money, disbursed strategically.  No matter how they feel 
about other matters, NII’s partners, participants, and observers praise Hewlett for the amount of money 
it committed to the initiative and for continuing to fund the effort generously despite the challenges that 
arose.  Clearly, money is an essential resource.  But NII also illustrates the fact that how one positions 
this resource in the initiative, and how one disburses it, are almost as important as how much money one 
has.  NII demonstrated that:  
 
• Making the managing partner responsible for raising funds and residents responsible for spending 
them creates an inherent tension around money. 
 
• Leading with money distorts expectations for what the initiative will accomplish, both within the 
foundation and in the neighborhoods.  
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• Leading with money can create local expectations that (a) every site will get the same amount of 
money regardless of their need and their performance, and (b) every site will receive its allotted 
money whether or not people are ready to spend it well.  
 
• It is possible to overwhelm a site with resources before people and organizations are ready to use 
the resources effectively. 
 
• Resident involvement brings the community’s preexisting power dynamics to the surface.  The 
choices made about how to organize and engage residents will determine whether resources go to 
gatekeepers—individuals and organizations who may or may not represent the neighborhood’s best 
interests—or to democratic processes that ensure all voices are heard.  
 
• Big money often is necessary to produce big results, but it comes with tradeoffs.  It can get 
bottlenecked in a single grantee that doesn’t yet have the capacity to spend effectively; and it can 
distract partners from substantive issues.  This phenomenon makes it important to accompany 
money with structures and strategies (such as system for making mini-grants) that make sure the 
money is used well.  
 
• Foundations’ grant cycles are not aligned with the pace of neighborhood change, and the pressure to 
meld the two can undermine choices. 
 
• Leveraged funds aren’t always what they seem to be.  Sometimes they are new, additional resources; 
sometimes they represent co-funding by grantmakers who would otherwise invest the same amounts 
but separately; and sometimes they are funds diverted from another, perhaps equally important 
purpose.  All three types of funding are worthwhile in their own way, but it is important to recognize 
that some “leveraged” funds may come at a cost to other endeavors and neighborhoods. 
 
Resource 3:  Human effort, knowledge, and commitment.  It takes intense effort, sustained 
commitment, and an evolving knowledge of “what works” to change the way people think, act, and 
experience life.  NII’s experience suggests that:  
  
• Community change is labor-intensive work, both in terms of the number of people needed to do the 
work and the level of effort required from each participant. All participants working on the front lines 
of community initiatives need:  humility, demonstrated by a desire to learn about local context and a 
respect for people, place, cultures, and history; curiosity, a sense of inquiry, and the desire to learn; 
the ability to learn quickly in new situations and to incorporate lessons learned from past 
experiences; flexibility, demonstrated by the ability to consider nontraditional strategies, a willingness 
to adjust methods if necessary, and the courage to admit when something isn’t working; and cultural 
competence. 
 
• Evaluators need: clarity about the purpose of the evaluation; comprehension of the initiative’s theory 
and strategies; a focus on learning, not just on measuring; ability to demystify the evaluation 
process; creativity in helping people learn from each other in real time; understanding of what 
participants already know, what they want to learn, and what they need to know but might not be 
aware of; and commitment to building feedback loops and reflection into the fabric of the evaluation. 
 
• Staff of the sponsoring foundation need:  clarity about the theory of change; inclination to partner 
with grantees; prior experience with on-the-ground community change; diplomacy in public, and 
extreme candor in private; strategic thinking ability; and ability to read the political dynamics in a 
community. 
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• Staff of the managing partner organization need:  Understanding of evaluation and of community 
outcomes; a strategic approach to grantmaking; understanding of how to negotiate with government 
entities; ability to work in a highly political environment; a sense of how complex and complicated 
community change is; ability to organize and facilitate technical assistance; and ability to see the big 
picture while also managing details. 
 
• Support and involvement from top-level foundation leaders (executives, program managers, and 
board members) are crucial for long-term initiatives.  
 
• Community foundation donors can be an important resource for community change.  
 
• National and community foundations’ institutional assets can be harnessed for community change. 
 
• Getting deeply involved in a community, even over a relatively short time, gives a funder inside 
knowledge that can pay off over the long term. 
 
• The effort to work “comprehensively” in a community builds powerful alliances that cut across 
professional and cultural boundaries. 
 
Resource 4:  Technical assistance.  Hewlett recognized from NII’s beginning that training and 
technical assistance would be an essential part of the initiative, although NII’s designers did not fully 
anticipate the depth and scope of the need for TA.  At first, the managing partners hired TA providers 
from community-based organizations, national consulting firms, and university-based research centers, as 
well as independent consultants, while Hewlett arranged additional TA as needs arose.  In 2002, Hewlett 
centralized TA and brought it under the Foundation’s management.   
 
NII’s concept of assisting sites on many topics, through many types of providers, was well-intended but it 
faltered in execution.  Technical assistance got ahead of itself; there simply was too much expertise, 
provided by too many people, too fast for the people who needed to formulate strategies on-site to 
absorb.  The biggest stumbling block lay in bringing the disparate pieces together coherently without a 
strong strategic framework for the initiative itself.  Without an overarching framework or strategy, it was 
impossible to develop a menu of technical assistance for all sites.  Instead, NII was guided by implicit 
assumptions that (a) residents could ask for the help they needed in an organized way and (b) NII’s 
technical assistance consultants would know how to assess residents’ needs for help and recommend TA 
strategies to Hewlett.  Both assumptions proved false during the first half of the initiative.   
 
During the second half Hewlett worked to improve TA, especially by reducing the cadre of contractors to 
a select, experienced corps and clearly defining their roles.  Foundation staff recall that local partners, 
evaluators, and TA providers found this second phase of TA adequate and effective.  Our interviews with 
members of those same stakeholder groups suggest that NII’s technical assistance did improve, leading 
to improvements in outcome tracking and program practices.  The benefits of technical assistance during 
this stage were more likely to be limited by the local intermediary's internal challenge of trying to grow 
roots and establish momentum while also preparing for the end of Hewlett funding.   
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PHILANTHROPY 
 
The community change field has advanced since 1994, when Hewlett Foundation staff began to design 
NII.  People know more now about how communities function; they have incorporated theories of change 
and attention to results more thoroughly into their initiatives; new tools are available for evaluation and 
technical assistance; and providers are more sophisticated about helping local participants use the tools 
effectively.  Funders are more likely now than in the past to look for opportunities to build on existing 
community strengths and momentum rather than starting something entirely new and to adapt their 
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approach to fit the demands and possibilities for change on the ground.  And some foundations have 
created vehicles for peer learning and exchange that give participants a chance to examine and apply 
each others’ lessons, with the goal of developing a “community of practice.”  
 
Nonetheless, community change—that is, the development of neighborhood leaders, organizations, and 
networks so they can support residents and link them to resources and opportunities, inside and outside 
the community—isn’t for every foundation.  Funders who are contemplating such investments need to 
seriously consider what capacities they have to play which kinds of roles in the community change 
enterprise.  Some will find the work too messy, politically charged, and/or hard to assess.  It isn’t a good 
fit for foundations that prefer short-term time horizons or orient toward short-term, return-on-investment 
strategies.  Nor is community change comfortable work for foundations that need to demonstrate exactly 
how their funds bring about particular changes in the community.  
 
What characteristics position a foundation to do this work well?  Although the field’s technical advances 
help, we believe that something simpler, more fundamental, and farther-reaching is needed to help 
philanthropies that want to engage in community change do it better.  At the most basic level, we see 
two core competencies as necessary (though not sufficient) to do this work well:   
 
• The ability to establish productive relationships with the diverse people and 
organizations with which a foundation must work to achieve community change.   Why 
did so many NII participants find the initiative frustrating despite its important accomplishments?  
Not because NII lacked resources or commitment from Hewlett, the community foundations, or 
neighborhood residents.  And not because of simple arrogance, ignorance, or bad faith on anyone’s 
part.  (Indeed, many of the same players have worked together on other initiatives since NII without 
the same level of frustration.)  Improving outcomes for people in low-income neighborhoods is a 
challenging enterprise, but so are many other targets of philanthropic attention, such as peace and 
security, the environment, economic development, and so on.  The stumbling block for NII was that 
participants couldn’t find a way to talk productively about their differences and work through them 
together to improve the initiative.  This is not to say that relationships were always tense or 
interactions always explosive; there were periods in Mayfair and East Palo Alto when work proceeded 
without undue turbulence.  Across the initiative’s lifespan, however, relationships and interactions 
were poor enough, for long enough, that they seriously affected NII’s evolution.  Indeed, 10 years 
after NII began, the rockiest years of the initiative remain the most vivid memories for many 
participants. 
 
• The ability to take a learning stance throughout the entire enterprise.  One of the few areas 
of consensus among our interviewees was a disappointment that more collective learning did not 
take place.  Participants describe an initiative that never established the trust needed for candid 
exchange and learning.  Relationships between Hewlett and its local partners often lacked mutual 
understanding and sometimes lacked respect; anxiety and blame surfaced frequently.  These 
conditions, which rarely rose to the level of public dialogue but were often discussed privately, made 
it impossible to debate and refine NII’s theories productively, fine-tune strategies in response to 
realities, and have continuous learning and adaptation.   
 
Relationships, learning, and all that they entail are not new issues.  Nor are they absent from the 
philanthropic landscape.  Indeed, many foundations demonstrate these competencies in many different 
initiatives and areas of work.  But somehow community change, perhaps because it is a long-term 
enterprise that challenges traditional power relations and lacks an easy blueprint for action, generates 
fewer success stories if by success we mean the quality of the philanthropic enterprise—the strength of 
the ideas or theories, the degree to which the theories are implemented consistently and effectively over 
time, and the collective learning that is generated for the field.   
 
  xii
Rather than focus on technical strategies to address these shortcomings, we emphasize the importance 
of changing foundations’ attitude and stance.  The foundations that seem most likely to create new 
knowledge are those that are willing to experiment, those that embrace the idea of learning while doing.  
This means systematically trying to capture and analyze data while the work is underway, convert the 
information into knowledge, reflect on what one is doing, discuss what one is learning, and incorporate 
each other’s good ideas into the mix.  It means having theories, expectations, partnerships, and funding 
mechanisms that are flexible enough to allow in-course corrections.  It means taking risks that may end 
up as mistakes.   
 
Being experimental also means becoming a partner in, rather than owner of, the discovery process. 
Foundations that intentionally develop and maintain productive relationships with partners—characterized 
by mutuality, respect, flexibility, transparency, honesty, and constructive dialogue—gain a durable tool 
they can use to generate knowledge as well as meet community change goals.  Unless these 
relationships work, the best technical assistance tool or the most generous amount of funding cannot 
produce its desired impact, especially over the long run.  We have seen how learning can be undermined 
by a culture of anxiety, blame, and unresolved power dynamics.  There simply is no way for community 
change initiatives to test their theories, adjust their strategies, and achieve their outcomes if the partners 
cannot learn with and from each other.  The corollary, however, is that effective relationships and a 
learning stance constitute very powerful assets that philanthropy can bring to the community change 
enterprise.  Indeed, we see them as potentially transformative, affecting all aspects of foundation 
structure and operations.  
 
Despite the difficulties inherent in the first two themes, this work is worth doing—and, therefore, it is 
worth learning to do well.  We believe it is possible to strengthen poor communities and improve 
outcomes for the people who live in them.  And we believe that philanthropy has an important role to 
play in doing so.  Several questions especially invite further  philanthropic attention: 
 
• Intermediaries—For what kinds of goals and under what conditions can foundations use 
intermediaries most effectively?  Many foundations feel the pressure to stay lean, which makes it 
difficult for them to operate initiatives directly.  Others see their value as providing operational 
leadership and hands-on engagement.  What should a foundation consider as it assesses whether 
and how to work with an intermediary?  And, once the decision is made, how can foundations 
work with intermediaries as partners rather than in the hierarchical relationship of 
funder/grantee? 
 
• Outcomes—What (and whose) targets will the initiative pursue, and can this be determined 
without fueling unproductive power dynamics?  What promising methods and tools are emerging 
to evaluate progress toward outcomes? 
 
• Learning—No foundation is against learning, but few are satisfied with the structures and 
mechanisms they have put in place to maximize learning in real time. What more can be done to 
identify practical structures and strategies that make learning central to the philanthropic 
enterprise rather than an extra burden? 
 
• Initiatives versus long-term partnerships—Some foundations are finding that they need 
more flexibility to be responsive to the organic nature of community change work than a highly 
defined and structured initiative allows.  What are the implications of this shift in thinking for 
philanthropic strategy and investment?
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PREFACE 
 
uch has been written about the Neighborhood Improvement Initiative (NII), thanks to the Hewlett 
Foundation’s steady investments in evaluation, analysis, and technical assistance.2  “Lessons 
learned” documents from other initiatives also pervade the field of community change, including 
several we have written ourselves.  Most of them describe some positive results and some fundamental 
disappointments.  And, if you read enough of them, you come away feeling that many of the same 
discoveries and mistakes keep getting made, over and over again.  
 
When the opportunity to produce this analysis arose, our first reaction was that surely the existing 
coverage of NII must be sufficient.  Did the field really need another deconstruction of what happened in 
West Oakland, East Palo Alto, and Mayfair?  We were struck, however, by Hewlett leaders’ interest in 
using NII’s experience not to declare victory or assign failure but to build knowledge about community 
change, both within the Foundation and in the philanthropic field at large.   
 
Community change is an extraordinarily complex enterprise for philanthropy, and it raises lots of 
conceptual, technical, and philosophical issues.  Foundation leaders and staff can overcome many of the 
challenges by capturing and reflecting on their experiences, incorporating new knowledge, and refining 
their practices.  But those activities take time, persistence, and—especially when they occur in public—
courage.  Thus, there are few candid, foundation-sponsored analyses of what it really takes to do this 
work.3 
 
We were impressed, therefore, by Hewlett’s willingness not only to present useful lessons but to explain 
the choices that NII leaders made (intentionally and implicitly), the contemporaneous knowledge that 
influenced them, and the contextual factors that shaped NII’s effectiveness.  It opened the door to such 
questions as, “What did we [Hewlett] know and how did we know it?  What did we do with the 
knowledge, to what effect, and how can we apply what we learned to future efforts?  What tradeoffs did 
we make, and why?  What caused our theory and practices to evolve, in what ways, and with what 
consequences?  What do we (‘the field’) know now that might have changed NII’s implementation?”  
 
As we began to review materials and conduct interviews, we learned of NII’s important accomplishments 
in each neighborhood.  Many people worked hard to incubate new organizations, stimulate new services, 
and help new leaders emerge.  At the same time, we learned that NII had not, for the most part, lived up 
to everyone’s hopes and expectations.  And we quickly discovered multiple, competing perspectives that 
were hard to reconcile—differences of opinion about NII’s design, implementation, and outcomes.  Some 
                                               
2 Examples include:   
• Multiple, site-specific mid-year and annual evaluation reports by NII’s implementation evaluator, Teamworks. 
• Quantitative data reports by NII’s outcome evaluator, JMPT Consulting. 
• Kubo, M.M., Wong, A.J., and Morales, E.F.  (2004).  “Missing the (Tipping) Point:  Looking for Impact and 
Discovering Learning in a Comprehensive Community Initiative.”  San Francisco:  JMPT Consulting, Inc.   
• Robinson, A. and Barengo, S.  (2005).  “Lessons from the Middle:  Managing a Neighborhood Improvement 
Initiative.”  San Jose, CA:  Community Foundation Silicon Valley. 
• Pastor, M., Jr., Benner, C., Rosner, R., Matsuoka, M., and Jacobs, J.  (2004).  “Community Building, Community 
Bridging:  Linking Neighborhood Improvement Initiatives and the New Regionalism in the San Francisco Bay 
Area.”  Santa Cruz, CA:  Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community.  Available online at www. cjtc.ucsc.edu. 
• Penny, A. and Hohn, J.  (2004).  “Of, By, and For the People:  Reflections on the Neighborhood Improvement 
Initiative’s Planning Process and Implementation, 1994-2003.”  Unpublished report to the William and Flora 
Hewlett Foundation. 
3 Exceptions include:  “The Path of Most Resistance:  Reflections on Lessons Learned from New Futures.”  (1995).  
Baltimore:  The Annie E. Casey Foundation; and Walsh, J.  “The Eye of the Storm:  Ten Years on the Front Lines of 
New Futures.”  (1998).  Baltimore:  The Annie E. Casey Foundation. 
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of this Rashomon effect is to be expected in a complex, long-term community change initiative that 
evolves over time with changing players.  Some can be attributed to the different dynamics and 
trajectories in each of the three sites.  But what struck us most powerfully (and resonated with what we 
have observed in many other foundation-sponsored community change initiatives) was that NII 
participants couldn’t find a way to talk productively about these differences and to use what they 
experienced to improve the initiative.  
 
In fact, one of the few areas of consensus among almost all of our interviewees was a disappointment 
that more collective learning did not take place.  Participants describe an initiative that never established 
the trust needed for candid exchange and learning.  Relationships between Hewlett and its local partners 
often lacked mutual understanding and sometimes lacked respect; anxiety and blame surfaced 
frequently.  These conditions, which rarely rose to the level of public dialogue but were often discussed 
sotto voce, made it impossible to debate and refine NII’s theories productively, fine-tune strategies in 
response to realities, and have continuous learning and adaptation.   
 
That context shapes our review in the following ways: 
 
• Although opinions about NII vary widely, we aim to describe all points of view without 
favoring any one perspective.  We based our analysis on interviews with staff from Hewlett and 
the participating community foundations, evaluation and technical assistance providers, and 
community representatives.  We also reviewed NII evaluation reports, internal memoranda, and site 
and Foundation materials generated over the last 10 years.  We visited the NII communities twice to 
see the initiative’s visible effects and to talk with participants on their home ground.  To put NII’s 
experiences in perspective, we reviewed material from and about comparable initiatives dating from 
the mid-1980s to today.  We also asked four special reviewers, representing diverse experiences and 
perspectives, to comment on the draft text and to help us connect the report to their own audiences 
and networks.  During this process, the people who shared their thoughts and products with us were 
exceptionally candid about many aspects of the initiative, and we have tried to honor their honesty 
by producing a balanced report. 
 
• Our report is not an evaluation, nor is it an in-depth account of what happened on the 
ground in each neighborhood that participated in NII.  It is an analytical review of how the 
initiative was designed, managed, measured, and supported and what those experiences imply for 
privately funded community change—during NII, now, and in the future.   
 
• We cannot analyze every dimension of NII equally in all three sites, due to the extreme 
variation in how NII unfolded locally.  Instead we focus on the aspects that are most relevant to 
other initiatives, while also noting some site-specific experiences that indicate an opportunity for 
learning. 
 
• We consider NII not as one isolated initiative but in the context of other multi-site, 
foundation-sponsored, community change initiatives.  Our analyses—especially the 
observations we make at the end of several chapters and in the final chapter on implications—are 
informed by this broader philanthropic experience and also speak to it.  Our observations go beyond 
the lessons that could be drawn exclusively from NII and reflect our own judgment about what the 
larger philanthropic field wants to know.  
 
When we step back from NII, we have to wonder why so many interviewees found the initiative 
frustrating despite its important accomplishments.  It is not because there were insufficient resources—
everyone agrees that Hewlett’s investment was very generous.  It is not because people weren’t 
committed to change; many people at Hewlett, in the community foundations, and in the three 
communities worked very hard to get things right.  And it is not because of simple arrogance or 
ignorance or bad faith on anyone’s part.  Indeed, many of the same players have worked together on 
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initiatives since NII without the same level of frustration.  Improving outcomes for people in low-income 
neighborhoods is a challenging enterprise, but so are many other targets of philanthropic attention—
peace and security, the environment, economic development, and so on.  And so, throughout this review, 
we stay alert to factors that could help foundations and their partners engage more effectively—that is, 
to use knowledge and experience to improve the work over time.4  We believe that philanthropy has an 
important role to play in community change, and we hope that readers will use our observations to 
enhance and test their concepts of community change, adopt or invent better approaches, develop more 
capacity for positive change, and reflect on and share their results.  
 
Chapter 1:  Overview of the Neighborhood Improvement Initiative sets the tone for our analysis by 
describing NII’s goals, neighborhoods, and evolution in each site.  Chapter 2:  NII’s Theory of Change 
describes NII’s original concepts, issues in implementing key dimensions of the theory, and how the 
theory and approach shifted over time from resident-driven, mostly project-oriented action to the 
foundation-driven adoption of a more explicitly outcomes-oriented framework.    
 
Chapter 3:  Managing Change explores the role of community foundations as NII’s managing partners 
(i.e., the intermediary between Hewlett and local players), while Chapter 4:  Capturing Change digs 
deeper into NII’s approach to evaluation and learning.  In Chapter 5:  Supporting Change, we look at NII 
through the lens of four key resources for community change initiatives:  time; money; human effort, 
knowledge, and commitment; and technical assistance.   
 
Chapters 3 to 5 end with a brief set of observations about the topic at hand.  The observations represent 
just a subset of the vast universe of potential lessons, because we focus on those most directly related to 
NII’s experience.  We underscore some common themes across chapters as well, including:  the 
challenge of building strategic capacity at all levels of an initiative; the critical roles of timing, sequencing, 
and pace in the flow of resources into a community; and the importance of cultivating productive working 
relationships among all the partners that enable them to learn together and improve performance over 
time. 
 
Our review concludes with Chapter 6:  Implications for Philanthropy.  Here we step back to ponder what 
NII can teach us not about how to design, implement, and assess a powerful community change initiative 
but how to “do” this type of philanthropy more effectively.  Appendix A lists the people interviewed for 
this report, Appendix B identifies our special reviewers, and Appendix C offers a snapshot of results in 
each of the NII communities for those readers who want additional detail.  
                                               
4 Frumkin, P. (2006). Strategic Giving: The Art and Science of Philanthropy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
p. 56. 
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NII TIMELINE, 1996-2006 
 MAYFAIR WEST OAKLAND EAST PALO ALTO 
1996 Hewlett approves NII and invites proposal 
from Community Foundation of Silicon 
Valley (CFSV). Mexican American 
Community Services Agency (MACSA), 
with CFSV, organizes Mayfair 
Collaborative.   
1997 Three-year strategic plan completed.  
Hewlett approves Year 1 implementation 
grant.  MACSA transitions from lead to 
partner agency.  CFSV and Collaborative 
decide to form new intermediary, Mayfair 
Improvement Initiative (MII).   
1998 Mayfair opens MII office, hires director.  
25 projects begin implementation.   
Hewlett approves planning 
grant to The San Francisco 
Foundation (TSFF); kick-off 
neighborhood event starts 
formal planning process. 
 
1999 CFSV and MII clarify roles/responsibilities.  
Baseline survey of outcomes and 
indicators is conducted. 
Community plan completed.  
Bylaws adopted for 7th 
Street-McClymonds Corridor 
intermediary. 
Hewlett selects East Palo Alto as third NII site.  
Peninsula Community Foundation (PCF) 
becomes managing partner. 
2000 “Index of Progress” is produced, based on 
1999 survey.  
Board and officer elections 
completed; director hired. 
Community organizing, public launch, and 
planning conducted.  One East Palo Alto 
(OEPA) evolves into formal organization. 
2001 NCDI leads strategic planning to sharpen 
MII’s focus. 
West Oakland makes first 
grants.  Hewlett and The 
San Francisco Foundation 
articulate conditions for 
future support. 
10 resident workgroups identify multiple 
issues and projects to pursue. 
2002 Hewlett contracts with JMPT for outcome 
evaluation and centralizes technical 
assistance under the Foundation’s 
management.  Mayfair selected to 
participate in San Jose’s Strong 
Neighborhoods Initiative.  
West Oakland elects a new 
board of directors, 
terminates executive 
director.  After several 
months, intermediary is 
disbanded and NII ends in 
West Oakland.   
Conflicting interests fracture OEPA’s board. 
PCF resigns as managing partner but remains 
funding partner.  Hewlett begins managing 
the work directly, streamlines OEPA’s priorities 
around three signature projects (EARN, 
LEARN, and SAFE). OEPA obtains independent 
nonprofit status. Hewlett contracts with JMPT 
for outcome evaluation and centralizes 
technical assistance under the Foundation’s 
management. 
2003 MII develops new 3-year plan with fewer 
staff/services, more intermediary role. 
TSFF makes two final rounds 
of grants in West Oakland. 
OEPA’s executive director resigns.  Evaluation 
management consultant begins helping OEPA 
with data.  
2004 Mayfair’s NII support sunsets with final 
one-time grant. 
Evaluation of McClymonds 
Youth and Family Center 
begins. 
New executive director stabilizes OEPA’s 
structure and relationships. 
2005 
  
OEPA drops three-program model, ends EARN, 
and refocuses on youth development.  
2006 
  
East Palo Alto’s NII support sunsets with final 
one-time grant. 
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NII’S UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Positive neighborhood change is most likely 
to occur when:   
 
The initiative targets geographically 
compact neighborhoods with modest 
populations; 
  
Residents have direct control over 
planning and managing the distribution of 
resources in their community; 
 
Approaches are comprehensive and 
coordinated, rather than narrowly defined, 
discrete, and uncoordinated; 
 
Capacity-building strategies help 
residents and neighborhood organizations 
participate in community renewal; 
 
Public and private stakeholders develop 
partnerships; 
 
Neighborhood change is connected to 
regional forces and resources; and  
 
Resources are committed over a multi-
year period.  
— 1 — 
OVERVIEW OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT 
INITIATIVE 
 
 
NII’S GOALS AND APPROACH 
 
NII designers set forth six goals for the initiative: 
 
1. Connect fragmented efforts to address poverty-related issues in select communities. 
 
2. Improve the capacity (proficiency and resources) of participating community-based organizations. 
 
3. Improve Bay Area community foundations’ capacity to support neighborhood improvement 
strategies. 
 
4. Develop neighborhood leaders by creating a 
vehicle for increasing resident involvement in 
neighborhood planning and improvement 
strategies. 
 
5. Leverage significant public/private resources to 
support community improvement. 
 
6. Provide long-term statistical evidence of changes in 
poverty indicators (e.g., unemployment, welfare 
dependency, vacant and abandoned structures).  
 
Although this last goal identified an explicit outcome that 
Hewlett hoped NII would achieve, it did not receive a lot of 
attention early in the initiative, when local efforts centered 
on reaching out to neighborhood residents and helping 
them develop their agenda for change.  
 
The belief or theory for how NII was to achieve its goals 
stated that “improvement in the physical, social, and 
economic conditions in lower-income neighborhoods will 
result from the active involvement of residents in 
community planning and decision making processes, in 
combination with a comprehensive, coordinated, multi-year 
strategy to address the problems that impair the quality of 
life in these neighborhoods.”5 
 
Hewlett did not develop a detailed theory of change that 
specified all the connections between each goal, the 
strategies to achieve that goal, and the assumptions 
underlying the connections.  So we focus instead on NII’s 
basic design elements:   
 
                                               
5 NII’s goals and theory evolved during implementation, but we refer here to the 2002 versions cited in many NII documents.  
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• NII would begin with a year-long resident-driven planning process to generate a plan that would 
guide the neighborhood’s future revitalization efforts.  A community-based lead agency would 
facilitate this process in concert with a local collaborative of residents and community stakeholders.6    
 
• Planning would be followed by six years of implementation, funded at $750,000 per year,7 during 
which time the neighborhood improvement efforts would have access to significant technical 
assistance and training resources.  
 
• Although Hewlett did not specify what sort of community entity would be responsible for 
implementation, all three sites would elect to create a freestanding neighborhood-based intermediary 
to carry the work forward. In order to connect neighborhood change with the larger forces and 
resources of the surrounding region, each site would establish an advisory committee composed of 
diverse movers and shakers from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.  
 
• Rather than operate NII itself, Hewlett chose three community foundations to be its managing 
partners tasked with staffing the initiative, regranting Hewlett’s resources, managing technical 
assistance and site-specific evaluation, and leveraging additional resources.  
 
• Although each site was responsible for obtaining neighborhood data and developing project-level 
tracking systems, Hewlett would contract directly with an independent evaluation firm to assess NII’s 
implementation and progress in each site.  Hewlett also would assume responsibility for cross-site 
documentation, training, and learning activities. 
 
THE NII NEIGHBORHOODS 
 
After narrowing the candidate pool to 10 neighborhoods identified by consultants to have an appropriate 
mix of need and readiness8, Hewlett selected three neighborhoods that would be phased into NII over 
time: Mayfair (1996), West Oakland (1998) and East Palo Alto (1999).  All three neighborhoods suffer 
from poverty, unemployment and under-employment, poor schools, overcrowded and substandard 
housing, and other urban ills that distinguish them from the surrounding Bay Area.  NII unfolded during a 
time when this region was undergoing dramatic economic transformation, most significantly the dot-com 
expansion in the mid-to-late 1990s and its subsequent downturn.  Consequently, Mayfair, West Oakland, 
and East Palo Alto all faced rising housing prices, gentrification, and other development pressures that 
challenged NII participants to think regionally as they developed their local strategies.  As Figure 1 
suggests, however, the three neighborhoods differ considerably in some key demographic characteristics.  
Thus each neighborhood also brought its own history and set of possibilities to NII.  
 
Historically an entry point and staging area for immigrants, the Mayfair neighborhood of East San Jose is 
the smallest (about one square mile) and most homogeneous of the NII sites.  Up to 50% of residents 
are undocumented immigrants—which presents both challenges and assets, such as Mayfair’s 
entrepreneurial capacity.  (An estimated 40% of resident families work in informal, entrepreneurial 
businesses.)  As the childhood home of Cesar Chavez, Mayfair also has a long tradition of community 
organizing, activism, and productive relations with civic and elected leaders, who recognize the need to 
address Mayfair’s poverty.  
 
                                               
6 NII’s language underscored the “resident-driven” nature of its approach but did not specify a method (beyond the 
planning collaborative) through which residents would drive the change effort—an issue we address in Chapter 2. 
7 Hewlett committed this amount to each site, plus an additional $250,000 per site for operations by the managing 
partner.  In East Palo Alto, after the managing partner withdrew, Hewlett redirected the operations money to the 
site.  EPA received $1.4 million in 2004, $1.6 million in 2005, and $1.7 million in 2006.   
8 Internal Hewlett Foundation document, 2004. 
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Figure 1:  DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF NII SITES9 
 
West Oakland is a predominantly African-American neighborhood with small but rapidly growing Latino 
and Asian populations.  Once selected for NII, neighborhood leaders renegotiated the original boundaries 
so that the target neighborhood, which came to be known as the 7th Street McClymonds Corridor, 
increased in size to three square miles with a population of over 14,000.  West Oakland had a more 
intractable set of poverty factors than the other two neighborhoods, including more long-term poverty, 
more female-headed households, and higher rates of disability.  West Oakland was home to many 
community-based organizations that got support from private and public funders but achieved only 
limited results.  Still, many people perceived the neighborhood as sitting on the cusp of significant 
change, thanks to a new Oakland mayor, redevelopment plans associated with the nearby army base and 
port, and designation of the area as a Commercial Revitalization Zone / Enhanced Enterprise Community. 
 
East Palo Alto (EPA) is an area of about 2.5 square miles that lies close to some of the country’s 
richest neighborhoods—and yet worlds apart.  Historically, it was an ethnically diverse area with a 
majority of African-American residents.  In the 1980s, EPA activists pushed to declare independence from 
San Mateo County, of which EPA was an unincorporated area.  They failed on a legal level but set in 
place a strong, pro-neighborhood, anti-outsider dynamic and produced neighborhood leaders who later 
brought that perspective to NII.  At the time NII entered EPA, Latinos (many of whom were new 
immigrants) had become the largest population of residents (62%), and the demographic changes 
                                               
9 Data in this table are from the 2000 U.S. Bureau of the Census as cited in Pastor, M., Jr., Benner, C., Rosner, R., Matsuoka, 
M., and Jacobs, J.  (2004).  “Community Building, Community Bridging:  Linking Neighborhood Improvement Initiatives and the 
New Regionalism in the San Francisco Bay Area.”  Santa Cruz, CA:  Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community.  Available 
online at www. cjtc.ucsc.edu.  The entire section draws substantially from this publication, as well as from sites’ materials and 
Teamworks’ reports.  
     MAYFAIR WEST OAKLAND    EAST PALO ALTO 
Population    8,349   14,127   13,855 
 
Racial/Ethnic Composition 
 Anglo      2.9%     5.6%     3.1% 
 Latino    79.8%   17.3%   61.6% 
 African American    1.8%   65.7%   25.1% 
 Asian/Pacific Islander  13.6%     7.9%     7.9% 
 Other      1.9%     3.5%     2.3% 
 
Foreign-born    59.2%   16.9%   43.2% 
Non-citizen    42.2%   10.6%   34.1% 
Living in poverty   16.8%   36.2%   16.2% 
Living below 200% of poverty  39.8%   60.8%   43.6% 
 
Education: Males older than 25 
 % with < high school  61.9%   35.8%   57.8% 
 % with B.A. or more    7.8%   14.0%     7.1% 
 
Education: Females older than 25 
 % with < high school  56.7%   31.5%   50.4% 
 % with B.A. or more    9.2%   13.3%     9.9% 
 
Labor Force Participation 
 Males    61.0%   56.6%   63.2% 
 Females   46.9%   47.3%   52.8% 
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produced volatile racial/ethnic conflict.  EPA was not originally among the sites Hewlett considered for NII 
because it had a weak, financially depleted municipal government; adversarial relations among municipal 
leaders, community members, and county government; and a weak nonprofit sector.  Working in EPA, 
however, fulfilled Hewlett’s commitment to working in the poorest communities and to investing in the 
Foundation’s own backyard.  
 
SUMMARY OF NII’S EVOLUTION AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
 
Two overarching facts shaped NII’s trajectory.  First, as noted earlier, the NII “story” differed so much 
across the three neighborhoods that NII essentially became a separate initiative in each location rather 
than one initiative with three sites.  Second, the changes to NII’s conceptual framework, management, 
and implementation strategies that occurred part way into the initiative (described in Chapter 2) greatly 
influenced what NII looked like on the ground.  Here, we summarize for each site the key players and 
events involved in planning and implementation, a snapshot of results achieved, and the initiative’s 
current status. 
 
A SNAPSHOT OF NII IN MAYFAIR10 
 
Managing Partner. The Community Foundation Silicon Valley (CFSV) was the managing partner for 
what came to be known as the Mayfair Improvement Initiative (MII).  At the time, CFSV (then known as 
the Community Trust of Santa Clara County) had about 12 staff and $100 million in assets, much of it 
non-discretionary.  Although it had participated in the C. S. Mott Foundation’s Neighborhood Grants 
Program, it had not undertaken anything close to the scale and complexity of NII.  
 
Planning.  CFSV and a well-established lead agency, the Mexican American Community Services Agency 
(MACSA), facilitated a community planning process that generated a strategic plan with 76 projects and 
seven desired outcomes.  The plan represented substantial consensus among the diverse stakeholders 
who participating in the planning collaborative; about 60% were residents. 
 
Implementation.  After Hewlett approved Mayfair’s three-year strategic plan, MACSA made the 
transition from lead to partner agency.  Without a lead agency and well aware of the challenges of 
starting a new organization, CFSV considered running NII itself or discontinuing it.  Ultimately, CFSV 
decided to help launch a new, freestanding nonprofit in the neighborhood—the Mayfair Improvement 
Initiative (MII).  With help from technical assistance providers, participants in the planning collaborative 
elected an interim board of directors, adopted by-laws, hired staff, and selected 25 priority projects for 
implementation.  MII slowly began to emerge as a viable community-based organization focused on 
carrying out the agenda outlined in the strategic plan.  Over the next six years, MII designed and 
managed several programs and regranted money for projects undertaken by other neighborhood 
organizations.  Several themes surfaced during this time:  
 
• Focus—MII eventually honed its focus to three areas deemed critical for family well-being:  school 
readiness, employment, and housing.  Each area encompassed leadership development and 
community organizing efforts.    
 
• Service provider versus neighborhood intermediary—Over time and with an eye toward sustainability, 
MII developed a hybrid intermediary model.  It aimed to provide some services but also build the 
capacity of other neighborhood groups through community organizing, networking, partnership, and 
                                               
10 This brief snapshot is based on review of biannual evaluation reports, interviews, and other NII materials including two 
publications exclusively devoted to Mayfair:  Robinson, A. and Barengo, S.  (2005).  “Lessons from the Middle:  Managing a 
Neighborhood Improvement Initiative.”  San Jose, CA:  Community Foundation Silicon Valley; and Berger, R.  (2006).  “Si Se 
Puede! Lessons for Community Transformation.”  San Jose, CA:  Mayfair Improvement Initiative. Available online at 
www.mayfairneighborhood.org. 
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coalitions.  When some MII transferred some services to other neighborhood organizations, MII 
reduced its own staff size. 
 
• Sustainability—MII began sustainability planning midway through the Neighborhood Improvement 
Initiative, a move that seemed promising.  Resource development was delayed, however, by 
differences of opinion among board members, the departure of MII’s founding director, the need to 
build MII’s own capacity for fundraising, and the refinement of MII’s focus. 
 
• Community engagement—MII lost some connection to residents over time, so leaders tried to 
reengage community members by moving MII program staff into partner agencies and using cultural 
events to create bonds among neighbors.  MII also began to tackle issues important to residents, 
such as immigrant rights and voter registration. 
  
Technical assistance and support.  MII received technical assistance from the National Community 
Development Institute; the Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community at the University of California, 
Santa Cruz; Collaborative Economics; and JMPT Consulting.  In addition, a former CFSV staff member 
whom Hewlett recruited to its staff in 2000 spent one day per week helping to build MII’s resources. 
 
Results.  Appendix C summarizes the key outcomes that resulted from MII’s work: tangible outcomes for 
residents, an increase in resources invested in Mayfair, and stronger neighborhood leadership.  MII 
implemented 54 of the 76 projects in its original strategic plan, adding others as the work became more 
focused and as MII grew more strategic about its role as a local intermediary.  One highlight was the use 
of promotores (community educators and outreach workers) to help families access health insurance and 
school readiness services.  Hewlett’s $6.3 million leveraged $9.6 million in additional funds for Mayfair.  
 
Epilogue.  In 2006, two years after the formal end of the Neighborhood Improvement Initiative in 
Mayfair, MII operates with substantial credibility and increasing capacity.  Leaders plan to change the 
intermediary’s name to Somos Mayfair to underscore the organization’s mission:  “Continuing the path 
toward ensuring social justice and promoting economic stability and community leadership.”  
Approximately half of MII’s $1 million budget is supported by government contracts; the rest comes from 
foundations, corporations, and individual donors.  MII has strong staff leadership from the neighborhood, 
an engaged board, and good working relationships with local government and CFSV.  
 
A SNAPSHOT OF NII IN WEST OAKLAND 
 
Managing Partner.  The San Francisco Foundation (TSFF) was Hewlett’s managing partner for the 7th 
Street McClymonds Corridor Neighborhood Improvement Initiative.  TSFF had a long history of 
grantmaking in West Oakland, an established community development program, and experienced staff. 
Unable to find an appropriate lead agency within the neighborhood to oversee the planning process, the 
Hewlett Foundation asked TSFF to play that role, too.  TSFF ended up being both the managing partner 
and the lead agency (local intermediary) for the first two and a half years of the initiative. 
 
Planning.  A core group of 35-45 residents participated in work groups to develop the plan, conduct 
outreach and organizing, make small grants, examine training needs, and develop a permanent 
governance structure to administer NII.  An interim Governing Body was formed to make decisions about 
small grants and to convene town hall meetings during the planning phase, which was extended by three 
months.  These efforts produced a plan that called for the creation of an independent nonprofit 
organization and program activities in nine areas. 
 
Implementation.  The shift from planning to implementation occurred slowly, leading to a six-month 
extension of West Oakland’s first year in NII.  Little outreach to public and private partners occurred 
during this time, because planners first wanted to establish priorities and set up an effective governance 
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structure.  Board elections were held, by-laws completed, and, toward the end of the year, an executive 
director was hired for the new organization.  The first round of grants was approved shortly thereafter. 
 
Over the next two years, the 7th Street McClymonds Corridor NII struggled to establish itself as an 
independent neighborhood-based organization.  A culture of mistrust of outsiders and factionalism within 
the community impeded progress.  TSFF felt pressure to respect the principle of self-determination while 
also keeping the initiative focused and moving forward.  The effort was unable to engage Latino and 
Asian residents in any sustained way, despite the rapid growth of these populations in the neighborhood.  
Technical assistance was sporadic; providers’ roles weren’t always clear, they lacked an overall strategy, 
and many people viewed the quality as inconsistent.   
 
An NII evaluation report suggests that one of persistent problems stemmed from a misalignment 
between resident leaders’ view of the initiative as “a source of sustenance” for their organizations and 
NII’s goal of using Hewlett’s money to leverage support “for projects of sufficient scale to affect tangible 
change and to develop new networks of influence to support the target area.”  
 
In West Oakland’s second year of implementation, Hewlett and TSFF issued the 7th Street McClymonds 
Corridor board some conditions for going forward (e.g., gaining nonprofit status, developing two or three 
signature projects, formalizing grantmaking procedures, building institutional relationships) and hired a 
firm to help with these tasks.  About a year later, under new leadership, the board adopted four 
community-wide target outcomes and created workgroups to establish priorities for each.  A decision to 
terminate the lead agency’s executive director prompted a board retreat and prolonged search for a new 
leader.  But internal politics undermined the search so thoroughly that TSFF and Hewlett finally decided 
to dissolve the fledgling organization.  The 7th Street McClymonds Corridor’s board “never cohered around 
a mission and vision…or a clear set of priorities for action” despite genuine efforts by many residents, 
technical assistance providers, and the sponsoring foundations, Teamworks evaluators found.  
 
Technical assistance and support.  At the beginning of West Oakland’s involvement in NII, 7th Street 
McClymonds Corridor had a technical assistance team of three organizations:  the Oakland Citizens 
Committee for Urban Renewal, the National Economic Development and Law Center (NEDLC), and the 
Urban Strategies Council.  Later in the initiative, the Institute for Urban and Regional Development 
(IURD) at the University of California-Berkeley, NEDLC, and the Community Development Institute (CDI) 
played significant TA roles, joined by other organizations on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Results.  During its three post-planning years, the 7th Street McClymonds Corridor NII made 57 grants 
worth a total of $1.6 million.  The quality of grant making improved from a rushed start, marked by 
grants of minimal value to the community, to increasingly strategic grants with potential to attract other 
resources for affordable housing, youth, workforce development, community building, and economic 
development.  Few data exist on project outcomes, due to poor data collection among grantees and a 
failed effort to establish a grants tracking system (hence we present no summary of West Oakland results 
in Appendix C).  7th Street McClymonds Corridor NII received a total of $4.7 million over four years (76% 
from Hewlett, 14% from TSSF, and the rest from the public sector and other foundations).  TSFF did not 
generate a full-fledged strategy for resource development strategy, however, because it was waiting for 
clearer direction from the initiative’s board. 
 
Epilogue.  Although NII’s sponsor and managing partner shut down the 7th Street McClymonds Corridor 
office, TSFF administered a final round of grants that was consistent with the project areas identified by 
the board and work groups.  To fulfill both foundations’ commitment to the neighborhood, TSFF also 
convinced Hewlett to support six months of planning to transform a school-based health center at 
McClymonds High School into a youth and family center that integrates and coordinates health, youth 
development, and social services.  The center is now in its third year of operation and is being evaluated 
by the University of California’s Institute for Health Policy Studies.  Hewlett provided funding for the first 
two years of the evaluation. 
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A SNAPSHOT OF NII IN EAST PALO ALTO 
 
Managing Partner.  The Peninsula Community Foundation (PCF) began as NII’s managing partner in 
East Palo Alto.  PCF already had many projects and investments in the community, and during NII’s 
planning year PCF raised an additional $1.1 million and leveraged $1.5 million for implementation in East 
Palo Alto.  By 2002, however, PCF leaders had grown frustrated by disagreements with Hewlett over the 
theory of how communities change, what the pace of change should be, and how best to develop civic 
capital.  PCF therefore resigned its managing partner role but continued to oversee grants made from 
community foundation funds.  At that point, Hewlett became both the sponsoring funder and the 
managing partner for East Palo Alto.  By the end of 2004, Hewlett redefined its role as solely a funder.  
From then on it relied on the local intermediary, One East Palo Alto (OEPA), to recommend grants and 
strategy for the initiative.   
 
Planning.  PCF framed the work as “The People’s Initiative” and, with help from the Community 
Development Institute, conducted three months of intensive outreach to the ethnic, faith, nonprofit, and 
civic communities.  An estimated 1,000 people attended the initiative’s public launch in 2000.  Nine 
months of community planning followed, accompanied by efforts to develop neighborhood leaders who 
could move the plan forward.  Residents formed task forces to discuss issues of individual and family 
support, neighborhood revitalization, and community building.  The groups proposed 39 projects 
involving dozens of grantees.  Grant making was the responsibility of 10 workgroups composed of 
residents and local nonprofit leaders, each of which had a $100,000 budget.   
 
Implementation.  During the planning process, NII was housed at CDI, a local technical assistance 
organization.  OEPA evolved into a formal organization in mid-2000 but CDI continued to serve as fiscal 
agent until the end of 2002, when OEPA obtained nonprofit status.   
 
At first, inexperienced staff and board leadership delayed OEPA’s development.  In early 2002, concerned 
about focus, Hewlett asked OEPA to concentrate on three to five issues.  Neighborhood participants voted 
and OEPA restructured its work around their priorities:  jobs, education, and crime.  Over the next two 
years, those signature projects—known as EARN, LEARN, and SAFE—evolved to include job training, 
employee development and career advancement, asset development programs, and local employment 
and business policies (EARN); English as a Second Language, parent leadership development, teacher 
development and coaching, and youth support (LEARN); and to organize and connect residents, build a 
community network, and partner with agencies that serve at-risk youth and young adults (SAFE).  A 
fourth priority, community engagement, ultimately became part of all three projects. 
 
In 2003, OEPA’s executive director resigned.  The post was vacant for eight months while the board 
struggled with internal strife and fatigue.  A new director came on board in April 2004, and OEPA began 
to set goals and strategies for the organization overall and for its programs.  In 2005, OEPA dropped its 
three-program model to reflect the loss of EARN’s program director, a desire to sharpen the focus on 
youth development, and concerns about sustaining signature projects.  Resources previously directed to 
job placement and asset development shifted to youth employment, job readiness, and leadership. 
 
Key issues for NII in East Palo Alto included: 
 
• Hewlett’s direct involvement in managing the work—When PCF withdrew from the managing partner 
role and Hewlett became directly involved, the dynamic between sponsoring foundation and site 
changed dramatically.  OEPA no longer had an entity to buffer its interactions with Hewlett, which 
exacerbated the power imbalance.  Hewlett, meanwhile, was exposed to all of the site’s strengths 
and weaknesses in detail.  The situation improved after late 2004, when OEPA hired a new executive 
director and Hewlett resumed its role as primarily the funder.  
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• Competition among grantees—Some community leaders and organizations were used to being the 
gatekeepers for resources coming into the neighborhood.  They actively competed for NII dollars 
against other groups located inside the neighborhood and outside the city limits.  
 
• Priorities—Tension persisted between (a) using planning and project development as a tool for 
resident engagement, which means allowing extra time to make mistakes and learn from them; and 
(b) getting the work off the ground in a timely way, which means intervening with knowledge about 
“what works” from outside the community. 
 
• Weak economy— The dot-com economy’s crash made many neighborhood conditions worse at a time 
when the fledgling initiative was just getting underway.   
 
• Diffuse organizational infrastructure—There are many players operating in East Palo Alto, with little or 
no coordination.  In 2004, for example, Stanford University alone had several dozen interventions 
underway in the school district, all operating independently of each other. 
 
Technical assistance and support.  OEPA’s technical assistance providers included:  the Community 
Development Institute; National Community Development Institute; Local Initiatives Support Corporation 
(LISC); Stanford University’s Haas Center for Public Service; and the University of California-Santa Cruz’s 
Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community.  In late 2003, Hewlett hired an evaluation management 
consultant to help OEPA and other NII partner organizations collect and report evaluation data, facilitate 
communication between the evaluators, and review evaluation reports.  In 2005, OEPA obtained technical 
assistance on sustainability planning from an experienced fundraiser. 
 
Results.  Appendix C summarizes the key outcomes of NII in East Palo Alto, including: improved 
neighborhood safety; English-language acquisition for adults and after-school enrichment for children; 
new and stronger resident leaders, social networks, and community organizations; job placements and 
support to local entrepreneurs; and greater investment of public and private resources in the 
neighborhood.  Highlights include the formation of block clubs and a Crime Reduction Task Force, which 
introduced community policing; and the incubation of Nuestra Casa, an organization that provides 
English-language and parent leadership training to adult residents who are mostly monolingual Spanish-
speakers.  Nuestra Casa trains and nurtures new leaders who are especially active around school reform. 
 
Epilogue.  By 2006, OEPA had become a community organization with a commitment to “fostering 
system-level change through building strategic alliances with key institutions and people.”11  Although 
evaluators note that OEPA remains a “small and fragile organization,” it has come a long way since its 
turbulent early years.  Five OEPA board members have become city commissioners, elected officials, 
and/or board members for other organizations.  In OEPA’s fifth fiscal year, the organization attracted 40 
percent of its funding ($243,400) from non-Hewlett sources, including the school district; and the board 
of directors affirmed a desire for the organization to continue its work in the neighborhood. 
 
Although the Neighborhood Improvement Initiative was winding down in East Palo Alto in 2006, Hewlett 
continues to invest in East Palo Alto with even greater resources than those provided by NII—in part, 
Hewlett staff say, because of the relationships and investments begun during the Neighborhood 
Improvement Initiative.  In particular, final NII grants and additional funding from Hewlett’s Education 
Program have built on the foundation laid by OEPA to improve in-school and after-school instruction, 
increase parent engagement, and provide summer job training for young people.  For example: 
 
• Grants to the Ravenswood City School District, New Teacher’s Center, and Boys and Girls Club 
support small-group instruction after school and provide coaching for after-school staff.  Hewlett 
                                               
11 Teamworks OEPA Year 5 Report, p. 7.   
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credits the New Teacher’s Center’s work, in part, with tripling the percentage of new teachers 
who return to East Palo Alto classrooms from one year to the next.   
 
• Nuestra Casa’s efforts to organize and educate new immigrant parents continue to expand, and 
the parents have launched successful campaigns to improve school grounds and lunch quality.   
 
• A youth employment program co-lead by OEPA and the Opportunity Industrial Center West, and  
involving more than a dozen service providers, teaches basic job-readiness skills to 100 youth 
who face significant barriers (e.g., previous incarceration, placement in foster care, school 
dropout), pays them for their time, and links them with continued education, training, and 
employment support. 
 
• Other summer programs—many of which pay stipends—involve EPA young people in mentoring, 
public art projects, job training, service learning, political education, community organizing, 
academic support, counseling, and leadership development.  
 
 
— 2 — 
NII’S THEORY OF CHANGE 
 
s described in Chapter 1, NII’s designers set forth six goals for the initiative and a loosely 
developed theory or set of assumptions about how those goals would be achieved: 
 
1. Connect fragmented efforts to address poverty-related issues in select communities 
 
2. Improve the capacity (proficiency and resources) of participating community-based 
organizations  
 
3. Improve Bay Area community foundations’ capacity to support neighborhood 
improvement strategies 
 
4. Develop neighborhood leaders by creating a vehicle for increasing resident 
involvement in neighborhood planning and improvement  
 
5. Leverage significant public/private resources to support community improvement 
 
6. Provide long-term statistical evidence of changes in poverty indicators (e.g., 
unemployment, welfare dependency, vacant and abandoned structures)  
 
Hewlett did not develop a detailed theory of change that specified all the connections between each goal, 
the strategies to achieve that goal, and the assumptions underlining the connections.  In this respect, NII 
was like other community change initiatives of its day, whose theories were articulated as the work 
unfolded rather than in advance (e.g., Neighborhood and Family Initiative, Rebuilding Communities 
Initiative, Plain Talk).  However, NII was guided by an overall theory that “improvement in the physical, 
social, and economic conditions in lower-income neighborhoods will result from the active involvement of 
residents in community planning and decision making processes, in combination with a comprehensive, 
coordinated, multi-year strategy to address the problems that impair the quality of life in these 
neighborhoods.” 
 
We begin this chapter by reviewing how the Foundation developed NII’s ideas at the outset.  Then we 
examine NII’s implementation to understand how three of its core ideas—strengthening residents’ role in 
community change, building community capacity, and connecting neighborhood improvement efforts to 
A
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the larger region—translated into practice and to see what NII’s experience teaches us about those ideas.  
We also describe what many participants viewed as a shift in Hewlett’s approach near the initiative’s 
midpoint, along with different perspectives on the meaning and consequences of that shift.  Because the 
decision to involve community foundations as managing partners is such an important design feature for 
NII, we reserve that topic for Chapter 3.  
 
NII’S IDEAS AT THE OUTSET 
 
To lay the groundwork for NII, Hewlett hired a consultant to review the experience of the major place-
based community change initiatives sponsored by foundations in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Hewlett 
staff and the consultant also conducted interviews and focus groups of program managers and funders to 
solicit their lessons, advice, and feedback about NII’s emerging design.  Consequently, many of the ideas 
and values behind NII resonated with the thinking behind other comprehensive community initiatives 
(CCIs) being tested elsewhere at the time, including community engagement and ownership, coordinated 
development strategies, capacity building, partnerships, and leverage.  These concepts also received 
broad support among NII stakeholders.  
 
Indeed, NII generated substantial excitement among those concerned with the plight of poor 
neighborhoods during the mid-to-late 1990s.  The initiative’s broad goals and values were appealing.  
Many people viewed Hewlett’s seven-year (per site) commitment as an important, even bold, statement 
of how committed the Foundation was to community change and how deeply the Foundation believed 
such change was possible.12  Observers also saw the scale of Hewlett’s financial commitment ($750,000 
per site per year after planning) as sufficient to bring stakeholders to the table and leverage additional 
resources, and Hewlett’s support for technical assistance also seemed generous. 
 
The only idea at the outset that did not generate substantial support (outside of Hewlett) was NII’s goal 
of providing long-term statistical evidence of changes in poverty indicators.  Few people believed it was 
realistic to move the needle on a neighborhood’s poverty indicators in seven years using a loosely 
structured, community-driven approach.  Nor had any CCI to date been able to resolve the difficult 
measurement and attribution issues involved in establishing impact on neighborhood-level outcomes.   
 
The skepticism about demonstrating poverty reduction was widely shared but not publicly articulated or 
debated before NII’s rollout.  Few people wanted this obstacle to prevent Hewlett from launching NII, so 
they didn’t voice their concerns.  Hewlett staff, meanwhile, genuinely thought that NII would reduce 
poverty, although in retrospect they acknowledge that “it’s more accurate to say we wanted it to be a 
catalyst for poverty reduction.”  In NII’s early years, it was only Hewlett’s request that evaluators 
produce quantitative evidence of poverty reduction that stimulated a more thorough debate within the 
Foundation, and among its advisors, about what impacts NII was likely and unlikely to generate. 
 
IMPLEMENTING KEY DIMENSIONS OF NII’S THEORY  
 
Community change initiatives typically have long-term agendas that go beyond the sponsoring 
foundation’s projected timeline.  This makes it especially important to build resident ownership, 
knowledge, and skills; develop the community’s infrastructure; and embed the change effort in the larger 
geographic and political context, because those are the capacities that will move the work forward and 
maximize the sponsor’s investment.  Here we examine how NII’s theory about these tasks played out in 
practice and see what contribution NII’s experience can make to improving broader philanthropic 
effectiveness. 
 
                                               
12 The seven-year timeframe was determined more by the maximum amount of time staff thought the Hewlett Board 
could accept than by an explicit rationale for what was supposed to happen by the end of seven years.  Still, seven 
years was a much longer commitment than was typical for the Foundation.  
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LESSONS TAKEN BY NII’S PLANNERS  
FROM OTHER COMMUNITY CHANGE INITIATIVES 
 
Before proposing the Neighborhood Improvement Initiative to Hewlett’s trustees, Foundation staff conducted and 
commissioned research on similar initiatives, including:  (1) a written analysis of strategies, structures, early 
outcomes, and emerging lessons based on the Surdna Foundation’s Comprehensive Community Revitalization 
Program, the Ford Foundation’s Neighborhood and Family Initiative, the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Rebuilding 
Communities Initiative, the Pew Charitable Trusts’ Neighborhood Preservation Initiative, the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Community Planning and Action Program, and the East Bay Funders Initiative; (2) demographic 
research on the nine-county Bay Area; (3) a scan of the capacities of community-based organizations in the 
potential target communities; (4) focus groups with other Bay Area funders; and (5) an analysis of Hewlett’s own 
neighborhood funding over the previous decade.  From this research, NII developers say they took the following 
lessons:* 
 
• Designate or create an intermediary organization to manage day-to-day operations onsite (if the 
sponsoring entity is not an operating foundation). 
  
• Include technical assistance and capacity building as core components of such initiatives, and commit 
funds for them. 
 
• Build evaluation into the initiative from an early stage.   
 
• Support the work not through a funding consortium or funding pool but through one sponsor, with other 
funders able to support the work as independent investors if they want to.  
 
• Think long term (e.g., at least six or seven years in sites to achieve results).  
 
• Operate in multiple neighborhoods simultaneously.  
 
• Concentrate on small geographic areas. 
 
• Foster an inclusive, community-driven planning process to drive the work in sites.  Community 
members should set priorities for action, and the sponsoring foundation should respond to community 
wishes.  This means that community development corporations—a mainstay of early community change 
initiatives—are not the sole (or even primary) vehicle for change.  
 
• Cultivate support from all relevant substantive areas or departments in the sponsoring foundation, 
including education and health care as well as broader “community development.” 
 
NII creator Alvertha Penny also was deeply influenced by a visit to the Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood 
Transformation Initiative in Baltimore, which she visited in the early 1990s before joining Hewlett.  That initiative, 
created by Jim Rouse of The Enterprise Foundation and then-mayor Kurt Schmoke, drew broad support from 
other funders, including the Annie E. Casey Foundation; had a strong partnership between private funders and 
public agencies; gave the sponsoring funder a hands-on role in the community; created a new community-based 
organization to coordinate the work; and gave residents a central role in neighborhood transformation.   
 
“Sandtown-Winchester gave me hope that community change was possible,” Penny recalls.  “I thought, there’s 
something here.  If they’re willing to take the risk, we ought to be willing to do it.  That was my turning point.” 
 
*Authors’ note:  Other people might draw quite different conclusions from the same research.  Our goal 
here is simply to understand how broadly NII designers cast their information net, how they interpreted 
the research and experience that existed at the time, and how they expected to translate what they 
learned into NII’s design.
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THE ROLE OF RESIDENTS IN NII 
 
During the design phase, Hewlett staff determined that community development corporations, the vehicle 
used by some other CCIs, were not sufficiently “resident driven” to serve as lead agencies for NII.  The 
Foundation wanted to underscore the importance of residents having direct control over planning and 
managing the distribution of resources in their community.  This stance was well received by NII’s 
managing partners and neighborhood stakeholders and consistent with the thinking and language of 
other foundation-sponsored community change initiatives at the time.  For example:13 
 
• Casey’s New Futures initiative and Ford’s Neighborhood and Family Initiative (NFI) had 
established community collaboratives as a way to involve residents, community members, and 
community institutions in identifying needs, solutions, and resources; Casey’s Rebuilding 
Communities Initiative (RCI) formed resident-controlled governance structures.   
 
• LISC’s Community Building Initiative and Surdna’s Comprehensive Community 
Revitalization Project worked through community development organizations to organize, 
facilitate, and implement strategies for resident involvement, while The Atlanta Project, sponsored 
by the Carter Center, used “resource coordinators” (paid professionals or loaned executives from 
corporations, government agencies, health organizations, and universities) to help residents identify 
and solve neighborhood problems.   
 
• New Futures and Rockefeller’s Community Planning and Action Programs (CPAP) helped 
community members collect and analyze data to understand the structural causes of urban poverty 
and develop strategic responses.  CPAP, in particular, tried to help communities use the data to 
highlight patterns of economic and social disinvestment and to change local, state and regional 
policies.    
 
• Several initiatives, most notably RCI, used community organizing techniques to mobilize and prepare 
residents to take action. 
 
• Edna McConnell Clark’s Neighborhood Partners Initiative designated lead organizations for the 
work in neighborhoods but expected the grantees to involve residents in efforts to improve housing, 
employment, resident leadership, and quality of life. 
 
Thus the Neighborhood Improvement Initiative began with a planning process in which a diverse group 
of residents came together to develop a vision for the neighborhood and a plan to achieve it.  Hewlett’s 
only guideline for this process was that residents make up at least 51% of the planning group.  Like 
many other foundations, Hewlett did not devote much attention to specifying the operational meaning of 
“resident-driven,” nor did it articulate a strategy for identifying and developing resident leaders who could 
ultimately take charge of NII.   
 
As time went on, NII encountered the same issues involving residents’ authority and responsibility that 
have surfaced in other community change initiatives.  Wanting to honor its commitment to a resident-
driven process, Hewlett approved all three community plans despite serious misgivings about the sites’ 
abilities to knit together a coherent approach, given the number of projects they proposed.  To build local 
capacity, Hewlett paid for technical assistance that exposed resident boards to best practices, supported 
visits to model programs, and brought national experts into the neighborhoods to stimulate new thinking.  
But Foundation leaders grew increasingly frustrated with what they saw as a lack of strategic direction in 
                                               
13 Adapted from www.Commbuild.org and “External Reconnaissance” from Casey Dispatch:  Opportunities, 
Challenges, and Lessons from Making Connections.  Working document.  Baltimore:  The Annie E. Casey Foundation. 
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all three sites, and they ultimately introduced new requirements for focus and approach.  This led the 
sites, in turn, to question the Foundation’s commitment to resident priorities and decision-making. 
 
Although residents clearly play important roles in community change efforts, little evidence exists to link 
specific roles with specific outcomes.  NII’s experience doesn’t do much to test or explain the specific 
links, but it does reinforce the potential for resident engagement to produce positive outcomes.  In 
Mayfair, for instance, MII engaged residents through its popular theater, supported voter registration and 
immigration reform, and partnered with the regional Mobilize the Immigrant Vote Campaign.  In East Palo 
Alto, NII incubated Nuestra Casa, an organization that helped Spanish-speaking adult residents learn 
English, proceed to community college, develop leadership skills, and understand and participate in their 
children’s school experience.  Also in East Palo Alto, residents formed block clubs that persuaded police to 
use community policing practices; advocated for an ordinance to drive out drug dealers, which led to the 
closing of a notorious drug house; and led a Crime Reduction Task Force that attracted federal and state 
resources to the neighborhood.   
 
Still, people operating from a community-organizing perspective consider the resident engagement aspect 
of NII’s theory to be weak.  Although the initiative invited residents to the table, their role there was 
primarily to provide input to a foundation-initiated planning process.  Without more explicit mechanisms 
for building leadership capacity, critics say, the local governing structure is challenged to exert leadership 
strategically, hire and guide staff effectively, or hold itself and its funders accountable to the original 
goals and agreements. 
 
NII also highlights the need to reach out to residents beyond those most likely to get involved, such as 
local agency heads, self-appointed leaders, and other traditional gatekeepers.  The West Oakland site, for 
example, was dominated by institutional representatives, some of whom had longstanding differences 
that impeded progress, while outreach to non-affiliated residents, especially Latinos, was only episodically 
successful.  This is a challenge for all community change initiatives:  “The community” is not a monolith.  
Given the diversity of resident populations and groups that form a community, which are the “right” ones 
to engage and how should one engage them?   
 
Some funders of today’s community change efforts are trying to answer that question by testing several 
alternative approaches: 
 
• The Jacobs Family Foundation has developed strategies to transfer ownership of its mixed-use 
development, Market Street Plaza, to the San Diego neighborhood’s shareholders and to establish the 
Neighborhood Unity Foundation as a permanent vehicle for raising and managing endowment 
resources for the community.14   
  
• The Northwest Area Foundation signs contracts with its partner communities that give residents 
authority to make decisions about resource allocation within the context of a broad set of mutually 
agreed upon goals and responsibilities.15   
 
• Another approach is to adopt a relational style of engagement through “profound connectedness, 
vital engagement, and sharing leadership” with communities.16  New Song Urban Ministries in 
Baltimore aims to graft change onto existing social and family networks, viewing relationships (rather 
than programs) as the bridge to change.17   
 
                                               
14 See  www.Jacobsfamilyfoundation.org. 
15 See www.NWAF.org.  
16 Mekha, R., Rosebear, K., Foster, D., Keefe, M., Azzahir, A., Barbee, J., Walker, M.J., Patton, M.Q., Berde, C., 
Batson, K., and Shark, M.  (2004).  “End of One Way.” Minneapolis:  The McKnight Foundation.  www.mcknight.org. 
17 Brown, P. and Fiester, L.  (2003).  “New Song Academy: Linking Education and Community Development to Build 
Stronger Families and Neighborhoods.” Available online at www.aecf.org.   
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• The Annie E. Casey Foundation, which views strong social networks as an important outcome of the 
Making Connections initiative, is exploring the links between resident engagement and social 
networks.   
 
• Across the country, so-called “embedded funders” pursue direct and ongoing relationships with 
multiple community actors, including residents, as a primary vehicle of philanthropic operation.18   
 
While effective resident engagement continues to challenge the field, at the very least NII underscores 
the value of foundations’ understanding (a) their own tolerance for the risks inherent in delegating 
responsibility to community members and (b) their own desire and capacity to share different kinds of 
power and authority with resident groups.  NII’s experience also illustrates the importance of clarity, 
patience (as one respondent said, “You have to leave the door to the oven closed while the cake is 
baking!”), and agreement about how to negotiate changes if something is not working.   
 
BUILDING COMMUNITY CAPACITY:  
THE ROLE OF A NEIGHBORHOOD INTERMEDIARY 
 
Hewlett did not set out to establish new community-based intermediaries, and there was no mention of 
the term intermediary in the original NII materials.  However, NII’s goals did include explicit reference to 
“a vehicle for increasing resident involvement in neighborhood planning and improvement strategies,” 
connecting “fragmented efforts to address poverty-related issues,” and providing a base from which to 
“leverage significant public/private resources to support community improvement.”  By the end of the 
planning period, each of the neighborhood boards, in concert with its managing partner, had determined 
that it needed to create a new nonprofit organization to accomplish these goals.  Neither MII nor OEPA 
began with the goal of becoming a neighborhood intermediary, but over time each has developed into 
just that.  (7th Street McClymonds Corridor disbanded before resolving its organizational identity).  
 
The central role of a neighborhood intermediary is to build the capacity of neighborhood residents and 
organizations to access and use resources on behalf of the community.  This typically involves activities 
such as promoting leadership and organizational development, fostering networks and connections 
through organizing and collaboration, serving as a credible convener of diverse community constituencies 
and sectors, leveraging new resources for the community, and increasing the effective use of existing 
resources.  While they may incubate service programs, most neighborhood intermediaries do not provide 
services on an ongoing basis because such a role can divert their energies, create competition with other 
neighborhood organizations for scarce resources, and compromise their ability to represent the interests 
of the entire neighborhood.   
 
MII and OEPA had slightly different trajectories as neighborhood intermediaries.  MII went through 
periods when it was largely a service provider that competed successfully for public contracts, raised 
foundation funds, and succeeded for the most part in delivering high-quality programs.  However, it came 
to see the limitations of this approach in light of the goals it had set for itself, which went beyond 
services for a limited number of residents.  To catalyze broader community change, it would have to 
assume and support an intermediary role.   
 
OEPA, on the other hand, never delivered services directly but instead funded a set of partners who 
provided such services at the same time as OEPA engaged in intermediary work designed to address 
system-level obstacles to achieving goals.  It struggled, however, to articulate a clear strategy for how 
                                               
18 Sojourner, A., Brown, P., Chaskin, R., Hamilton, R., Fiester, L. and Richman, H.  (2004)  “Moving Forward While 
Staying in Place: Embedded Funders and Community Change”; and Brown, P., Chaskin, R., Richman  H., and Weber, 
J. (2006) “Embedded Funders and Community Change: Profiles.”  Chicago: Chapin Hall Center for Children.  Available 
online at www.chapinhall.org.  
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this combination of support for direct services and intermediary activities would operate to meet some 
definable goals.  
 
Most of our interviewees consider the neighborhood intermediary a good vehicle for accomplishing NII’s 
community change goals, pointing especially to a growing optimism in Mayfair attributable to MII’s broad 
and deep neighborhood connections and other accomplishments.  However, our reviewers and 
interviewees also advise that the ambition and complexity of NII’s agenda requires a neighborhood 
intermediary with substantial capacity, making the preferred route one of building on existing community 
strength rather than starting a new organization.  NII faced constant tension between trying to achieve 
its program goals and building the organizational capacity needed to do this well.  It took a great deal of 
energy and technical assistance to establish and nurture a new organization—to create a mission 
statement and by-laws, elect a board, locate and hire staff, develop a strategic plan and method for 
evaluating progress, regrant NII funds, and raise additional resources.  As one observer noted, groups 
juggled responsibility for getting Hewlett resources out the door (i.e., acting like a grantmaker); 
fundraising (which, if successful, generally required them to provide direct services); and building the 
capacity of their own organizations as well as others in the community—all while trying to develop the 
credibility needed to be the intermediary for a divided community. 
 
Developing the new organizations’ strategic capacity was even more challenging.  By strategic capacity, 
we mean an organization or group’s ability to make a more powerful impact over the long run because it 
has:  
 
• A clear vision, goals, and distinct value orientation;  
• A carefully devised set of actions to achieve these goals (based on research, planning, use of best 
practices, careful execution, and follow-through), and a clear rationale linking the actions to the 
goals;  
• The resources (or ability to leverage them) required to undertake the actions;  
• Strong leadership and capable staff; and  
• A commitment to ongoing, meaningful self-assessment and to using self-reflection to improve 
decisions and practices along the way. 
 
Even under the best of circumstances, strategic capacity grows through trial and error, experimentation, 
and revision.  Not surprisingly, NII’s neighborhood intermediaries struggled to develop strategic 
capacity—and Hewlett struggled to find ways of helping them become more strategic within NII’s 
timeframe.  Our reviewers questioned the idea that a start-up organization with an inexperienced board 
could produce NII’s intended results within six years and suggested that it might have been better to go 
to neighborhoods where there was existing organizational strength to build on.  That choice carries its 
own challenges but would not require the same investment of time and resources as starting from 
scratch.  
 
CONNECTING NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS TO THE 
LARGER REGION 
 
Recognizing that low-income neighborhoods often are isolated from external resources and expertise, 
Hewlett required each site to establish an Advisory Committee composed of diverse movers and 
shakers from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to provide expertise, access, strategic advice, 
social connections, and additional resources.  The community foundations charged with constituting and 
managing the Advisory Committees and the neighborhood collaboratives that wanted to connect their 
work with outside resources viewed the Advisory Committees as a valuable addition to NII’s design—in 
theory.  In practice, however, this design component encountered numerous challenges, many of which 
fell under the category of “too much too soon.”  Emerging neighborhood intermediaries weren’t ready to 
take advantage of the experts enlisted to help, and they had concerns that “outside experts” would 
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dominate local decisions and lack of clarity about the committee members’ role.  The managing partners, 
meanwhile, had concerns about timing:  they found it useful to keep a broader group of stakeholders 
involved and informed but hesitated to convene them until neighborhood collaborators had developed 
their plans sufficiently to know how the Advisory Committee might help.  
 
These dynamics led to inconsistent use of the Advisory Committees.  At points in NII’s trajectory, sites 
did adapt the Advisory Committee’s form and function to the changing circumstances and needs of the 
initiative.  For example, the Teamworks evaluation concludes that Mayfair’s Advisory Group, initially 
composed of high-level representatives from every sector, played an important role in communicating the 
initiative’s progress to elected officials, policymakers, corporate executives, and government agency 
heads.  It also raised more than $1 million for the first phase of Mayfair’s work.  (Later in Mayfair’s 
history, the Advisory Committee went almost two years without convening and then took several different 
forms as MII sought new ways to obtain advice, educate people outside the neighborhood about future 
plans, and generate support for the work.)  But there also were missed opportunities for the Advisory 
Committees over NII’s course.  Potential resources went untapped, member’s interest waned, and lack of 
follow-up limited the degree to which leads on external connections actually panned out.  Further, one 
community foundation executive noted that while it made sense for the managing partner to recruit and 
initially convene the Advisory Committee, by keeping the community foundations in the convening role 
NII missed an opportunity for neighborhood leaders to take more responsibility for decisions, interact 
with power brokers outside the neighborhood, and establish the robust relationships needed for sustained 
progress.  
  
In 2001, Hewlett also hired the Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community (CJTC) to coach 
sites on how to “think regionally” and to explore ways of linking neighborhood change with regional 
development agendas.  CJTC’s publication, Community Building, Community Bridging: Linking 
Neighborhood Improvement Initiatives and the New Regionalism in the San Francisco Bay Area,19 
describes the results of this work in much more depth than we can report here.  To illustrate a positive 
impact, it cites Mayfair’s partnership with several regional advocacy organizations, demonstrating how 
local solutions often benefit from—or require—regional levers.  The partnership produced dramatic 
improvements in access to health insurance for children and their families in Mayfair—gains that could 
not have been achieved by focusing solely within the neighborhood.  However, the researchers make the 
important point that while community-based regional strategies have an important role to play in 
neighborhood development initiatives, they require of the neighborhood group substantial skill and 
political savvy, good timing, and a strong local identity and vision that help residents make the 
connection between their desire for better services and the need to build effective alliances at the 
regional level.  These conditions developed unevenly in NII sites, limiting the degree to which the 
neighborhoods benefited from the approach. 
 
In sum, NII’s ideas about connecting each neighborhood’s development work to the larger region reflect 
recent thinking about the limitations of change strategies that focus solely within the neighborhood.20  
The design elements NII used to operationalize these ideas—i.e., a diverse and high-powered Advisory 
Committee and technical assistance to help sites make regional connections—gained traction from time to 
time but their overall impact was limited because the sites could not implement the strategies 
consistently to their maximum advantage.  As with technical assistance, discussed in Chapter 5, timing is 
everything when it comes to connecting a neighborhood to a region.  Too much emphasis on thinking 
regionally at too early a stage ran counter to the site’s own need to develop basic capacities and come to 
a natural realization that external connections would advance the work.  
                                               
19 Pastor, M., Jr., Benner, C., Rosner, R., Matsuoka, M., and Jacobs, J.  (2004).  “Community Building, Community 
Bridging:  Linking Neighborhood Improvement Initiatives and the New Regionalism in the San Francisco Bay Area.”  
Santa Cruz, CA:  Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community. Available online at www. cjtc.ucsc.edu. 
20 See, for example, Kubisch, A., Auspos, P., Brown, P., Chaskin, R., Fulbright-Anderson, K., and Hamilton, R.  Edited 
by L. Fiester.  Voices from the Field, Vol. II:  Reflections on Comprehensive Community Change.  (2002).  New York:  
Aspen Institute Roundtable on Community Change. 
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A SHIFT IN HEWLETT’S APPROACH  
 
A leadership change at Hewlett in 2000 brought a heightened focus on articulating clear objectives and 
measuring progress toward achieving them, both Foundation-wide and within NII.21  The result was that 
Hewlett applied an explicitly outcomes-based framework to NII in late 2001 and convened the three sites 
to discuss the guidelines in 2002—midway through Mayfair’s implementation, several years after West 
Oakland had launched its initiative, and half-way through One East Palo Alto’s first year of 
implementation.  
 
The new guidelines called for a focus on a small number of community-wide outcomes, cornerstone 
projects developed to address each one of these targeted outcomes, and the development of logic 
models specifying target populations, project outcomes and performance measures.  Hewlett arranged 
for substantial technical assistance to help sites adopt the new framework, with the idea that pursuing 
results was not optional but the choice of what the outcomes would be and what strategies sites would 
use to achieve them was up to the local partners.  In other words, Hewlett imposed a way of thinking 
about and guiding the sites’ work but left the focus and substance of the work up to the communities.  
The Foundation also hired a second evaluation firm to conduct an outcomes-based quantitative 
evaluation.   
 
These changes, perceived locally as “the new outcomes orientation,” became a lightning rod for problems 
in the relationship between local NII partners and Hewlett.  But the idea of targeting outcomes wasn’t 
entirely new to NII; desired results had, after all, been included (albeit loosely) in NII’s six original goals.  
Nor, from Hewlett’s perspective, was NII sailing along smoothly before Hewlett intervened.  As noted in 
Chapter 1, long-standing distrust and factionalism impeded progress in West Oakland.  East Palo Alto, 
meanwhile, was hindered by staffing and leadership problems, strife and fatigue among board members, 
competition among grantees, and an overly broad set of projects. 
 
Paul Brest, the catalyst for Hewlett’s changes, recalls that in 2000 his concerns about NII went beyond “a 
lack of strategic orientation or even a frequent shifting of goals.”  After reviewing research on what other 
CCIs had and hadn’t accomplished and discussing measurement of population-level change with 
evaluators, he urged staff to focus not on the wishful goal of trying to move poverty indicators but on 
“what was, in effect, the goal implicit in the theory:  local improvements in physical, social, and economic 
conditions.”  Even so, Brest viewed intervention as a necessary response to what seemed like a failing 
situation in at least two of NII’s sites.  Given the dysfunctional dynamics within West Oakland and East 
Palo Alto, “there was little if any indication that these communities would achieve any of our shared 
goals,” Brest says: 
 
I do not think the Foundation handled the change of course with nearly as much sensitivity as we 
should have.  But it is important to be clear about the nature of our intervention.  We did not 
substitute our goals for those of the communities but pressed the communities to choose an 
achievable number of their own goals...that had a plausible chance of succeeding and included 
indicators of progress toward the goal.  [And then we] tried to help them, doubtlessly clumsily, 
achieve the goals through assistance with strategic planning.   
 
In retrospect, we gave the sites too short a time frame to develop strategic plans and didn’t 
understand how difficult the concept of a logic model would prove to be.  [But] I am very 
skeptical that they would have developed and implemented strategic plans and achieved what 
outcomes they did if we had not intervened. 
 
                                               
21 Brest, P.  (2002).  “The Hewlett Foundation’s Approach to Philanthropy.”  Menlo Park, CA:  The William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation. www.Hewlett.org.  
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From the sites’ perspective, the new framework changed the rules of the game midstream.  Residents 
and community groups certainly wanted the initiative to achieve good results as much as Hewlett did—
after all, they were investing plenty of their own time, energy, and hard work into NII—but the shift to an 
outcomes-oriented framework for the whole initiative seemed abrupt and disruptive to many local 
participants.  The effect played out differently in each site.  Mayfair had been functioning long enough 
with strong local leadership that it was able to incorporate change without derailing its direction and 
momentum.  West Oakland’s significant internal challenges limited the energy it could bring to respond to 
Hewlett’s request before ultimately closing down.  The dynamics were most intense in East Palo Alto, the 
site that was “youngest” and where Hewlett ended up taking on the managing partner role.  
 
In EPA, trust was already thin among residents and between the community and foundation partners.  
Comments like these from community members and managing partners are typical: 
 
“We had created incredible momentum, but everything we had framed in the plan was never 
given a chance.  With a year more, we would have gotten where we needed to be….But we will 
never know if it would have worked.  [We] were micromanaged from there on.  We were 
basically told all we had done to then…had to be scrapped.”  
 
“What drove the planning process was a sense that the sky’s the limit, you can do whatever you 
want.  We were well into planning for Year 2 when Hewlett came in and said to the community, 
‘You aren’t doing it right, we’re going to scale back the 10 [areas of focus] to four.’  It was a 
shock, and very demoralizing.  That was the first major blow to the project, and many people fell 
off as a result.  It was as if the game changed, and people didn’t know why.”  
 
“When you are working in community, you don’t build back trust over night.  Once you go back 
on your word, your chances of success are very poor.  [If you continue to affirm a commitment 
to resident control while imposing a new way of doing business], it creates cynicism.” 
 
Clearly, both Hewlett and the sites wanted the work to generate positive outcomes and wanted residents 
to play a role in achieving them, but each had a different perspective on how to connect resident 
engagement to outcomes.  Unfortunately, two factors limited NII’s ability to advance the field’s 
knowledge on this point: 
 
First, NII’s original theory of resident-driven change was not fully tested.  We do not 
know, for example, whether the sites would have eventually gotten to outcomes on their own, in 
their own way, if Hewlett had not intervened.  It is possible that although it might have taken 
longer, a more developmental and resident-driven process might have gotten to the same 
outcomes but produced other “softer” benefits, such as resident leadership, along the way.  
Alternatively, sites might have floundered, grown discouraged, and quit in the face of limited 
progress. 
 
Second, NII failed to provide a good test of the value of an outcomes framework 
because even though residents were empowered to select the particular outcomes they wanted 
NII to produce, the introduction of the framework midstream was experienced by sites as 
changing the rules of the game and, in some cases, as disrespecting resident voice, which 
ultimately limited the degree to which participants embraced it.  Further, we know from other 
initiatives that it takes significant time and effort to build for self-evaluation and outcome 
tracking in a new community organization.  Expecting NII’s nascent local organizations to 
develop this capacity midstream, even with substantial assistance, yielded only modest success.   
 
Furthermore, Hewlett used a definition of “community change” (at least from 2001-02 onward) that was 
slightly different from the definition commonly used by other practitioners.  According to senior Hewlett 
staff, community change in NII was defined less by evidence that beliefs, practices, capacities, and 
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opportunities in the community had changed (e.g., neighborhood leaders, organizations, and networks 
had been developed to support residents and do a better job of linking them to resources and 
opportunities) and more by evidence that residents were less poor than before.  Purists might argue that 
Hewlett’s definition had more to do with addressing individual well-being within a specific place than with 
trying to achieve community-level change and that NII’s original goals mixed individual-level outcomes 
(e.g., reduced poverty) with community-level ones (e.g., leveraged resources). 
 
We discuss NII’s growing emphasis on outcomes and the challenge of measuring NII’s progress more in 
Chapter 4.  First, however, we examine community foundations’ role as NII’s managing partners and how 
these partners addressed Hewlett’s shift in thinking about NII.   
 
 
— 3 — 
MANAGING CHANGE:   
COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS AS MANAGING PARTNERS 
 
t the outset, Hewlett had to consider whether it would operate NII itself, transfer management to 
an intermediary organization, or develop a hybrid model through which it retained responsibility for 
certain tasks and outsourced others.  Given its preference for lean staffing, Hewlett lacked the 
capacity to operate such an ambitious initiative, so the Foundation declined to take on the operating role 
itself.  It turned instead to local community foundations as managing partners.  This arrangement served 
a second function for Hewlett: one of NII’s six goals became to increase the capacity of community 
foundations to revitalize neighborhoods.  
 
THE MANAGING PARTNER ROLE 
 
Hewlett could have chosen a variety of models for NII’s managing partner.  The Pew Charitable Trust’s 
nine-site Neighborhood Preservation Initiative and the Ford Foundation’s four-site Neighborhood 
and Family Initiative relied, like NII, on community foundations as managing partners.  Other 
foundations have either set up a national intermediary, like the National Program Office that the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation created for the five-site Urban Health Initiative, or turned to the services 
of an existing intermediary like MDC, as was the case with The Duke Endowment’s 22-site Program for 
the Rural Carolinas.  Some foundations manage an initiative themselves during the early stages and 
then create or designate an entity to carry the work forward, as in the Surdna Foundation’s six-site 
Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program.  The Annie E. Casey Foundation currently is 
making a similar transition in its 10-site Making Connections initiative.   
 
Hewlett’s choice of community foundations as NII’s intermediaries offered several advantages for both 
parties.  Hewlett could partner with a foundation that was closer to the community, had substantial 
fundraising capacity, and would be working in the community long after Hewlett moved on.  The 
community foundations, meanwhile, would gain dedicated human and financial resources to augment 
their work in the neighborhoods.  NII’s resident-driven, asset-based approach matched their values and 
interests, and they welcomed the opportunity to work with each other and with a large foundation that 
had significant history in the community development field. 
 
Hewlett charged the managing partners with translating NII’s theory into action on the ground.  These 
tasks involved: identifying a lead agency; helping the lead agency create a resident-driven collaborative 
to develop and implement a comprehensive neighborhood improvement plan; administering a grants 
program; constituting and managing the advisory committee; administering a pool of funds for training 
and technical assistance; and leveraging resources for the neighborhood effort.  The community 
foundations received money for program management and for regranting on the community’s behalf.   
A
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The main task that Hewlett kept for itself at the outset (apart from general oversight and grant 
monitoring) was NII’s evaluation.  
 
CHALLENGES TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEWLETT AND 
ITS MANAGING PARTNERS 
 
Hewlett and the community foundations all shared a deep commitment to community change; all 
invested substantial amounts of time and resources; and the partnerships did generate some positive 
outcomes.  The relationships themselves were challenging, however.  Numerous factors undermined 
them:  lack of significant pre-existing relationships and understanding of each others’ goals, capacities, 
and cultures; power dynamics typical of the traditional grantor/grantee relationship; and lack of clarity 
about mutual responsibilities and accountabilities.  Because these factors resonate with the experience of 
other foundation-sponsored community change initiatives,22 we provide examples drawn from NII and 
then discuss alternative approaches based, in part, on what we heard from Hewlett and community 
foundation staff.  It is important to underscore here that, as in most partnerships, these challenges were 
neither Hewlett’s nor the community foundations’ alone but characterized the way each party related to 
the other, often to their mutual disadvantage. 
 
ALIGNMENT OF GOALS AND EXPECTATIONS WITH ON-THE-GROUND 
REALITIES   
 
The way that Hewlett and CFSV, the managing partner for NII’s first site, launched their partnership 
illustrates the issue of aligning each partner’s goals and expectations.  The Hewlett Board approved NII in 
July 1996, and immediately thereafter Hewlett contacted CFSV leaders to gauge their interest in being 
Mayfair’s managing partner.  Within three months, CFSV had submitted a proposal and received a grant 
award notice.  CFSV identified a lead agency, the Mexican American Community Services Agency, and 
newly hired staff launched a community planning process in Jan 1997.   
 
Mayfair’s three-year strategic plan was due in mid-August 1997 so that Hewlett staff could review it 
before an October board meeting.  Mayfair met the deadline and Hewlett approved the plan, but CFSV 
was not ready to move forward.  A five-month transition period ensued, during which MACSA withdrew 
from its role as lead agency.  NII’s future seemed questionable until CFSV and community leaders 
decided to create a new community organization (MII), elected an interim board, hired staff—and they 
didn’t accomplish all of that until summer 1998. 
 
The most obvious problem with this launch is the discrepancy between the tasks to be accomplished and 
the compressed timetable.  As in other community change initiatives committed to genuine resident 
involvement, NII’s community planning process required people to forge new relationships, develop new 
capacities, collect and analyze data, and reach consensus about future directions.  What was supposed to 
be a one-year planning process effectively lasted seven months (between the time staff were hired and 
the deadline for submitting a proposal to Hewlett).   
 
NII’s timetable assumed that the community foundation and lead agency could transform their limited 
grantor/grantee relationship into a partnership overnight and immediately get to work facilitating a 
complex planning process.  Predictable tensions arose, and despite efforts to resolve them MACSA 
withdrew as lead agency at the end of the year.   
 
                                               
22 Brown, P. and Garg, S.  (1997).  “Foundations and Comprehensive Community Initiatives:  The Challenges of 
Partnership.”  Chicago:  Chapin Hall Center for Children.  Available online at www.chapinhall.org. 
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“If the [local lead agency] grantees aren’t 
strategic to begin with, you have to start 
with where they are.  I didn’t understand 
that I couldn’t rush that.”   
— Hewlett staff 
Hewlett responded to CFSV’s need for assistance throughout this planning period, primarily through the 
services of a program consultant who worked closely with the Hewlett program officer.  The consultant 
helped CFSV put together its initial proposal for the planning period and stayed engaged with CFSV over 
the next year.  When communication and role tensions 
emerged between CFSV and MACSA, she was called in to 
mediate.  When it became clear that local planners had 
neither the time nor skills to produce a proposal with the 
kind of “professional” look Hewlett expected, she obtained 
funding from Hewlett for a grant writer.  And, when MACSA 
withdrew as the lead agency, Hewlett extended CFSV’s first-
year implementation grant to give people time to regroup.  
 
Those supports undoubtedly helped.  But if Hewlett had entered the relationship more aware of its 
partner’s real strengths and weaknesses, the Foundation could have fostered the necessary capacities 
developmentally rather than engaging in a cycle of unrealistic expectations, disappointment, and efforts 
to fix problems without getting too far behind NII’s timetable.  Such a stance would have required both 
parties to be somehow more curious and more forthcoming at the outset. 
 
At NII’s outset, however, Hewlett staff did not ask their community foundation partners what tasks they 
knew they could carry out well based on experience, what tasks they would like to take on but would 
need assistance for, and what tasks would be better carried out by another party.  Nor did community 
foundation staff voluntarily raise those questions with Hewlett.  “I don’t think there was any clear sense 
of what makes an effective community foundation and how we would develop it.  I think [Hewlett] just 
thought that giving them more money would give them more capacity,” a former Hewlett staffer says.  
Nor had the community foundations fully considered or understood what their role would be and, 
consequently, what capacities they needed to bring to the table.  
 
As NII evolved, Hewlett staff became increasingly disappointed with the community foundations’ 
performance in regranting money to sites, reporting progress and expenditures to Hewlett completely 
and on time, retaining project managers, arranging technical assistance for sites without guidance, and 
participating in the initiative’s evaluation.  Community foundation representatives dispute those 
assessments; some say that Hewlett’s expectations were often unclear and changing and that their role 
was more that of a pass-thru entity or grant administrator than a grant maker.  It is not our purpose here 
to prove either side right or wrong.  Our interest lies in the fact that, as NII unfolded, the majority of 
interactions between Hewlett and the community foundations centered on these administrative activities 
rather than on the goals and substance of community change.  Ironically, Hewlett seemed unwilling or 
unable to recognize the limitations within community foundations that NII explicitly sought to bolster. 
 
A CULTURE OF ANXIETY AND BLAME  
 
As NII evolved, a powerful dynamic of anxiety and blame surfaced.  More often than not, the community 
foundations did not meet Hewlett’s performance expectations.  “We were always behind where they 
wanted us to be, we were never doing anything right,” a community foundation representative recalls.  
To make matters worse, community foundation staff and local players felt that Hewlett’s disappointment 
in them was communicated harshly.  “And then I found myself not wanting to even try to talk about the 
issues.  I just wanted to avoid them,” our interviewee said.  
 
A similar sense of anxiety existed within the Hewlett Foundation.  Rather than create discomfort or risk 
conflict with Hewlett’s senior leaders and board members, program staff tended to simply try harder, 
cover for the sites by rewriting their grant proposals or logic models, or pass the responsibility (and 
blame) to someone lower in the initiative’s hierarchy.  Those actions bought sites and staff some time by 
protecting the initiative’s funding, but they also created a dishonest dynamic that affected all of NII’s 
relationships, several staff members said. 
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ROLE CONFUSION   
 
The San Francisco Foundation’s experience as managing partner for NII in West Oakland illustrates how 
role confusion complicated the Hewlett/managing partner relationship.  Hewlett could not identify an 
appropriate lead agency in West Oakland, so it asked TSFF to serve as both managing partner and lead 
agency during the planning period.  This temporary arrangement ended up lasting for more than two 
years, however, because it took almost nine months to seat a board once Hewlett approved the strategic 
plan, and it took almost as long to hire an executive director.   
 
TSFF’s dual roles and responsibilities confused the community foundation staff and community members.  
A staff member reports recalls feeling caught in the middle between two sets of role pressures regarding 
NII’s timetable, for instance.  Wearing his managing partner’s hat he tried hard to enforce Hewlett’s 
timeline, but in his role as facilitator of the lead agency he was inclined to be more responsive to the 
resident’s slower pace of work.     
 
Role confusion also plagued the East Palo Alto site for several years.  The first problem was overlapping 
responsibilities for the Peninsula Community Foundation, lead agency, and a TA provider around data 
gathering, analysis, and management.  Then, in Year 2, OEPA began to assert its independence, 
“clashing with PCF around the foundation’s directives regarding [OEPA’s] insufficient oversight of 
personnel decisions and work groups, among other matters.”  In another instance, a workgroup made a 
hiring decision without informing or involving OEPA’s board; PCF staff intervened when they realized what 
had happened, which alienated some community factions.23  And after Hewlett took on the managing 
partner role in East Palo Alto, the line between funder, technical assistance provider, and facilitator of 
change became even blurrier.   
 
From some local participants’ perspectives, problems in one area of work tended to bleed into the others 
when Hewlett was playing multiple roles.  From Hewlett’s perspective, however, taking on those extra 
roles was the only way to keep the initiative alive during the leadership void that OEPA experienced in 
2003-04.  “I primarily made the decisions about investments, using the general issue areas residents had 
identified,” a program director says, because otherwise the money would revert to Hewlett: 
 
I chose good organizations to fund with the capacity to use the money well and included OEPA 
staff in the process.  Once [a new OEPA director] was in place and some semblance of strategy 
and choices emerged, I followed her recommendations and changed Hewlett’s role in the 
initiative…She was the leader and facilitator of local activities.  I reviewed the grants as part of 
normal due diligence efforts but did not otherwise intervene.   
 
The role confusion subsided as OEPA’s director took charge and the organization’s influence spread.  
Several OEPA board members gained elected office and/or joined the boards of other major organizations 
in the community; OEPA leveraged a large grant from the school district for a successful, community-
based adult ESL project; and Latino parents began to advocate for changes in the school system. 
 
A different source of role confusion and complexity may have its roots in Hewlett's proximity to the three 
NII sites.  Even though it chose community foundations to be its managing partners, Hewlett “lived” 
within 5 miles of one NII site and not far from the other two.  This had the advantage of keeping the 
Foundation informed about NII's progress; Foundation staff had ongoing relationships with many of the 
local players and technical assistance providers.  But being close at hand and knowing what was 
happening on the ground, while also trying to work through intermediaries, created different challenges 
than those faced by local foundations working directly with sites or by national foundations working 
through intermediaries from afar.  Hewlett staff regularly faced role decisions about when to stay out of 
the action and when to intervene, a situation that was exacerbated by the Foundation’s disappointment 
                                               
23 Teamworks OEPA Final Report Year 2, p. 18 
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“I learned from NII, among other 
things, how important it is to hold 
yourself accountable intellectually.”  
—Community foundation 
representative 
in its managing partners’ performance.  Moreover, Hewlett staff couldn’t retreat to headquarters until 
disagreements cooled down, as staff from a national foundation might, because the activity was in their 
own backyard.   
 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AUTHORITY, AND DECISION-MAKING   
 
None of the managing partners felt that sufficient discussion of 
who has authority to make which kinds of decisions (and when) 
occurred at the outset of their relationships with Hewlett.  
Consequently, at various points in NII’s evolution they felt they 
lacked the authority that goes along with being accountable.  
Perhaps the most extreme example was PCF’s decision in 2002 to 
end its partnership with Hewlett, which stemmed from a sense 
that the pressure Hewlett exerted around the results framework 
denied PCF the chance to implement NII as the community foundation thought best—and it also put PCF 
in a difficult position with the community, to which it also was accountable.  PCF’s feelings of being 
undercut and micromanaged became untenable because the community partner and Hewlett had not 
clarified what communication protocols they would use when they disagreed or who would take the heat 
publicly for unpopular decisions.  These tensions are familiar ones for community change initiatives, but 
none of the players involved in NII made much headway on them. 
 
SELECTED OBSERVATIONS ABOUT PARTNERSHIPS WITH 
COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS 
 
National and regional foundations increasingly invest in and partner with community foundations in order 
to pursue their mutual philanthropic goals.  These partnerships have become more powerful as 
community foundations learn to play increasingly sophisticated leadership roles in the community and as 
national foundations learn how to treat community foundations as partners rather than as traditional 
grantees. 24   
 
Before we turn to the observations our interviewees made about effective foundation-intermediary 
partnerships, however, we want to look more closely at community foundations as intermediaries or 
managing partners in NII.  Hewlett staff assumed that NII’s partnering community foundations already 
possessed deep relationships with the target neighborhoods, the reporting and financial management 
capacities required by an initiative like NII, and a track record of strategic and proactive work.  As we 
have seen, those assumptions proved to be only partially accurate.  As in the Ford Foundation’s 
Neighborhood and Family Initiative, for instance, NII’s community foundation intermediaries tended to 
have some connections with most local constituencies but not the deep relationships beyond 
neighborhood gatekeepers that Hewlett had hoped for.  Similarly, most community foundations have only 
nascent capacity to engage and sustain their donors’ time, talent, and financial resources in long-term 
initiatives.  
 
How might Hewlett and the community foundations have worked together to develop the necessary 
strategic capacities?  Other national and regional foundations have taken two tacks simultaneously:  
                                               
24 See: 
• Hamilton, R., Parzen, J. and Brown, P.  (2004).  “Community Change-Makers: The Leadership Roles of Community 
Foundations.”  Chicago:  Chapin Hall Center for Children.  Available online at www.chapinhall.org.  
• Bernholz, L., Fulton, K. and Kasper,G.  (2005).  “On the Brink of New Promise: The Future of U.S. Community 
Foundations.”  Blueprint Research and Design, Inc. and Monitor Company Group, LLP.   
• Hughes, R.  (2005).  “Philanthropies Working Together:  Myths and Realities.”  Published by Practice Matters, the 
Improving Philanthropy Project.  Available online at www.fdncenter.org/for_grantmakers/practice_matters/. 
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helping the community foundation implement the initiative, and developing the internal commitment, 
resources, and skills needed to sustain the work beyond the life of the grant.25  Based on our interviews 
for this study, the qualities, expertise, and resources that community foundations needed to implement 
NII strategically were very similar to those needed by NII’s neighborhood intermediaries (described in 
Chapter 2).  They include the ability to:  (1) set a clear vision and goals for change; (2) develop 
strategies and actions to achieve those goals, and a clear rationale that links the strategies to the goals; 
and (3) test and improve their approach along the way.  Along with these responsibilities would 
necessarily come the authority to make key decisions about NII’s implementation and progress. 
 
An effective strategy for building those capacities within community foundations would take into account 
the differences among their size of discretionary resources, history of giving, level of donor engagement, 
board and staff leadership, and areas of program expertise.  After all, national or regional foundations 
that make large, strategic, multi-year grants often have different goals and capacities than geographically 
circumscribed community foundations with broader, more localized interests and accountabilities.  
Therefore, Hewlett and the community foundations would each have needed, at the outset of NII, to 
explicitly state the initiative’s values and goals, consider the community foundation’s attributes, determine 
what adaptations or additional capacities were needed to do the work well, and plan how to acquire or 
develop the new capacities.  If the initiative changed substantially as it unfolded, as NII did, the partners 
would need to revisit those topics.  Those conversations did not occur in NII, however.  And so, midway 
through the initiative when Hewlett staff determined that the community foundations “weren’t acting 
strategically enough,” they struggled with how to enhance the foundations’ capacities. 
 
In all of our discussions about strategic capacity, NII participants made the point that the quality of the 
relationship between a sponsoring foundation and managing partner (i.e., the community foundation) is 
directly related to the performance of both institutions.  Thus the following observations about 
sponsoring/community foundation partnerships also speak to the issue of building mutual capacity: 
 
Make sure the sponsoring foundation’s board and staff are clear and in agreement 
about the initiative’s goals, strategies, risks, and timeline for achieving results. 
 
A sponsoring foundation needs to consider whether the roles required by an initiative match their 
foundations’ operating style, capacities, and tolerance for risk.  Frequently, foundation staff “sell” an 
approach to the board but then find themselves under incredible pressure (bordering on panic) to 
produce, either because the plan is unrealistic, intermediate outcomes are not articulated or dismissed as 
unimportant, or the foundation’s partners have not performed as expected.  Then, as one of our 
reviewers noted, the focus shifts to managing disappointment and trying to assign fault elsewhere—
leaving little room for mobilizing assets or learning from the work.  
 
Make sure the community foundation’s board and staff are clear and in agreement 
about the initiative’s goals, strategies, risks, and timeline for achieving results. 
 
A community foundation needs to assess its own readiness and commitment to serve as an intermediary 
partner.  A tool produced by The James Irvine Foundation’s Community Foundation Initiative helps 
community foundation staff work through the process.26  It emphasizes the need to ask and answer 
questions about initiative purpose (how might the initiative add value?), partners (who else will the 
foundation need to carry out the initiative successfully?), and practices (what is its own readiness, 
resources, and capacity to take on the initiative?).  Such an examination can help a community 
                                               
25 Mayer, S. (1994). “Building Community Capacity: The Potential of Community Foundations.” Minneapolis: Rainbow 
Research; and The James Irvine Foundation (2003) “Community Catalyst: How Community Foundations are Acting as 
Agents for Local Change.” Available online at www.Irvine.org. 
26 The James Irvine Foundation (2003). “Eyes Wide Open:  Deciding When to Launch a Community Initiative.”  
Available online at www.Irvine.org. 
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If the partner isn’t seen as a fellow change 
agent, “it creates a difficult context in which to 
build relationships that are deep, thoughtful, 
and can handle the surprises that will 
inevitably come up in the relationship.”  
 —Community foundation representative 
“Just because a foundation wants 
something to happen, it can’t ignore 
the work that goes into making it 
possible for things to happen.  This 
can take a lot of time.”    —NII contractor 
foundation resist tempting opportunities that might bring new resources into the community but exceed 
the foundation’s threshold capacities—or it can help community foundation staff identify the supports the 
will need if they decide to participate.  In retrospect, at least one of NII’s managing partners wishes it 
had paid more attention to its own capacity building throughout the initiative so that it could more fully 
embed key aspects of the work—such as the staff, skills, and to some extent the deep knowledge that 
had been developed—in the foundation following NII’s formal conclusion.  
 
Treat the potential intermediary as a fellow change agent rather than as a technician.  
 
Sponsoring foundations frequently approach a potential intermediary by outlining the mechanics of the 
proposed relationship.  Unless the foundation needs its intermediary to have a narrow scope or limited 
discretion, however, it is more useful to think about 
an intermediary as a fellow change agent.  “The 
first conversation shouldn’t be about whether they 
can get the grants out but whether the relationship 
can advance the mission of the community 
foundation.  We didn’t pay attention to that,” a 
Hewlett staff member observes.   
 
Because the technical dimensions of budget cycles 
and grant approvals dominated the NII managing 
partners’ relationship with Hewlett, a community foundation executive suggests that leading with money 
in the partnership tends to “skew and handicap the work”—just as it does when foundations pour lots of 
money into a community before understanding the likely impact.  Approaching the intermediary as a 
fellow change agent, however, allows collaborators to focus on mutual goals and strategies rather than 
making technical processes the centerpiece of the relationship. 
 
Take time to build a relationship informed by an understanding of each other’s goals, 
capacities, and cultures.   
 
An investment in relationship building at the start of a long-term initiative will surface the real capacities 
and constraints that partners bring to the table and create the mutual understanding needed to address 
later issues.  Staff from both Hewlett and the community foundations acknowledge that they knew very 
little about each other’s organizations at NII’s outset.  This 
explains why Hewlett concluded fairly quickly that it had 
overestimated community foundations’ capacity to carry out 
NII as envisioned, provided extra support to the community 
foundations, and relieved them of some of their tasks (most 
importantly NII’s technical assistance).  Community foundation 
staff, meanwhile, report that they didn’t fully appreciate the 
internal pressures and priorities at Hewlett.   
 
Bring the intermediary responsible for managing the initiative into the planning 
process early enough to develop a shared vision for change.   
 
By engaging an intermediary (in NII’s case, the community foundations) early on, the foundation can 
share its vision and test out key elements of the initiative’s design with the party whose job it will be to 
implement them.  Such an approach also promotes mutual ownership and investment, which helps to 
keep divergent or competing ideas about goals and outcomes from derailing the initiative.   
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“It should be like the Wild West, how 
they sometimes all agreed to leave 
their guns at the door of the saloon.  
There needs to be a democratic space 
where everyone can come to the table 
and have a dialogue from which they 
all come away smarter.”    —NII observer 
 Address the dynamic that unequal power brings to the relationship.  
 
Even though they are foundations themselves, when community foundations serve as intermediaries for 
larger private foundations may have trouble expressing their concerns about the initiative or representing 
their own strengths and weaknesses honestly.  Until each party trusts the other’s interests and 
understands its constraints, the partnership is 
vulnerable to arrangements that look good but won’t 
hold up.  And, if the larger foundation uses its power 
inappropriately, the partnership’s trust, candor, and 
opportunity for learning deteriorate.  The observations 
outlined above (about getting to know your partner and 
developing a shared agenda, especially) and below 
(about understanding roles and the rules of 
engagement) can help buffer the power imbalance. 
 
 Establish a tone of mutual respect, transparency, and shared risk-taking.  
 
Effective working relationships are as much about attitude and posture as they are about specific 
behaviors.  These attitudes set the tone for all that happens; they create possibilities and close off 
options.  If the foundation and intermediary feel they are working toward the same goals and sharing 
risks together, they are more likely to communicate honestly with each other and to devote their energy 
to the challenges of the work—not to managing the dynamics of the relationship.  
 
Build the relationship between institutions, not just individuals.   
 
As NII demonstrated, foundations’ program staff have too much already on their plates to be the sole 
linchpin of foundation/managing partner relationships.  Furthermore, individual staff are likely to move on 
to other foundations or professions before the initiative ends.  So it makes sense to build relationships at 
the institutional level rather than between individuals.  But foundations change, too; initiative designers 
and champions come and go, board members and executives turn over, and leaders adopt new 
paradigms and practices.  Thus it may make even more sense to establish a board-staff committee at the 
sponsoring foundation to oversee the initiative internally, and convene it periodically with a similarly 
composed committee from the intermediary.  Such committees help to institutionalize the initiative within 
the partnering organizations, and they provide continuity despite changing players and priorities. 
 
Clarify roles, mutual accountabilities, and rules of engagement.27   
 
This means addressing how the partners will share authority and responsibility, control funds, 
communicate with each other, resolve differences, learn together, and evaluate each other’s 
performance.  What kind of bad news does the foundation want to hear, and how?  What kind of contact 
does the foundation expect to maintain with the grantees in neighborhoods?  And how can the original 
understandings and commitments endure while also being open to review and modification?  
 
 
  
                                               
27 See Brown, P.  (2005).  “The Experience of an Intermediary in a Complex Initiative: The Urban Health Initiative’s National 
Program Office.”  Available online at www.urbanhealth.org. 
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“We never expressed disappointment 
in NII for not achieving results.  The 
disappointment was a step before 
that, in [people] not knowing what 
they wanted to do.”    
—Hewlett Foundation representative
— 4 — 
CAPTURING CHANGE:   
EVALUATION AND LEARNING IN NII 
 
ommunity change initiatives are notoriously hard to evaluate.  Their complexity, broad scope, 
dynamic nature, and vulnerability to uncontrollable variables pose inherent obstacles to 
experimental, or even quasi-experimental, evaluation design.  Consequently, deciding what to 
measure, how to measure it, how to collect the data, and how to interpret the results is a challenging 
process that involves many tradeoffs of rigor, practicality, and resources.  Nonetheless, every community 
change initiative offers an opportunity to assess progress toward goals, to help participants learn better 
strategies, and to build knowledge within the field of community change.   
 
Unfortunately, NII’s struggles with evaluation left Hewlett and its partners disappointed that the initiative 
did not generate as much knowledge or learning as they hoped for.  This chapter explores the decisions, 
activities, and factors that shaped NII’s experiences with evaluation and learning and the implications we 
distill from those experiences. 
 
ADOPTING AN OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK 
 
As described in Chapter 2, Hewlett’s 2002 adoption of an explicitly outcomes-based framework for NII 
required sites to make some major changes.  Although the original design had called for “statistical 
evidence of changes in poverty indicators,” it was only in 2001-02 that the Foundation developed an 
explicit strategy to help sites focus on outcomes.  The shift occurred four years into the work in Mayfair, 
two years into West Oakland, and about a year into East Palo Alto.   
 
Hewlett’s heightened attention to outcomes was precipitated by 
the arrival of a new president, but it had roots in a classic and 
widespread foundation perspective, characterized (in our 
words) as:  “We’re spending a lot of money and we aren’t 
confident that our grantees are on track to achieve the goals, 
so we’d better focus everyone on what their desired outcomes 
are and how to achieve them.”  Hewlett President Brest says he 
was less concerned about pushing sites to get results than 
about getting them to clearly identify what results they wanted 
and what resources they needed to achieve them.  The parameters of the mandate were less clear to 
Hewlett staff, however.  They hired consultants to help local collaborators develop a logic model, 
performance measures, and intermediate outcomes for their activities.  But they also felt great pressure 
to demonstrate positive results, and they conveyed that sense of urgency to local partners.   
 
The changing paradigm did not sit well with NII’s managing partners, local lead agencies, or 
neighborhood partners.  For many, the challenge of specifying target outcomes within a logic model 
framework was beyond their reach.  After revising their logic models multiple times and still not reaching 
the level of clarity Hewlett sought, a community foundation source says, the process of figuring out how 
the pieces fit together lost its meaning.  That might be so, a Hewlett representative acknowledges, but 
adds, “If you were putting large amounts of money into implementing a strategic plan, wouldn’t you want 
to get it right?”  A local participant, in turn, explains his frustration:  “The message was, ‘We want these 
outcomes and indicators.  Here is the logic model process you have to use.’  It became much more rigid.  
The initiative became about helping Hewlett demonstrate changes rather than pursuing what we wanted 
to do.”  
 
The difference in perspectives between how Hewlett and other NII participants experienced the adoption 
of a more explicitly outcomes-based framework illustrates well the Rashomon effect to which we referred 
C 
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“We were very attuned to being able 
to say something about what we had 
accomplished.  Maybe we were 
somewhat naïve about that, but we 
wanted to be able to count 
things,…to see [tangible]results of 
the proposed interventions.“  
—Hewlett staff 
earlier.  Unfortunately, when differences like these are not resolved in a way that speaks to all partners’ 
needs, they spill over into other dimensions of the initiative.  For example, many of Hewlett’s 
collaborators saw the changes as a direct challenge to one of NII’s core principles, the critical role of 
residents in driving the work.  “I was never against the logic modeling exercises and the pressure on 
outcomes,” a local partner says.  “It was the way they did it and the timing; they took it away from the 
people.”   
 
Hewlett staff now say they should have been clearer that it wasn’t an either/or situation—managing 
partners “didn’t have to stop talking with residents” but they did “need to be clearer about what 
outcomes [they were] going to get.”  Unfortunately, at the time the angst over how the outcomes 
framework was introduced overwhelmed any discussion about what outcomes should frame the work. 
 
EVALUATING THE WORK 
 
NII’s evaluation grew to encompass an implementation study and performance data tracking.   
 
IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION 
 
After inviting proposals from several potential evaluators, in 1997 Hewlett selected Teamworks, a San 
Francisco-based management consulting organization, to evaluate NII.  At that point, the Foundation 
expected to contract with only one evaluation firm.   
 
Hewlett’s NII staff were not evaluation experts themselves, and they weren’t entirely clear what they 
wanted from the evaluation or what, in fact, the evaluation could and could not accomplish.  They did, 
however, want Teamworks to provide “evidence of impact.”  The evaluators, meanwhile, felt it was 
impossible to establish causality between inputs and outcomes in a complex initiative like NII.   
 
The approach that Hewlett and Teamworks ultimately agreed 
upon can be characterized as implementation evaluation, and 
it was very similar to that of other CCIs at the time.  
Teamworks would review documents, observe site activities, 
interview key stakeholders and then produce rich and detailed 
descriptions of how NII unfolded in each site, along with an 
assessment of strengths and weaknesses and 
recommendations to advance the work going forward.  To 
support the analysis, Teamworks also required directors of the 
local lead agencies to collect data and craft a narrative 
explaining their work during a given time period. 
 
Teamworks generated two reports annually per site, guided by research questions that the evaluators 
and Hewlett agreed upon at the beginning of each year.  Teamworks expected the reports to help sites 
put what they were doing in a broader framework, giving them the power and ability to talk with people 
outside of the community in new ways.  The evaluators also met with NII participants in the sites to 
discuss the evaluation findings, hoping that their feedback would reinforce successes and encourage 
efforts to address areas of concern.   
 
Most community foundation staff seem to have valued and acted on Teamworks’ analyses of 
programmatic issues and its “watch list” of issues aligned with NII’s goals.  Most thought the reports 
contained important insights and useful issues.   
 
Hewlett leaders and staff, however, were dissatisfied.  They would have preferred more analytic, less 
descriptive reports with recommended changes that were more tightly linked to the analyses.  They 
wanted more help identifying and analyzing interim measures of success.  They felt the evaluators fixated 
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on “process, to the exclusion of substantive outcomes” and were sympathetic to sites’ troubles “at the 
cost of being candid.”  NII staff wanted the reports to include more constructive feedback about NII’s 
quality and outcomes compared to other CCIs’, to best practices in the field, or to some other knowledge 
or research base that would help inform thinking about NII.  During the evaluation’s early years, 
conversations between Teamworks and Hewlett staff about those desires were sometimes very 
contentious. 
 
The frustration that Hewlett staff felt with evaluation was widely shared by other funders and, indeed, 
many evaluators of CCIs.  The state of the art for evaluating community change was evolving but still fell 
short of the precision that accompanies traditional, experimental-design evaluations of simple 
interventions.  The type of documentation that Teamworks conducted for NII was the standard for 
evaluations of multi-site initiatives—similar to that used by evaluators of the Ford Foundation’s 
Neighborhood and Family Initiative and Casey’s Rebuilding Communities Initiative, for example.  
Documentation plays an important role in understanding community change initiatives, because it 
captures information about the levers and context for change especially well.  A common critique, 
however, is that too much descriptive data without a strong analytic framework or outcomes focus is 
overwhelming in its detail and limited in its utility to improve practice. 28   
 
Our task is not to evaluate NII’s evaluation.  We do know, however, that Hewlett hired an evaluation firm 
with the skills and capacities needed to design and conduct a top-notch evaluation.  Based on our 
interview data, it is likely that the continuing push and pull between Hewlett and NII’s evaluators was 
another effect of relationships that got off on the wrong foot.  The evaluators felt that Hewlett’s 
expectations for evaluation were constantly shifting and sometimes unrealistic, and the Foundation felt 
the evaluators adhered rigidly to a methodology that didn’t yield the data it wanted and the sites needed 
to guide in-course corrections. 
 
People working in the NII sites, meanwhile, grew to trust the Teamworks evaluators but remained aware 
that Teamworks’ primary audience was its client, the Hewlett Foundation.  Their reactions to the 
evaluation reports ranged from appreciative to dismissive.  Some sources affiliated with the 
intermediaries said they only scanned the reports to learn what problems had been reported to Hewlett; 
some expressed regret, in retrospect, that they didn’t spend more time digesting and acting on the 
reports’ lessons; and we heard about a site where, six months after a Teamworks report called for more 
strategic networking and focus on organizational capacity, those features soon were visible in the 
intermediary’s work.   
 
PERFORMANCE DATA TRACKING 
 
Initially, Hewlett gave its managing partners responsibility for establishing and tracking performance 
indicators at each site.  Given the multiple goals, strategies, and populations involved, NII’s data 
collection needs exceeded the managing partners’ capacity (and, some respondents say, their agreed-
upon role), so the community foundations contracted with university research departments or consulting 
firms to help out.  By 2001, however, it was clear that none of the sites had a robust data tracking 
system.  Concurrently, the Foundation’s new president and board were asking about NII’s impact, and 
staff were scrambling to find the “statistical evidence of changes in poverty indicators” described in NII’s 
design.   
 
Concerned that the initiative could be undermined by the lack of uniform data collection, Hewlett staff 
hired a second firm, JMPT Consulting, to take responsibility for collecting performance data in Mayfair and 
East Palo Alto.  JMPT, a newly founded company that was already advising Mayfair, created a database of 
                                               
28 See Auspos,P. and Kubisch, A.C. (2004).  Building Knowledge about Community Change: Moving Beyond 
Evaluations.   New York:  The Aspen Institute (available online at www.aspeninstitute.org). Also Snibbe, A.  (2006).  
“Drowning in Data.”  Stanford Social Innovation Review, 39-45. 
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programmatic data (e.g., client enrollment by program, demographic characteristics of participants, 
number of participants demonstrating progress on specific performance measures, summary information 
reported by program directors).  The database gave Hewlett, its technical assistance providers, and local 
players “a structure to talk about what performance was and what outcomes were,” an NII source says, 
and it helped to pinpoint some programmatic successes and shortcomings.  Still, Hewlett was dissatisfied.  
Once again, leaders felt the evaluators were trying to provide an encouraging view of NII rather than “an 
honest assessment,” and they wanted a deeper level of analysis than JMPT sometimes provided. 
 
JMPT encountered the same dilemma that sites faced, however, when trying to implement NII:  The 
broad theory behind the initiative was that an “empowered” community would figure out what strategies 
work best to turn the corner on poverty, and there was no conceptual framework or pathway to link that 
theory with outcomes.  Moreover, the large number of small-scale projects, many of which only served a 
handful of residents, made demonstrating population-level results or linking strategies to specific results 
out of the question.  In the end, therefore, the performance database was not particularly helpful as a 
tool for capacity building, strategic intervention, or impact evaluation.  A more robust and unifying theory 
of change might have helped NII shift from a narrowly programmatic set of outcomes to the focus on 
community-level results to which Hewlett aspired. 
 
In retrospect, a former Hewlett staff member says, “We probably should have revamped the evaluation 
process totally in Year 2 of each site”: 
 
After the planning process was done, we should have gone back to the board and the community 
and asked, how would one measure the impact of this work and how does it fit into a larger 
strategy for the community?  Given that the range of projects don’t connect around a central 
theme, how do we prioritize this laundry list of work?...I don’t think the evaluator needs to be the 
one to do this work, but it needs to be done in order to structure the evaluation. 
 
INTEGRATION OF THE TWO EVALUATIONS 
 
NII leaders found it very difficult to consolidate the Teamworks and JMPT findings or develop a line of 
analysis connecting the two, not for lack of goodwill on the evaluators’ part but for practical reasons.  
The data were collected at different levels—from individuals by Teamworks and from programs and 
organizations by JMPT—and focused on different research topics (i.e., the processes, relationships, and 
perspectives that shaped implementation for Teamworks; service delivery and performance measures for 
JMPT).  Until Hewlett hired an evaluation management consultant, there was no mechanism to ensure 
that the evaluation firms communicated with each other, that Teamworks benefited from JMPT’s analyses 
of program data, and that JMPT benefited from Teamworks’ understanding of why the data showed what 
they did.  
 
 EVALUATING COMMUNITY CAPACITY OUTCOMES 
 
The multiple and shifting perspectives on what NII was trying to accomplish (e.g., changes in poverty 
indicators, programs that produce tangible improvements in the lives of residents, and/or strengthened 
neighborhood leadership and infrastructure) impeded evaluation—as did a predictable tension between 
community-building goals, which feature hard-to-measure processes, and so-called “hard” outcomes.29   
The performance tracking that JMPT conducted focused on micro-impacts at the programmatic level and 
excluded measurement of progress toward the NII goals associated with building community capacity, 
such as leadership and organizational development.  Both Teamworks and JMPT tried to identify and 
measure these aspects of increased capacity over time, but the results tended to be largely anecdotal.   
 
                                               
29 Connell, J.P., Kubisch, A.C., Schorr, L.B., and Weiss, C.H., eds.  (1995) New Approaches to Evaluating Community 
Initiatives Volume 1: Concepts, Methods, and Contexts.  New York:  The Aspen Institute. 
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“It was OK that Hewlett didn’t know 
what it was doing, given the state of 
the field.  But [somehow Hewlett] 
couldn’t take a learning approach 
that was much more fluid, 
experimental, collaborative.  Such a 
stance would have freed everyone up 
to be creative, learn together, share 
risks.”
One of the most promising aspects of this work focused on trying to assess increases in the strategic 
capacity of the new local intermediaries (MII and OEPA).  In fact, JMPT’s final report on Mayfair argues 
that the field needs to take seriously capacity outcomes like the ability to “plan, design, and implement 
programs; advocate for the neighborhood with policy makers; and set up structures for using data on the 
community’s behalf.”30  The value placed on these outcomes for their own sake—not just as “soft” 
measures that may lead to something else—is consistent with JMPT’s view that “the most important 
impact of a CCI may be the lasting learned capacity among participants to continue to make change in 
themselves and their communities.”  Unfortunately, JMPT did not extend this line of analysis substantially 
following the Mayfair report, so benchmarks of OEPA’s potential growth in strategic capacity over the last 
several years were not systematically identified and tracked.   
 
LEARNING FROM NII  
 
When NII began, the philanthropic field did not have a well-established base of knowledge about 
community change.  NII had an opportunity to be truly experimental—to use trial, error, and revision to 
expand that knowledge.  Many of NII’s participants now say they wanted to learn as the initiative 
unfolded, but in reality there were few successful opportunities for the reflection and experimentation 
needed to learn while doing.   
 
Several factors and choices impeded learning in the Neighborhood Improvement Initiative.  First, 
individual hopes of learning came up hard against the anxiety and blame discussed in Chapter 3.  A 
Hewlett source expressed this eloquently: 
 
When you feel pressure around results, there can be a tendency not to learn, to just rigidly apply 
what you already know.  There isn’t room for the pliability needed for learning—the awareness of 
your own ego, of the things that get in the way of learning—when there is the terrible fear that 
you might do something wrong or be exposed as wrong.   
 
Second, at the beginning of the initiative Teamworks proposed evaluating Hewlett’s role in the process of 
implementing NII, but Foundation staff declined.  It simply didn’t seem that important, an interviewee 
recalled; like most foundations at the time, Hewlett had only recently begun to invest substantially in 
evaluating grantees, and the idea of evaluating its own role was so unfamiliar that “it would have been a 
hard sell to the Board.”   
 
Many—perhaps most—foundations exempt themselves from their own evaluations because they don’t see 
themselves as part of the action, they have a return-on-investment orientation that places full 
responsibility for the “return” on the grantees, or they 
prefer not to have their actions scrutinized publicly.  NII 
participants, however, viewed Hewlett’s decision as a 
statement that the Foundation didn’t want outside scrutiny 
or feedback on its own performance, which they 
interpreted as a sign of bad faith.  By not publicly sharing 
the intellectual risks of this decidedly risky venture, 
interviewees said, Hewlett was being “arrogant,” “rigid,” 
and “dictatorial.”  These comments (the first from a 
community source, the second from a community 
foundation) express the sites’ frustration:  
 
 
                                               
30Kubo, M.M., Wong, A.J., and Morales, E.F.  (2004).  “Missing the (Tipping) Point: Looking for Impact and Discovering 
Learning in a Comprehensive Community Initiative.”  San Francisco, CA:  JMPT Consulting, Inc. 
  36
Hewlett tried to sit pretty much outside of the dynamic so it could blame us, not take the same 
risks, make them feel that problems were because we (the community foundations, staff, TA 
providers, etc.) were not good enough.  But by taking this approach, Hewlett got exactly what it 
didn’t want.  It was very hard for anything to take hold.  People are not at their best when they 
are confused and afraid and angry.   
 
There is hubris in saying, “This is the design, give us the intended outcomes.”  If we don’t come 
up with them, Hewlett assumes we’re doing it wrong rather than the other possibility—that the 
design is flawed.  
 
Once this kind of dynamic gets established, it affects interactions throughout the initiative.   
 
Third, NII’s attempts to stimulate cross-site learning never really took root.  Although NII stakeholders 
disagree about many things, they all agree that little learning occurred across sites.  A typical comment 
was, “There was a separate initiative in each site instead of one initiative with three sites”—something 
that changes from a pro to a con depending on one’s perspective.  Several community foundation and 
neighborhood representatives saw the disconnectedness as a sign of NII’s incoherence.  To at least one 
Hewlett staff member, however, it was a strength:  “We got in more trouble when we tried to centralize 
or standardize things across sites.  They really needed different things.”   
 
Hewlett established listservs, held weekend gatherings for the sites’ board members, brought site leaders 
together, and convened periodic cross-site learning meetings that involved local participants, evaluators, 
and technical assistance providers.  Participants in these exchanges seemed to gain some moral support 
from each other—a result that Hewlett staff see as important, although insufficient—but by all reports the 
exchanges did not produce much new knowledge.  A university representative who praised the concept 
of cross-site learning says that NII’s convenings failed because “there was no shared paradigm, no robust 
conceptual framework, and no way to talk about this central problem…The cross-site meetings were a 
good idea but Hewlett couldn’t articulate what it wanted to learn, couldn’t have authentic relationships 
through which to learn, and didn’t want to take a stance that acknowledged what it didn’t know.”   
 
From Hewlett’s perspective, there were other barriers to cross-site learning.  Many of the outside experts 
seemed unable to discuss data, findings, and strategies with neighborhood residents in ways they could 
understand and benefit from.  The cross-site gatherings occurred when the work on the ground was still 
nascent, when people weren’t ready to share knowledge within their neighborhood—let alone with people 
from other neighborhoods.  And the contextual differences between neighborhoods made some 
knowledge inapplicable from site to site.  Hewlett staff now say that cross-site learning “sounds like such 
a good idea” but question whether it is the most powerful strategy for knowledge development: 
 
Investing a lot of resources for cross-site connections, especially when there simply aren’t so 
many resources, is not equivalent with investing in intra-site learning or even connecting the sites 
with projects elsewhere around the country that have similar issues.  East Palo Alto had more in 
common with some neighborhoods in Chicago than it did with San Jose, for example, and EPA 
leaders actually went to Chicago for a site visit….I believe the bigger return on learning would be 
within the site, where so many different actors and constituencies need to come together. 
 
Fourth, NII missed the opportunity to explicitly lift up, examine, understand, and react to the racial and 
ethnic tensions that existed in NII neighborhoods—and, consequently, to learn from them.  Diversity 
issues abound in almost every community change initiative, yet foundation-funded initiatives rarely take 
their effect into account or make it possible to learn about them in real time, and NII followed the same 
path.  “It was phenomenally frustrating that there were three neighborhoods in which these themes of 
racial/ethnic tensions were operating but…it took a very long time for any one neighborhood to be able to 
benefit from what was being learned by others,” a community foundation source notes.   
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In sum, Hewlett staff encountered the predictable evaluation and learning challenges inherent in 
community change initiatives, which were exacerbated by the midstream shift in NII’s conceptual 
framework.  To Hewlett staff, the implementation evaluation approach did not seem to reinforce the 
outcomes focus they wanted to promote in the sites, nor did it appear to be building site’s strategic 
capability for change.  When Hewlett tried to reenergize OEPA participants, evaluators, and Hewlett staff 
through a “learning session” in 2004, staff felt that the evaluators did not “step up to the plate” and 
resisted (or were unable) to find new ways of engaging with the site and the Foundation.  Several 
participants in that meeting commented that, by that time, poor communication among the evaluators, 
the grantees, and the Foundation hampered the development of a safe learning environment in which all 
parties could share their perspectives effectively.  
 
SELECTED OBSERVATIONS ABOUT EVALUATING AND LEARNING 
FROM COMMUNITY CHANGE 
 
We have already noted the challenge that NII’s theory of change posed for evaluators.  But it is also true 
that initiatives like NII often operate at a disadvantage because the theory about the social condition they 
are trying to change is undeveloped.  This makes evaluation not only tougher to do but even more 
important to do well.  As researcher Gerard Alexandar noted during a discussion of “strategic giving” in 
late 2006:31 
 
Any theory about which kind of nonprofit action is most likely to have a desired effect 
requires…some knowledge of what makes political, social, or economic changes occur.  [For 
example], if you want to alleviate poverty, you can’t just say which nonprofit vehicle will be most 
likely to do so.  You have to have a theory, in effect, of poverty—of what non-foundation 
activities seem to alleviate and exacerbate it, about what kinds of things are contributing to it, 
and so on. 
 
The fact is—and this is the rub—we don’t know enough about social processes to be very expert 
in them.  [Social] science’s knowledge about what causes poverty, or a lot of other things, is 
deeply inadequate.   
 
There are three big implications of not knowing that kind of thing.  First, we mustn’t pretend that 
we do.  Second, we ought, in a spirit of humility, to experiment to try to find out more…And 
third, [we] have to try and measure the effects of the experiment. 
 
Hewlett’s disappointment with NII’s evaluation raises two questions in particular.  First, what options did 
the Foundation have to address its evaluation concerns when it adopted a more explicitly outcomes-
based framework?  Hewlett could have dropped the implementation evaluation and started again with a 
new evaluation design, using either the same or a different evaluator.  There are obvious pros and cons 
to this approach depending on the value of the implementation evaluation—and, as we have seen, 
different parties have quite different views on that.  (For that matter, the evaluators could have 
voluntarily parted ways with Hewlett if they felt they could not do what was asked of them.)  Hewlett 
could have narrowed, scaled back, or otherwise modified the existing evaluation if the evaluator was 
willing and able to shift its approach. Or Hewlett could have augmented the implementation evaluation 
with another approach.  This, in fact, is what the Foundation did by hiring JMPT.  
 
None of those options were entirely satisfying, however—partly for technical reasons and partly because 
they did not grow out of a common understanding between Hewlett and the sites about what was 
                                               
31 October 19, 2006.  Remarks by Gerard Alexander, Associate Professor, University of Virginia, and advisor to the 
Searle Freedom Trust.  Made during in a panel discussion of Strategic Giving:  The Art and Science of Philanthropy,”  
by Peter Frumkin, in Washington, DC at The Hudson Institute’s Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal. 
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important to examine, measure, and report and why.  This limited the ownership, creativity, investment, 
and flexibility that all parties, including the evaluators, brought to the enterprise.  
 
Second, how could evaluation do a better job of helping initiative participants think and work more 
strategically?  After considering the experiences of NII stakeholders, we offer these observations about 
how foundations might shape the learning and evaluation enterprise to better meet their own goals, 
increase the strategic capacity of grantees, and contribute new knowledge to the field.  This is not a 
comprehensive set of suggestions for philanthropy; rather, it focuses on aspects of learning and 
evaluation that were most salient for NII. 
 
 Establish an evaluation framework at the outset. 
 
A funder who intends to use a theory-of-change approach, logic models, or some other organizing 
framework should make that clear during the planning process.  The theory may change over time—in 
fact, if the foundation and its partners are truly committed to learning while doing this work, the theory 
will undoubtedly be modified.  But as NII has demonstrated, it is much easier for participants to absorb 
modifications than to incorporate an entirely new conceptual framework or way of thinking after strategic 
plans have been drafted and implementation begun.  The same is true for evaluators, who need to be 
flexible and responsive to evolving theory but may be hard pressed to adopt a very different evaluation 
design midstream.       
 
 Establish a shared agenda for learning about community change. 
 
An initiative as complex and multi-faceted as NII can generate many different kinds of knowledge.  The 
sponsoring foundation and its partners need to prioritize the questions to be addressed and consider the 
kinds of data and analyses that different audiences (e.g., foundation board and management, community 
partners, broader field, etc.) would find useful.  For example, the learning agenda might be driven by a 
core issue within the field of community change, such as which resident engagement practices make 
sense for which kinds of community change goals and enterprises.   
 
By involving other players in shaping the learning agenda and figuring out how to implement it, the 
funder encourages broader support for data activities, helps to clarify expectations, and reinforces the 
notion that learning is a shared enterprise to which everyone can and should contribute.  As NII 
demonstrated, people do not learn if they do not feel safe, so attention must also be paid to creating the 
conditions under which all parties can pursue the learning agenda together. 
 
Draw upon the expertise of an external advisory committee for evaluation and 
learning. 
 
Many foundations have found it useful to convene a group of experts with diverse experiences and 
perspectives to help weigh the relative advantages of different approaches to evaluation and to connect 
the evaluation to the latest thinking in the field.  Frequently, this group is most engaged  during the initial 
design phase and then reconvenes periodically to help interpret interim findings, refine the approach to 
accommodate experience on the ground, problem-solve when the evaluation faces obstacles, and 
disseminate results to diverse audiences. 
 
Don’t start implementation without a shared definition of success and how it will be 
measured. 
 
NII was launched without a clear definition of what success would look like.  Knowing the pathway to 
success, however, is as important for knowing what to measure as it is for knowing what actions to take 
or what resources to draw upon.  (In fact, a unifying theory of change may be especially important in 
initiatives that involve nonprofit community-based organizations, which traditionally operate in a narrowly 
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programmatic environment.  The theory becomes a tool for moving participants from a programmatic 
perspective to thinking about community-level results, and for assessing progress in that direction.) 
 
The definition of success may evolve over time, and the tools for measuring it may be imperfect, but 
having a shared definition up front helps avert conflict and disappointment down the road.  This is not a 
call to specify outcomes prematurely or to cleave rigidly to obsolete measures of success.  Indeed, 
outcomes are likely to evolve in response to new knowledge, new capacities, and new experience on the 
ground.  It is simply a recognition that, more often than one would hope, foundations and their partners 
do not make explicit at the outset their assumptions about what changes they hope to see in the target 
communities or how they expect to know whether such changes have occurred.  
 
Recognize, measure, and track a full range and continuum of outcomes, including 
changes in capacities and behaviors, instead of categorizing results as either 
processes or products or rejecting “soft” outcomes.   
 
The process-product tension is well-documented in the history of CCIs, most notably by the Aspen 
Roundtable on Comprehensive Community Initiatives in Voices from the Field (I).32  As Voices’ authors 
note, products (e.g., affordable houses, new street lights) are appealing because they are tangible and 
often early measures of success.  But CCIs also are defined by their commitment to the more slow-
growing processes (“soft” outcomes) that make community change authentic, possible, and sustainable:  
community building, capacity building, leadership development, resident empowerment, and resident 
participation.   
 
Positioning product against process—getting things done vs. how they get done—creates a false 
dichotomy because they are inextricably related.  Tension does surface, however, under pressure to 
achieve results quickly and efficiently, and in that context measurable products often take priority. 
 
One of our reviewers emphasized the important distinction between outcomes thinking and outcomes 
measurement, making the case that it’s very useful for everyone involved to think in terms of the 
outcomes they want the initiative to achieve but it is equally important not to let the challenges of 
measurement narrow the scope of legitimate outcomes or results that matter.  NII’s experience suggests 
that instead of dividing outcomes into processes and products, funders of community change should 
recognize that changes in how people think and act are, in and of themselves, important outcomes to be 
valued and measured, if imperfectly.  Such outcomes include:  an increase in political acumen; greater 
skill at developing strategies linked to clear goals; enhanced ability to make and act upon decisions; 
increased capacity to identify and attract resources; etc.  These outcomes are related to another that 
came up frequently in our review:  expanded and strengthened social networks, which give a community 
access to the expertise and resources needed to achieve goals over the long run. 
 
The last few years have seen several attempts to help people and organizations measure the 
development of these and other skills.  The McKinsey Capacity Assessment Grid, designed to give 
nonprofit organizations a sense of their strengths and weaknesses, is a starting point.  Reviewers praise 
two of this tool’s aspects in particular:  “It includes the most comprehensive set of questions and 
recognizes that organizational capacity includes higher-level elements of leadership, mission, and vision; 
[and] each question uses a four-level rating scale with detailed descriptions of activities that demonstrate 
capacity at each level,” thus ensuring that assessments are relatively consistent across respondents.33    
The McKinsey Grid contains indicators of capacity in seven areas—organizational aspirations, strategy, 
skills, human resources, systems and infrastructure, structure, and culture—but could be expanded or 
                                               
32 Kubisch, A., Brown, P., Chaskin, R., Hirota, J., Joseph, M., Richman, H, and Roberts, M.  (1997).  Voices from the Field: 
Learning from Comprehensive Community Initiatives.  Washington, DC:  Aspen Institute. 
33 Guthrie, K., and Preston, A.  (2005).  “Building Capacity While Assessing It:  Three Foundations’ Experiences Using 
the McKinsey Capacity Assessment Grid.”  San Francisco:  Blueprint Research and Design, Inc., p. 4. 
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adapted to encompass community-building capacities, too.  Promising work being done in the field of 
social and organizational network analysis may generate useful metrics for measuring this key outcome.34 
Other benchmarking frameworks have been developed (and continue to be refined) by Collaborations 
that Count (Ford Foundation), Making Connections (Annie E. Casey Foundation), Women’s Funding 
Network, Action Aid/Institute for Development Research, and Alliance for Justice, among others.35  
Additional work on benchmarks, scales, rubrics, definitions, and other continuum-oriented tools will 
advance the field even further—especially if the tools link strategies to outcomes.   
 
Recognize that grantees may not enter the initiative with capacity to produce 
outcomes or track progress toward them.   
 
It may be necessary to build grantees’ (and communities’) capacity around data and evaluation before 
they can provide evaluators with data or use evaluation findings productively.  
 
Position evaluation as a tool for improving practices and nurturing the change 
process as well as for gauging outcomes. 
 
There are several ways to do this.  One is by creating a system for documenting and analyzing what 
initiative participants are doing in the communities, within participating organizations, and even in the 
sponsoring foundation itself.  This usually includes establishing the expectation that evaluation data will 
inform and guide participants in real time. 
 
Another is to use data for planning and feedback, especially for discussions about the gap stakeholders 
are trying to close.  What is the status of the issue in question, where is the trend headed, what direction 
and how much do stakeholders want it to change, and if there’s a gap how can the initiative close it?  
Several initiatives have made good use of this type of gap analysis.  The Urban Health Initiative 
developed a “denominator exercise” in which local participants determined the scope and scale of 
necessary changes and what resources were needed to make it happen.  Making Connections applied a 
similar analysis to close the gap on children’s education outcomes.  Local teams mapped backward from 
the goal of having all children read at grade level by third grade to figure out what has to happen in early 
childhood to ensure that result.  The W.K. Kellogg Foundation and the Amherst H. Wilder Foundation are 
among other foundations that have used evaluation to focus initiative participants on the practical 
process of “closing the gap.”  
 
Researcher Patti Patrizi outlines an intriguing, broader option that she calls “evaluative inquiry”36 in a 
recent monograph.  She proposes that foundations first shift their thinking… 
 
• From evaluation as measurement to evaluation as inquiry 
• From evaluation as a specialist’s responsibility to evaluation as a leader’s responsibility 
• From evaluation as a discrete, outsourced function to evaluation as an ongoing, collective 
responsibility 
• From evaluation at the final stage of grantmaking to evaluation at every stage of grantmaking 
• From evaluation on the margins to evaluation at the center of everything we do 
• From evaluation as “the right answers” to evaluation as “the right questions” 
 
                                               
34 See, for example, Bruce Hoppe’s work to apply social network analysis to accelerate business results 
(http://connectedness.blogspot.com). 
35Guthrie, K., Louie, J., David, T., and Foster, C.C.  (2005).  “The Challenge of Assessing Advocacy:  Strategies for a 
Prospective Approach to Evaluating Policy Change and Advocacy.”  Los Angeles:  The California Endowment.  
36 Patrizi, P.  (2006).  “The Evaluation Conversation:  A Path to Impact for Foundation Boards and Executives.  Using 
Inquiry to Bring Evaluation to the Center of the Foundation Enterprise.”  Philadelphia:  Patrizi Associates.  Also 
available at www.foundationcenter.org/grantmakers/practice_matters. 
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…and then focus on seven “dynamic dimensions of foundation strategy”:  (1) Problem (understanding the 
community’s need); (2) Purpose (clarifying the desired change); (3) Pathway (taking a bet on the best 
means of achieving desired change based on evidence and experience); (4) Practice (acknowledging 
what we know, what we don’t know, and how we might learn more); (5) Progress (maintaining regular, 
systematic, and timely attention on what is being achieved); (6) Proof (identifying evidence needed to 
make decisions, and then using it); and (7) Promulgation (sharing with stakeholders what we’ve done 
and the difference and discoveries we’ve made).   
 
The model Patrizi suggests would have helped Hewlett frame NII’s evaluation as a way for everyone to 
become more strategic and capable, as well as a tool for assessing results.  Evaluation for program 
improvement also positions the evaluators as active learning partners rather than auditors.  
 
One place to start implementing evaluation in this way is by having a candid discussion among 
foundation trustees, staff, evaluators, and grantees about what kinds of information would be most likely 
to improve the work along the way, who should be responsible for collecting which elements of that 
information, and what resources are needed to do so.37  Basing an evaluation strategy on the different 
parties’ needs for information, realistic expectations about the demands of data collection and reporting, 
and a shared commitment to using the information to modify practice goes a long way toward creating 
informed, active participants in the learning process. 
 
Consider a phased approach to evaluation, linked to phases in the initiative’s own 
evolution and the iterative process of learning while doing. 
 
Early in an initiative, when strategies may be implicit or still evolving, it is especially difficult to measure 
progress toward outcomes.  The path taken during the “meandering” stage is both formative and 
informative, but it may not merit the exhaustive level of description that a full-blown intervention strategy 
requires.  “Perhaps foundations [should contract] for a smaller dose of evaluation during the meandering 
phase and add doses as clarity emerges,” a Hewlett staff member suggests, “[but] how do you contract 
for such a responsive, flexible evaluation over the life of a long initiative?”  The Casey Foundation 
addressed that question in Making Connections by having a multi-faceted evaluation.  Some facets (such 
as a baseline survey) were implemented immediately, while others (such as a process evaluation) were 
delayed until the work was well underway in the neighborhoods.  
 
A phased approach to evaluation also supports the iterative process of learning while doing.  Most 
community change participants can’t specify target outcomes very well at first because they don’t know 
yet what it will take to produce change.  (Thus, for example, the director of CCRP, which explicitly 
promoted learning while doing, tended to talk about “areas in which we hope to see change” rather than 
about specific outcomes to be achieved.)  It often is useful to start out with learning experiences 
structured around initial actions, such as seed grants for very specific projects that lay the groundwork 
for more ambitious work down the road.  It is very important to link these early successes to the 
initiative’s broader vision for change so the evaluation helps to refine and deepen the theory of change, 
build capacity for strategic thinking, and define the indicators of long-term success—a step that, 
unfortunately, often gets missed. 
 
Tap residents’ indigenous knowledge while also sharing good ideas gleaned from 
other communities and initiatives.   
 
The value of local knowledge versus proven models often gets debated around the extremes, whereas 
NII demonstrates that both have a role to play in shaping community change initiatives.  Board members 
in Mayfair, for example, benefited from participating in some national meetings and learning about 
                                               
37 David, T. (2006) “Evaluation and Foundations: Can We Have an Honest Conversation?” The Nonprofit Quarterly, 
13, (1). 
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effective practice in other communities at the same time that one of Mayfair’s most successful 
approaches—the use of promotores—emerged from local knowledge and culture.  Hewlett provided 
resources for its partners to visit and learn from other communities, but it wisely did not impose their 
approaches.   
 
Even so, the degree to which foundations and local groups can introduce new ideas to each other and 
debate their merits depends to a great extent on the amount of respect and trust in their relationship, as 
well as the extent of resident engagement and ownership.  Participation in a community-wide planning 
process, while important, is not enough to elicit the full scope of knowledge and skill that residents can 
contribute.  As community-organizing efforts have shown, it takes sustained effort, explicit strategies, and 
opportunities to develop and exercise leadership to fully tap the resources that residents possess. 
 
Ensure that foundation staff, as well as grantees, understand the requirements and 
limitations of evaluation.   
 
Contemporary initiatives generally recognize that nonprofits need some amount of technical support to 
define, measure, and report progress.  They are less certain, however, to recognize gaps in foundation 
staff’s own knowledge of what evaluations can and can’t do and what it takes to evaluate a complex 
initiative well.  The consequence, as Hewlett learned, can be protracted and debilitating tensions among 
the funder, the evaluator, and community participants.  
 
Foundation staff don’t need to be evaluation experts, but they do need to become familiar enough with 
the field of community change evaluation to be able to ask good questions, set realistic expectations, and 
make informed decisions.  The field has matured considerably since NII began, and many good resources 
are available to offer guidance.38  
 
Be realistic about what can be done to capture effects, given the nature of 
community change and the available time and resources. 
 
                                               
38 See, for example:   
• Bailey, T., Jordan, A., and Fiester, L.  (2006).  “Imagine, Act, Believe:  A Framework for Learning and Results in 
Community Change Initiatives.”  Baltimore:  The Annie E. Casey Foundation. 
• Woodwell, W.H.  (2005).  Evaluation as a Pathway to Learning.  Washington, DC:  Grantmakers for Effective 
Organizations.  
• Bartczak, L.  (2005).  A Funder’s Guide to Organizational Assessment:  Tools, Processes, and Their use in 
Building Capacity.  Washington, DC:  Grantmakers for Effective Organizations. 
• “Making Measures Work for You:  Outcomes and Evaluation,” “Learning Together:  Collaborative Inquiry Among 
Grant Makers,” and “Getting Inside the Story:  Ethnographic Approaches to Evaluation.”  Publications of 
GrantCraft, a project of the Ford Foundation.  Available online at www.grantcraft.org. 
• Guthrie, K., and Preston, A.  (2005).  “Building Capacity While Assessing It:  Three Foundations’ Experiences 
Using the McKinsey Capacity Assessment Grid.”  San Francisco:  Blueprint Research and Design, Inc. 
• Chin, J.  (2006).  “The Power of Learning:  Funders and Grantees Getting Smarter Together.”  Available online at 
http://blueprintrd.com/pubsdl.htm. 
• Hamilton, R., Brown, P., Chaskin, R., Fiester, L., Richman, H., Sojourner, A., and Weber, J.  (2006).  “Learning 
for Community Change: Core Components of Foundations that Learn.”  Chicago:  Chapin Hall Center for 
Children.  Available online at www.chapinhall.org. 
• The W. K. Kellogg Foundation Evaluation Handbook (1998), available online at 
http://www.wkkf.org/pubs/Tools/Evaluation/Pub770.pdf#search=%22foundation%20evaluation%20handbook%
22. 
• Connell, J.P., Kubisch, A.C., Schorr, L.B., and Weiss, C.H., eds.  (1995) New Approaches to Evaluating 
Community Initiatives Volume 1: Concepts, Methods, and Contexts.  New York:  The Aspen Institute. 
• Fulbright-Anderson, K., Kubisch, A.C., and Connell, J.P.  (1998).  New Approaches to Evaluating Community 
Initiatives Volume 2: Theory, Measurement, and Analysis.  New York:  The Aspen Institute.  
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After nearly two decades of dealing with “the attribution problem” in community change initiatives, we 
know that it is impossible to isolate a foundation’s specific contribution to community change.  
Foundations never act in a vacuum and never are single-handedly responsible for change.  Although this 
fact seems obvious, it often needs to be emphasized at the outset so that everyone has (a) the same 
expectations for what evaluation will and won’t be able to say about the foundation’s impact and (b) a 
sense of how evaluation can help to assess the initiative’s value even when it cannot provide 
unambiguous proof of impact or the extent of the foundation’s contribution to that impact.  
 
Model the learning process at all levels, holding everyone to the same standards for 
clarity on outcomes.  
 
A community change initiative involves lots of players, each with its own potential contribution to the 
initiative’s success.  These contributions need to be understood and assessed in order to evaluate the 
initiative’s overall success.  Rarely, however, do sponsoring foundations hold themselves to the same 
standard of clarity on outcomes that they require of grantees or partners.  The target outcomes don’t 
have to be the same for both parties—just the level of clarity.  For instance, have foundation staff 
specified their own desired results, strategies for achieving them, and indicators of progress for the 
initiative?  Can the foundation be as transparent in tracking its own contribution to the initiative’s success 
as it would like its partners to be?  Ignoring the contribution of any significant party—including the 
sponsoring foundation—necessarily limits the knowledge that an initiative can generate and undermines 
the collegial dynamic that fosters learning. 
 
Promote learning across sites and among partners.   
 
Cognizant of the challenges to cross-site learning, foundations have begun to infuse their work with new 
structures and tools ranging from peer learning partnerships and learning clusters to e-groups, study 
circles, and site exchanges.39 Well-facilitated, carefully designed convenings, retreats, or other 
opportunities for reflection among key players can surface early successes and emergent obstacles.  
Qualitative research conducted by ethnographers, diarists, or other professional observers—or by 
participants in the initiatives—can capture issues and achievements in real time.  It isn’t easy for 
foundations to link effective learning vehicles to an initiative’s theory and goals for community change, 
but doing so is likely to benefit all parties involved.  
 
Most foundations have found, as Hewlett did, that (a) it’s hard to promote cross-site learning when sites 
have very different needs, strengths, contexts, and approaches from each other; (b) it requires highly 
skilled facilitation; and (c) key people from the sites often resist participating, at first, because they don’t 
want to take time away from doing the work.  Nonetheless, several foundations have concluded that if 
they put an adequate learning system in place and stick with it, the effort to foster cross-site learning 
pays off.  Examples include: 
 
• Learning Cohorts—groups of grantees who share their knowledge and solve common problems 
(Robert Wood Johnson Foundation) 
 
• Learning Clusters—groups of grantees and non-grantees that meet quarterly, organized around a 
theme of work or a program area (Barr Foundation) 
 
• Annual Learning Institutes combined with Learning Clusters—opportunities for teams of collaborators 
from the sites to come together (The Duke Endowment’s Program for the Rural Carolinas) 
 
                                               
39 Hamilton, R., Brown, P., Chaskin, R., Fiester, L., Richman, H., Sojourner, A., and Weber, J.  (2006).  “Learning for 
Community Change: Core Components of Foundations that Learn.”  Chicago:  Chapin Hall Center for Children. Available online 
at www.chapinhall.org.  
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• Cross-site Learning Exchanges—periodic convenings organized around topics chosen by local partners 
and the Foundation, to learn about issues and strategies relevant to the developmental stage of the 
initiative (Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Making Connections Initiative) 
 
Cultivate a flexible learning stance. 
 
All partners share responsibility for learning, but the sponsoring foundation usually sets the tone for an 
initiative’s learning culture.  That culture starts with foundation leaders who value candor, are willing to 
be fallible, accept others’ honest mistakes, and support internal structures for improving knowledge and 
practice.  Such a stance, combined with patience, humility, and a curious attitude, can go a long way 
toward establishing an initiative-wide culture and relationships that support mutual reflection and allow 
the parties to make collective adjustments as they learn.   
 
Flexibility is especially crucial to a learning stance.  This means that funders and evaluators need to be 
comfortable with the formative nature of the work.  If the evaluation isn’t yielding the needed 
information, the evaluation design and/or methods need adjustment.  If the intended outcomes prove to 
be out of reach within the initiative’s timeline, interim measures need to be identified and measured.  And 
if whole dimensions of the initiative’s theory of change appear unsubstantiated on the basis of evidence 
from implementation, new theories that incorporate this evidence need to be developed.  
 
Put mechanisms in place to explicitly support learning. 
 
The structures and processes that make learning possible include:  evaluation and other information 
collection; an external advisory committee for evaluation and learning (described above); technical 
assistance on collecting, interpreting, and using data from evaluation and other sources; documentation 
of what is happening—especially of the choices and trade-offs being made, and their consequences—in 
real time; processes for reporting on progress and challenges, reviewing them, and solving problems 
collectively; and time for relationship- and trust-building.   
 
Such mechanisms help to keep learning on the agenda (and in the schedule) when other demands 
compete for time, money, and attention.  They also give learners a framework for taking the risks 
associated with learning.  People often become nervous when asked to talk publicly about what they 
have and haven’t achieved—especially if the results are less than anticipated, resources are too slim to be 
wasted, or the discussion reveals a shortcoming.  People involved with initiatives in struggling 
communities may feel especially vulnerable when acknowledging mistakes; they often have made great 
personal sacrifices for their work, or they may base their identity, in part, on “making a difference.”  In 
that context, an interviewee noted, the mere questions “What do you plan to do, what do you hope to 
achieve, and how will you know when you’ve achieved it?” produce angst. 
 
 
— 5 — 
SUPPORTING CHANGE:   
SUFFICIENT AND APPROPRIATE RESOURCES 
 
e turn to the issue of resources last because it affects each of the three core activities already 
discussed—framing, managing, and measuring change in a long-term community change 
initiative.  Without the right supports applied in sufficient amounts, even a well-framed, 
effectively managed, and accurately measured initiative may fail.  Conversely, with appropriate and 
sufficient resources it may be possible to overcome some flaws in design and implementation as an 
initiative unfolds. 
 
W 
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The resources most people think of as essential supports for foundation initiatives include time; money; 
human effort, knowledge, and commitment; and technical assistance.  NII’s experience helps us look 
within those broad categories to learn more about what resources a long-term community change 
initiative needs and how those resources should be applied.   
 
KEY RESOURCE 1:   
A LONG TIMEFRAME FOR CHANGE 
 
The Hewlett Foundation’s timeframe for NII (one year of planning and six of implementation per site; a 
total of 10 years from beginning to end of the Foundation’s grant making) was generous for its day.  The 
longest-running privately funded initiatives of the 1990s lasted five to seven years.  CCI practitioners and 
researchers urged funders to give them enough time to achieve and measure results, and Hewlett 
heeded their argument.  Moreover, Hewlett included in its timeframe a year-long planning phase for each 
site, which reinforced the sense that complex, meaningful change doesn’t occur quickly. 
 
In theory, Hewlett’s long-term commitment gave local partners leeway to tackle recalcitrant issues, such 
as poverty and social isolation; to build the relationships and capacities needed with, and within, 
communities before taking action; to involve people and organizations that had never participated in this 
type of work before; and to get back on track if an experimental strategy didn’t pan out.  That might 
have been the reality for NII, too, except for two circumstances.  First, from the sites’ perspective—
especially in East Palo Alto, which was the last neighborhood to enter NII—the shift to an outcomes 
framework disrupted the work so thoroughly that participants felt they were essentially starting anew.   
 
Second, although in theory each site had a year to plan the work before implementing it, none of the 
sites was ready to begin when its planning period ended.  The foundation’s budget cycle required sites to 
submit their proposed plans three months before the end of the year, which shortened the planning 
period.  CFSV (Mayfair) needed time to staff up; West Oakland required six months of preliminary 
groundwork before collaborators could hold their first community meeting; and in East Palo Alto, it took 
extra time for Hewlett and PCF to negotiate their partnership.    
 
Our interviews surfaced the following insights about timeframes: 
 
• Funders tend to set their initiatives’ start and end dates arbitrarily, dictated by internal 
schedules and priorities.  If the resulting timeframe doesn’t allow enough time to get the work off 
the ground, it may not be worth launching the initiative. 
 
• Initiative funders, managers, and implementers need to agree on a reasonable 
expectation for how long it will take to do the work.  The negotiation has to take into account 
that community change is very process-oriented—that is, it involves sharing new ideas, establishing 
new relationships, developing new capacities, and testing new strategies—and processes take time to 
reach fruition.  Furthermore, the negotiation isn’t just about the total amount of time to be invested; 
it’s also about what sequence or staging of activities, resources, etc. will be the most useful and best 
aligned with the initiative’s goals.  Relationship building, community engagement, and leadership 
development may need the most attention and resources at the beginning of an initiative, for 
instance, but data collection and analysis, and the resources they require, may become increasingly 
important as the work matures.40    
 
 
                                               
40 See, for example,  Fiester, L.  (Forthcoming).  “Making Connections at Midpoint, Vol. I:  Early Choices, Lessons, 
and Results.”  Baltimore:  Annie E. Casey Foundation. 
  46
• The timeframe should ensure sufficient time for new ideas and behaviors to take hold 
and for participants to ride out the rough spots, without making such a long commitment 
that it removes the immediate pressure to get results.  This is a delicate balance to achieve, 
and it underscores the fact that simply making a resource available to an initiative will not 
automatically guarantee success.  The resource has to be accompanied by a strategy, and 
participants have to hold themselves accountable for using the resource according to the strategy.  
 
• Talking explicitly and repeatedly with participants about the rationale and strategy for 
the timeframe may help to keep expectations in line with reality.  Managing expectations is 
one of the toughest challenges for any ambitious initiative, and (as NII’s experience demonstrates) 
when expectations conflict with each other and/or reality, it’s easy for the work to unravel.  NII’s 
developers say they explained the need for a long commitment thoroughly to the trustees who were 
in place when NII began, but subsequent changes in board membership diluted their understanding.    
 
• The transition from one phase of the initiative to the next (e.g., from planning to 
implementation) should be determined by whether the site has reached essential 
milestones rather than by arbitrary timelines.  Some foundations find it useful to let a site’s 
performance determine the pace of community change.  This approach requires clarity on how 
performance will be assessed, and it presents administrative challenges for a foundation that might 
prefer to handle all communities in a multi-site initiative as a cohort.  By creating a funding 
mechanism triggered by performance rather than length of time, however, the sponsoring foundation 
signals respect for the inherent differences among sites and places responsibility for keeping pace 
largely with the people doing the work on the ground. 
 
• Within a timeframe, the sequencing of activities is important.  NII and many other 
community change initiatives (most recently, Making Connections) have demonstrated the 
importance of focusing first on building strong relationships and addressing issues of race, class, 
culture, and power.  Once the relationships exist, participants can use them to achieve practical, 
specific projects that represent short-term wins.  Those “micro-successes,” as the Casey Foundation 
calls them, can ultimately add up to bigger achievements. 
 
• A long timeframe alone won’t always get to the right results.  If the initiative is struggling too 
hard, for too long, on too many levels—if essential milestones are unreachable and relationships 
irreparable with the amount of time and money available—it may be time to end the initiative, 
change grantees, or adjust the amount of funding (up or down).  Each foundation has a unique set 
of factors to consider when contemplating whether to cut losses and end an initiative, including its 
broad organizational priorities, alternative options for using the money, and whether the funders’ 
long-term credibility can weather negative publicity in the short term.   
 
KEY RESOURCE 2:   
AN ADEQUATE AMOUNT OF MONEY, DISBURSED STRATEGICALLY 
 
No matter how they feel about other matters, NII’s partners, participants, and observers praise Hewlett 
for the amount of money it committed to the initiative—about $15 million over 10 years—and for 
continuing to fund the effort generously despite the challenges that arose.  Clearly, money is an essential 
resource.  And, just as clearly, ambitious goals such as poverty reduction and long-term community 
improvement require a lot of money.  But NII also illustrates two important facts about funding 
community change:  (1) even a generous amount of money may be insufficient to meet ambitious goals; 
and (2) how one positions financial resources in the initiative, and how one disburses them, are almost as 
important as how much money one has. 
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Hewlett committed $750,000 per year to each site’s managing partner, of which a significant portion was 
regranted to projects in the sites.41  Hewlett also expected the managing partners to raise additional 
funds from their donors and other local sources.  This funding strategy, similar to that of many multi-site 
foundation initiatives, has the advantage of making relatively large amounts of money available to sites 
with relatively few restrictions.  It also has drawbacks, however, as NII collaborators learned: 
 
• Making the managing partner responsible for raising funds and residents responsible for 
spending them creates an inherent tension around money.  At times, community foundation 
staff resented the assumption that they would raise whatever amount of money local partners 
thought they needed.  Many residents, meanwhile, never realized how hard it was to generate funds 
until the initiative drew to an end and the responsibility of sustaining the changes fell to them.   
 
• Leading with money distorts expectations for what the initiative will accomplish.  To 
foundation staff who are not involved in the day-to-day, incremental, and labor-intensive work of 
community change, $750,000 annually seems like a great deal of money.  The need to justify that 
amount of funding within the sponsoring foundation can prompt initiative leaders to be overly 
optimistic about what they think the money will accomplish.  
 
Within poor neighborhoods, meanwhile, sudden wealth can disrupt power dynamics and cause 
conflicts among residents as they assume authority for local grant making.  “For people who don’t 
work in the philanthropic sector or haven’t had experience with large sums of money, the perception 
of what $2,000 will buy is distorted,” a managing partner told us.  “In their experience, [it] may 
sound like a fortune.  In hindsight, we needed more time to explore the issues around money and to 
educate residents [about] who got how much and what the grant money could realistically buy.”  
 
• Leading with money can create local expectations that (a) every site will get the same 
amount of money regardless of their need and their performance, and (b) every site will 
receive its allotted money whether or not people are ready to spend it well.  This can 
produce various results, none of them particularly good:  a need to manage the “feeding frenzy”; 
dependence on the funder; pressure to spend money before other capacities and supports are in 
place; a sense of entitlement rather than a focus on results; and wasted resources.   
 
At the same time, money is an important signal that the foundation is committed to a community.  
One person associated with NII’s launch told us it would have seemed “arrogant” to say to residents 
and leaders of local organizations, “we want to do an initiative here but there won’t be any money in 
the beginning; once you come up with an idea, we’ll think about whether to fund it.”  
 
• It is possible to overwhelm a site with resources before people and organizations are 
ready to use the resources effectively..  Even though the need for resources in poor 
communities exceeds the amount any foundation can spend, it is possible to shower a neighborhood 
with more money than partners can absorb productively within the allotted timeframe.  At various 
times, for example, both Mayfair and East Palo Alto faced the bizarre situation of not being able to 
spend all of their Hewlett money because they didn’t have the necessary systems, people, and 
spending strategies in place.   
 
• Resident involvement brings the community’s preexisting power dynamics to the 
surface.  It can be a challenge to sort out the grant applicants who have an axe to grind from “true” 
neighborhood leaders, especially during the early stages of an initiative.  But the choices made about 
how to organize and engage residents will determine whether resources go to gatekeepers—
                                               
41 The exception was East Palo Alto, where grant making amounted to $1.4 million in 2004, $1.6 million in 2005, and 
$1.7 million in 2006.   
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individuals and organizations who may or may not represent the neighborhood’s best interests—or to 
democratic processes that ensure all voices are heard.   
 
• Big money often is necessary to produce big results, but it comes with tradeoffs.  It can 
get bottlenecked in a single grantee that doesn’t yet have the capacity to spend effectively; and it 
can distract partners from substantive issues.  Some interviewees blame the amount of money 
involved in NII for focusing the Hewlett/managing-partner relationship on fiscal matters, especially 
budget approvals and grant making, rather than on refining NII’s framework or learning from 
implementation.  The feeding frenzy “is not as intense at the foundation/ intermediary level but it still 
operates,” observes a managing partner source.  “I would never start an initiative that has these 
kinds of goals with a big pot of money on the table.  It dramatically skews the issues, exacerbates 
conflicts, and creates unnecessary tensions.”  This phenomenon makes it important to accompany 
money with structures, strategies (such as system for making mini-grants), and relationships that 
ensure the money is used well.  
 
• Foundations’ grant cycles aren’t aligned with the pace of neighborhood development, 
and the pressure to meld the two can undermine choices.  In a large-scale, multi-pronged 
initiative, foundation staff often feel they have to move money quickly or lose the ability to spend it 
within the current budget cycle.  That was certainly the case for the Hewlett staff involved with NII.  
When crises arose, local capacities came up short, or proposed projects failed to meet Hewlett’s 
criteria, they faced a dilemma:  Should they intervene and unilaterally select local grant recipients (or 
help local partners rewrite their proposals), just to keep money flowing into these very needy 
communities—or should they cut off the spigot until local players were ready to make the decisions 
themselves?  If they chose the first option, they might waste some resources and/or aggravate the 
“too much too soon” problem we noted in Chapter 2.  If they chose the second, they might starve 
the very process of learning and skill-building they are trying to nurture.   
 
• Leveraged funds aren’t always what they seem to be.  In most cases, the money that people 
claim to have leveraged really represents co-funding or simultaneous investment by another funder 
who was already working in the area.  Or it may be money reallocated from one project to another or 
diverted from a different neighborhood.  Both types of funding are good; they indicate that the 
community change effort is able to attract multiple funders and that the funders are able to work 
across turf boundaries.  But it is important to recognize that a net gain for one community/project 
may be a loss for another if the funder has simply reallocated the same amount of money to a new 
use.  Furthermore, a neighborhood initiative that attracts money from many private sources may 
cause local policy makers to shift their dollars to other, poorer neighborhoods—making it even harder 
to support the work at a sustainable level.  
 
An alternative funding model, which involved giving smaller “seed grants” to stimulate community 
interest and build capacity to manage larger grants, was emerging at about the time NII began through 
the Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program.  CCRP (1991-98) was created by the 
Surdna Foundation to “turn neighborhoods into fully engaged and functional communities with 
[community development corporations] serving as organizers, facilitators, and implementers of integrated 
strategies.”42  Although CCRP acquired a cadre of about 20 funders, it never had the level of resources 
committed to NII.  Nonetheless, CCRP demonstrated that a small amount of money, distributed 
incrementally and with few restrictions, could produce significant results. 
 
Core elements of CCRP’s approach included (1) funding for at least two full-time, dedicated program staff 
based at each CDC to keep the work moving forward; (2) the provision of “first-in money” to 
demonstrate confidence in new projects and reduce the risk for other funders; and (3) permission to use 
                                               
42 http://www.commbuild.org/html_pages/ccrpfinal.html.] 
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much of the money (about 67%) “flexibly, quickly, and non-bureaucratically.”43  Above all, CCRP didn’t 
lead with money.  The initiative provided seed money and interim support, when and as opportunities 
arose, and it thus avoided some of the pitfalls outlined above.   
 
A few years later, Casey adopted a similar approach for Making Connections.  Casey allows local 
implementers to draw from a pool of flexible, quickly accessed funds for certain activities, while the 
Foundation covers the costs of evaluation, some technical assistance, and local data collaboratives 
directly.  (Casey was so cognizant of the distorting properties of money that it also defined one of Making 
Connections’ early principles as, “Lead with ideas, not money.”) 
 
The Levi Strauss Foundation, meanwhile, has established an endowment for its work in San 
Francisco’s Mission District.  This strategy gives community players more time to develop capacity for 
strategic decision-making before having to exercise that ability.  It also allows for more sustainability and 
coordination of funding from various sources.   
 
KEY RESOURCE 3:   
HUMAN EFFORT, KNOWLEDGE, AND COMMITMENT  
 
It takes intense effort, sustained commitment, and an evolving knowledge of “what works” to change the 
way people think, act, and experience life.  NII’s experience suggests the following points about these 
essential human resources: 
 
• Community change is labor-intensive work, both in terms of the number of people 
needed to do the work and the level of effort required from each participant.  How much 
time the staff of the sponsoring and community foundations must commit depends on how the 
foundations define their roles.  Hewlett staff—either by choice or because they didn’t define their role 
clearly—played a more hands-on role in NII sites than they anticipated, even though the Foundation 
didn’t have the mission or capacities of an operating foundation.  Consequently, Hewlett staff were 
stretched thinly to cover all of their NII responsibilities.  Community foundation staff also say the 
initiative took more of their time and energy than anticipated.  As underscored in Chapter 3, by 
getting clear about mutual roles and accountabilities at the outset of an initiative, foundations and 
their partners can decide together what staff are needed in each organization to support the 
initiative.  
 
• Support and involvement from top-level foundation leaders (executives, program 
managers, and board members) are crucial for long-term initiatives.  Staff turnover and 
fatigue on the ground can easily nudge an initiative off course unless the folks at the top see the 
work as a priority.  As a community foundation representative observed about both NII’s sponsor and 
the managing partner, “The higher-up people need to know the incredible reach and breadth that 
this kind of initiative has in the community [and] its potential, both good and bad.  There are so 
many opportunities to drift [that the work] needs to be kept at the top of the pile of foundation 
activities, even if the [amount of] money is not so big.”   
 
• Community foundation donors can be an important resource for community change.  The 
more community foundations are involved as genuine partners rather than simply as fiscal agents, 
the more opportunities there are to engage donors.  Community foundations vary in terms of the 
proportion of their funds that are discretionary versus donor-advised.  The Peninsula Community 
                                               
43Spilka, G., and Burns, T.  (March 1998).  “The Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program in the South 
Bronx:  Final Assessment Report.”  Philadelphia:  The OMG Center for Collaborative Learning.  Retrieved from 
http://www.commbuild.org/html_pages/ccrpfinal.html. 
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Foundation, for example, had limited discretionary funds but, through an extensive donor education 
effort, raised considerable money for NII from its donors and thus was able to keep supporting 
community change in East Palo Alto even after PCF withdrew from its managing partner role.  Donors 
also can provide expertise and advice, access to relevant networks, and behind-the-scenes work as 
movers and shakers who can help get things done in the larger environment.  
 
• National and community foundations’ institutional assets can be harnessed for 
community change.  In order to promote NII’s goals, both Hewlett and its managing partners 
assumed strategic roles beyond grant making, such as convener, coach, and technical assistance 
provider.  Recent studies of “embedded” funders underscore the value of those resources, suggesting 
that foundations can increase their effectiveness through various forms of financial investment as 
well as non-financial roles that add political and civic legitimacy to the community-change effort and 
encourage broad participation and support.44  Community foundation staff and trustees are especially 
well positioned to mobilize their long-term, dynamic relationships with community actors in this way. 
 
Another way to think about human resources is in terms of the specific skills, knowledge, and qualities 
possessed by the people and organizations involved in an initiative.  We know something about the skills 
and attributes needed by other people working on the front lines of community initiatives.  All partners 
need:  humility, demonstrated by a desire to learn about local context and a respect for people, place, 
cultures, and history; curiosity, a sense of inquiry, and the desire to learn; the ability to learn quickly in 
new situations and to incorporate lessons learned from past experiences; flexibility, demonstrated by the 
ability to consider nontraditional strategies, a willingness to adjust methods if necessary, and the courage 
to admit when something isn’t working; and cultural competence. 
 
NII also highlights the need for specific stakeholders to have certain other characteristics.  Evaluators, 
for example, need: 
 
• Clarity about who the client is and what the purpose of the evaluation is 
• Comprehension of the initiative’s theory and strategies 
• A focus on learning, not just on measuring 
• Ability to demystify the evaluation process and to translate complex technical terms into everyday 
language 
• Creativity in helping people learn from each other in real time 
• Understanding of what participants already know, what they want to learn, and what they need to 
know but might not be aware of 
• Commitment to building feedback loops and reflection into the fabric of the evaluation 
 
Staff of the sponsoring foundation need: 
• Clarity about the theory of change 
• Inclination to partner with grantees 
• Prior experience with on-the-ground community change 
• Diplomacy in public, extreme candor in private 
• Strategic thinking, including the ability to find and foster it where it isn’t immediately apparent 
• Ability to read the political dynamics in a community 
 
 
 
                                               
44 Sojourner, A., Brown, P., Chaskin, R., Hamilton, R., Fiester, L. and Richman, H.  (2004)  “Moving Forward While 
Staying in Place: Embedded Funders and Community Change”; and Brown, P., Chaskin, R., Richman  H., and Weber, 
J. (2006) “Embedded Funders and Community Change: Profiles.”  Chicago: Chapin Hall Center for Children.  Available 
online at www.chapinhall.org.  
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Staff of the intermediary organization need: 
• Understanding of evaluation and of community outcomes 
• Strategic approach to grant making 
• Understanding of how to negotiate with government entities, beyond the realm of funding (e.g., the 
ability to cut through red tape) 
• Ability to work in a highly political environment 
• A sense of how complex and complicated community change is 
• Ability to organize and facilitate technical assistance 
• Ability to see the big picture while also managing details 
 
Neighborhood residents need the ability to get information to fill knowledge gaps, to generate respect 
across and within diverse racial/ethnic groups in the neighborhood, and to serve as a bridge builder or 
ambassador of the work within the neighborhood.  Technical assistance providers need awareness of 
the big picture and how each piece of technical assistance fits in and a desire to work in partnership with 
local participants.  
 
KEY RESOURCE 4: 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  
 
It is noteworthy and commendable that Hewlett recognized, from the beginning of NII, that training and 
technical assistance would be an essential part of the initiative—even if NII’s designers did not fully 
anticipate the depth and scope of the need for TA.  At first, the managing partners hired TA providers 
from community-based organizations, national consulting firms, and university-based research centers, as 
well as independent consultants, while Hewlett arranged additional TA as needs arose.  In 2002, Hewlett 
centralized TA and brought it under the Foundation’s management to improve its quality and to 
streamline delivery.   
 
Regardless of who was arranging it, the technical assistance provided through NII encountered issues 
about providers, content, local ownership, and coordination that other multi-site, place-based, community 
change initiatives share.  NII’s experience with TA also illustrates the overarching question of how 
funders can help grantees and collaborators develop capacity, especially for strategic thinking and action. 
 
TA AS A MEANS FOR BUILDING CAPACITY 
 
The issue of capacity is relevant to community change initiatives in three respects:  because the presence 
or absence of specific capacities affects the trajectory of work within sites; because the assumptions 
about local capacity made by initiative designers affect the initiative’s structure, strategies, and 
relationships; and because the desire to build new capacities or strengthen existing ones affects decisions 
about what technical assistance to provide and how to provide it.   
 
NII partners and participants give Hewlett a great deal of credit for aiming to build capacity in the 
neighborhoods rather than simply trying to “fix” them.  Indeed, two of NII’s six goals involved capacity 
building (of community-based organizations and of community foundations).  Mayfair and East Palo Alto 
both offer examples of capacities created and incubated by NII, such as Nuestra Casa, an organization in 
East Palo that helped Spanish-speaking parents understand and participate in their children’s school 
experience; and MII, which grew into a credible neighborhood organization that helped other 
organizations improve and brokered partnerships within and outside the neighborhood.   
 
However, NII leaders also misread capacity needs in some crucial ways, beginning with the capacities of 
community foundations (see Chapter 3).  Nor did Hewlett and the managing partners express a clear 
sense of what capacities local implementers should have, which meant that NII’s goals and expectations 
didn’t always align with local realities.  And the issue of capacity butted up against concerns about 
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resident autonomy.  Tensions arose during the early years in East Palo Alto, for instance, when OEPA’s 
resident-led working groups chose grant recipients and projects that the managing partner deemed 
weak.  When community foundation staff, concerned about their accountability for Hewlett funds, 
overrode the residents’ choices, community members charged PCF with reneging on the promise that NII 
was “the People’s Initiative.”   
 
Those experiences support several observations about TA’s role in capacity building, outlined at the end 
of this chapter. 
 
SELECTION OF TA PROVIDERS 
 
At first, NII inundated sites with technical assistance providers.  During NII’s first several years, 
technical assistance got ahead of itself; there simply was too much expertise, provided by too many 
people, too fast for the people who needed to formulate strategies on-site to absorb.  “There was an idea 
that if you just threw in more experts, things would get better,” one interviewee recalled.  In 2002-03, 
for instance, the local intermediary in East Palo Alto—which had a total of four staff—had the National 
Community Development Institute, the Haas Center for Public Service, LISC, Center for Justice, 
Tolerance, and Community, and JMPT all providing assistance.  The experts all vied for the attention and 
endorsement of intermediary leaders; they all believed they were the community’s real champions; and 
they all answered to different institutions and bosses.  During the last three years of the initiative, 
Hewlett reduced the number of TA providers and assigned them distinct roles, which improved the 
situation.  
 
NII’s university-based TA partners get mixed reviews.  A review by Julia Parzen45 describes the 
many ways that university-community partnerships added value to NII, such as producing data that 
helped to frame community strengths and needs in very concrete terms.  NII’s program staff used the 
Haas Center’s data analyses, for example, when writing internal reports about the strategies put forth by 
local intermediaries.  CJTC also provided solid, compelling regional data.  But the university partners were 
not well-positioned “to dig in with the intermediaries and help them figure out how to apply the strategies 
in a hands-on way,” a Hewlett staff member says.  It takes experience and some very explicit skills to 
work productively in low-income communities (see pp. 48-49), and the graduate students and junior staff 
whom universities often assign to do this work do not necessarily have those capacities. 
 
TA CONTENT 
 
The NII model did not specify an overarching framework or strategy, so it was impossible to 
develop a standard menu of technical assistance for all sites.  Instead, NII was guided by implicit 
assumptions that (a) residents and new intermediary organizations could ask for the help they needed in 
an organized way and (b) NII’s technical assistance consultants would know how to assess their needs 
for help and recommend TA strategies to Hewlett.  Both assumptions proved false during the first half of 
the initiative.   
 
During the second half Hewlett worked to improve TA, especially by reducing the cadre of contractors to 
a select, experienced corps and clearly defining their roles.  Foundation staff recall that local partners, 
evaluators, and TA providers found this second phase of TA adequate and effective.  Our interviews with 
members of those same stakeholder groups suggest that NII’s technical assistance did improve but still 
could not build all of the capacities needed to ensure locally sustained positive changes.  For example, 
many of the NII intermediaries’ board members and staff were taking on administrative and governance 
                                               
45 Parzen, J.  (2002).  “University Partnerships with Community Change Initiatives:  Lessons Learned from the 
Technical Assistance Partnerships of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s Neighborhood Improvement 
Initiative.”  Available online at www.Hewlett.org. 
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“The central [TA] issue was 
about power and who 
represents the community.”  
—Hewlett representative  
responsibilities for the first time, but NII’s planners and leaders did not anticipate their need for very 
basic knowledge.  Recalls a foundation representative: 
 
I was very clear with [the intermediary] about things like our expectations for an upcoming 
planning report, but I didn’t anticipate the need to be clearer about what they would need to do 
and figure out ahead of time to write that report—[to explain that they needed] to have talked to 
their board and constituents about what they wanted, to have systems in place for how they 
would spend the money, etc. 
 
During the later phase of technical assistance, TA’s benefits were more likely to be limited by the 
intermediary organization's internal challenge of both trying to grow roots and establish momentum at 
the same time as needing to prepare for the end of Hewlett funding.  
 
LOCAL OWNERSHIP OF TA 
 
Effective technical assistance is both responsive to local demand and strategically directed.  
Community organizations want responsibility for pursuing their TA needs, but local partners cannot be 
expected to gauge all of their own knowledge needs accurately.  Therefore, sites need technical 
assistance for the issues that community members “own” and on the models, strategies, and practices 
that initiative directors know to be important.  NII never found a 
comfortable balance between selecting TA providers for sites based on 
what Hewlett perceived as the capacity needs, and allowing people 
onsite to manage their own assistance.  (The same issue surfaced in 
Casey’s Making Connections initiative, which began with a help desk 
format that fielded sites’ TA requests but then moved to a combination 
of site-generated peer learning exchanges and Foundation-designated 
convenings on topics that initiative managers deem important.) 
 
COHERENCE AND COORDINATION OF TA 
 
NII quickly encountered a challenge that is best described as too many cooks in the kitchen, 
working without a menu.  The concept of assisting sites on many topics, through many types of 
providers, was a good one but it faltered in execution.  The biggest stumbling block lay in bringing the 
disparate pieces together coherently without a strong strategic framework for the initiative itself.  
Observers of NII who are familiar with the TA component of other CCIs find the lack of coordination a 
familiar theme.  Casey’s Rebuilding Communities Initiative, for example, eventually found a systematic 
way to connect TA to its theory of change, but in the early days there was a sense in sites that TA 
providers “were dropping out of the sky and nobody knew why they were there…People were brought in 
to fix things or build capacity for a specific activity with no sense of how it all fit together.  There was no 
one directing the traffic.”  
 
For NII, there were other challenges, too.  Sites felt pressured to use the TA providers whether or not 
they recognized a need for the services being provided; and the differences in concepts and techniques 
recommended by different TA providers confused TA recipients.  Eventually, concerned about the quality 
and alignment of services across sites, Hewlett designated one of its own staff members to manage and 
coordinate TA across all NII sites.  In East Palo Alto, Hewlett also reduced the number of TA providers to 
two people focusing on strategic planning, leadership coaching, and resource development.   
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SELECTED OBSERVATIONS ABOUT RESOURCES 
 
As with the observations made in Chapter 4, we caution readers that what follows is not a complete set 
of lessons for philanthropy.  It is a short list of reflections on the resource issues most relevant to NII.   
 
The corollary to time is patience, and it takes plenty of both for community change 
efforts to show positive results. 
 
In many ways this work is a multi-generational endeavor, and it takes a willingness to stay the course for 
the duration. 
 
Lead with relationships, not money.   
  
There’s no denying that money is extremely important for any effort to empower residents and 
strengthen neighborhoods.  But money also has an overwhelming power in poor communities, and its 
presence affects the power dynamic between funders and local collaborators.  Funders need to contain 
their power and make sure it isn’t used arbitrarily, and an important way to ensure that is to take big 
pots of money off the table during the initiative’s fragile, early years while the relationships that make 
change possible are still evolving.    
 
Be clear up front about non-negotiable expectations embedded in the provision of 
resources, and give community partners the opportunity to opt out. 
 
Partners, especially in the communities, need to feel free to exit the initiative if they think the price of 
participation is too high.  If they don’t, it is much harder to establish the level of trust, commitment, and 
partnership required for difficult community changes. 
 
It takes an innovative funding structure to promote a new way of doing business. 
 
In addition to leading with ideas and relationships rather than money, this means linking the amount of 
money a site receives to local capacity.  Thus, for example, during the earliest stage of an initiative when 
local partners are developing the leadership and management skills needed to spend and oversee large 
funds, it make sense to give primarily small grants.  By the time the local partners or intermediary have 
reached the height of their capacity, it makes sense to decrease the sponsoring foundation’s financial 
contribution and increase the proportion that local partners raise on their own behalf. 
 
Innovative funding may also mean creating the flexible spending pools and endowments described on p. 
46.  And it may also mean setting aside some funds that can be spent outside the dictates of the normal 
grant-making schedule—both more quickly and more slowly, in response to both immediate and 
developmental needs.   
 
Getting deeply involved in a community, even over a relatively short time, gives the 
funder inside knowledge that can pay off over the long term. 
 
Working in the NII neighborhoods gave Hewlett an opportunity for reconnaissance—a chance to get to 
know the players, institutions, change agents, racial/ethnic/political dynamics, etc. that affect how an 
initiative plays out.  Ideally, such knowledge prepares the funder for future work in the community, even 
beyond the life of one initiative.  That certainly is a lesson that Hewlett staff take from the NII 
experience.  “NII tested out people and opportunities,” explains an interviewee.  “We learned where the 
resources are and what the levers [for change] are.  For example, we’re funding more work in East Palo 
Alto today that grew out of our NII partnership with the New Teacher’s Center—partnerships we might 
not have forged otherwise because we would have seen the institutions as marginal.”   
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The effort to work “comprehensively” in a community builds powerful alliances that 
cut across professional and cultural boundaries. 
 
The term “comprehensive” often promises more than it can deliver, and so today we talk about 
community change initiatives rather than comprehensive community initiatives.  But the idea of 
addressing multiple issues and nurturing multiple strengths in poor communities, rather than addressing 
a single issue, is as worthwhile and compelling as ever—and NII demonstrates this lesson well.  In late 
2006, two eighth-graders were shot and killed in East Palo Alto.  Immediately, staff from the New 
Teacher’s Center, parents, and police officers began working together to address the community crisis.  
“That would not have happened before NII or if [the initiative] had been sprinkled across a broader 
area,” an observer notes.  “It happened because people had gotten used to working together on a lot of 
other issues.”   
 
This type of labor-intensive work in communities may not be appropriate for 
foundations that are leanly staffed, unprepared for a hands-on role in sites, and/or 
unwilling to give management authority over to an intermediary. 
 
It takes a core group of staff with dedicated time to make this kind of initiative work.  If the sponsoring 
foundation can’t provide the necessary human resources in-house or won’t purchase them from another 
entity, the foundation probably shouldn’t take on a community change initiative.  That is not to say, 
however, that the foundation can’t play a valuable role in helping to change specific aspects of a 
community through more discrete grants and programs. 
 
Technical assistance that aims to build capacity rather than apply an external solution 
requires extra time, money, and patience. 
 
TA that helps partners develop capacity involves:  
 
• Incorporating and supporting tools for strategic thinking, learning, and planning—both existing tools 
and promising new ones.  Examples include:  pathway mapping; logic modeling; results-based 
accountability; scenario planning, which uses a charette-like process to survey the landscape of needs 
and resources and then walks participants through decisions and tradeoffs; development of success 
measures; resident involvement in data collection and analysis; and GIS-based tools for smart-growth 
community planning, which juxtapose the geographic distribution of assets and sub-populations.  Our 
reviewers especially recommend pathway mapping because it is an iterative process, it infuses 
complicated community-change efforts with discipline, it encompasses both quantitative and 
qualitative measures of success, and it focuses on a shared vision not of what will happen but how it 
will happen. 
 
• Developing data systems, methods, and skills for:  tracking progress, capturing a variety of changes, 
analyzing and interpreting results, and explaining what changes are or aren’t occurring (and why).  
 
• Creating and facilitating “learning communities” among people with similar roles and responsibilities, 
so they can build on each other’s skills. 
 
Such TA can produce capacities that are extremely valuable—even essential—to long-term, sustained 
results.  However, it also may require more resources than a funder can or will invest. 
 
TA providers can come from outside the community they are hired to serve, but they 
can’t be disconnected from realities in poor neighborhoods.   
 
TA providers have to earn the confidence of local participants and be knowledgeable about local contexts; 
as an NII participant said, they have “to see, believe in, and use the community’s talent.” 
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The content of TA should combine topics and ideas generated by local participants 
with those that the funder, TA provider, and evaluator know to be important. 
 
Most people can identify some of what they need to learn, but not everything.  (Put another way, if they 
knew enough to know what they needed to know, they probably would already know that which they 
need to learn.)  Waiting for local participants to ask for help on a specific topic, therefore, probably won’t 
work if it is the only TA approach.  At the same time, some people are more able to learn about topics 
they discover than about topics assigned by someone else.  A combination of site-generated and 
foundation-designated TA, therefore, often works best. 
 
 
— 6 — 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PHILANTHROPY 
 
ike other community change initiatives of its era, the Neighborhood Improvement Initiative pursued 
bold ambitions despite serious limitations.  Along the way, NII lifted up issues that are just as 
relevant today as they were a decade ago—issues involving the goals, conceptual framework, roles, 
relationships, connections, management practices, evaluation approach, and resources for 
community change efforts.  We highlight those issues and some of their broadest lessons for foundations 
in chapters 1-5 of this report.  Here, however, we are concerned with what NII’s experience implies for 
philanthropic practice writ large, in communities but not necessarily in a community initiative.  Indeed, 
one of NII’s messages is that philanthropy might do better to shift from initiatives to long-term 
commitments to place, from circumscribed grantmaking relationships to more dynamic community 
partnerships.  
 
NII’s experience is not the only factor influencing philanthropic practices for community change, of 
course.  The field has made many advances since 1994, when Hewlett Foundation staff began to design 
NII.  People know more now about how communities function; they have incorporated theories of change 
and attention to results more thoroughly into their initiatives; new tools are available for evaluation and 
technical assistance; and providers are more sophisticated about helping local participants use the tools 
effectively. 46  Funders are more likely now than in the past to look for opportunities to build on existing 
community strengths and momentum rather than start something entirely new; to use their networks, 
credibility, and resources to stimulate new collaborations and forms of community investment; and to 
adapt their operating approach to fit the demands and possibilities for change on the ground.   
 
In addition, some foundations have created vehicles for peer learning and exchange that give participants 
a chance to examine and apply each others’ lessons, with the goal of developing a “community of 
practice.”  These vehicles run the gamut from written guides, such as the GrantCraft and Practice Matters 
series; to convenings, by such groups as Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, Neighborhood Funders 
Group, and the Evaluation Roundtable; to learning forums that serve a specific sector or interest in the 
philanthropic field.  For example, the Aspen Roundtable on Community Change is facilitating a community 
of practice for foundations that support multi-site initiatives to reduce poverty and promote prosperity.  
Chapin Hall Center for Children is doing the same for a group of so-called “embedded funders” that 
support such initiatives in a deep and sustained way in their own backyards.  
 
Today, therefore, there are many ways for people in philanthropy to think about and work on community 
change.  But community change—that is, the development of neighborhood leaders, organizations, and 
networks so they can support residents and link them to resources and opportunities, inside and outside 
                                               
46 Brown, P., Chaskin, R., Hamilton, R. and Richman, H.  (2003).  “Toward Greater Effectiveness in Community 
Change:  Challenges and Responses for Philanthropy.”  Chicago: Chapin Hall Center for Children.  Available online at 
www.chapinhall.org.  
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the community—isn’t for every foundation.  Funders who are contemplating such investments need to 
seriously consider what capacities they have to play which kinds of roles in the community change 
enterprise.  Some will find the work too messy, politically charged, and/or hard to assess.  It isn’t a good 
fit for foundations that prefer short-term time horizons or orient toward short-term, return-on-investment 
strategies.  Nor is community change comfortable work for foundations that need to demonstrate exactly 
how their funds bring about particular changes in the community.  
 
What characteristics position a foundation to do this work well?  Although the field’s technical advances 
help, we believe that something simpler, more fundamental, and farther-reaching is needed to help 
philanthropies that want to engage in community change do it better.  At the most basic level, we see 
two core competencies as necessary (though not sufficient) to do this work well:   
 
• The ability to establish productive relationships with the diverse people and 
organizations with which a foundation must work to achieve community change; and 
 
• The ability to take a learning stance throughout the entire enterprise. 
 
Relationships, learning, and all that they entail are not new issues.  Nor are they absent from the 
philanthropic landscape.  Indeed, many foundations demonstrate these competencies in many different 
initiatives and areas of work.  But somehow community change, perhaps because it is a long-term 
enterprise that challenges traditional power relations and lacks an easy blueprint for action, generates 
fewer success stories.  We don’t want to devalue the positive outcomes that community change initiatives 
produce:  houses are built, services improved, new leaders developed, and residents empowered.  
Certainly, these initiatives have successfully demonstrated the importance and value of doing this work, 
even if it isn’t possible to achieve population-level change.  But if by success we mean the quality of the 
philanthropic enterprise—the strength of the ideas or theories, the degree to which the theories are 
implemented consistently and effectively over time, and the collective learning that is generated for the 
field—then the outcomes seem less positive.   
 
Rather than focus on technical strategies (the mainstay of other lessons-learned documents and guides) 
to address these shortcomings, we emphasize the importance of changing foundations’ attitude and 
stance.  As we suggested earlier, philanthropic attitudes set the tone for all that happens; they can either 
create or close off opportunities.  The foundations that seem most likely to create new knowledge are 
those that are willing to experiment, those that embrace the idea of learning while doing.  This often 
means building the airplane while flying it.  It means systematically trying to capture and analyze data 
while the work is underway, convert the information into knowledge, reflect on what one is doing, discuss 
what one is learning, and incorporate each other’s good ideas into the mix.  It means having theories, 
expectations, partnerships, and funding mechanisms that are flexible enough to allow in-course 
corrections.  It means taking risks that may end up as mistakes.  And it means remembering, as one 
respondent suggested, that the community change enterprise has at its core people—those in 
communities who are seeking a better life for themselves and their children, and those who want to try 
to make a difference.  
 
Being experimental also means becoming a partner in, rather than owner of, the discovery process, 
which brings us to the matter of productive relationships between funders and their partners (including 
community members).  Foundations that intentionally develop and maintain such relationships—
characterized by mutuality, respect, clarity about the goals and risks, agreement on strategies and 
timeline, flexibility to make adjustments along the way, transparency, honesty, and constructive 
dialogue—gain a durable tool they can use to generate knowledge as well as meet community change 
goals.  Unless these relationships are in place, the best technical assistance tool or the most generous 
amount of funding cannot produce its desired impact, especially over the long run.  Furthermore, we 
have seen how learning can be undermined by a culture of anxiety, blame, and unresolved power 
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dynamics.  There simply is no way for community change initiatives to test their theories, adjust their 
strategies, and achieve their outcomes if the partners cannot learn with and from each other.  
 
The corollary, however, is that effective relationships and a learning stance constitute very powerful 
assets that philanthropy can bring to the community change enterprise.  Indeed, we see them as 
potentially transformative, affecting all aspects of foundation structure and operations.  Despite the 
difficulties inherent in the first two themes, this work is worth doing—and, therefore, it is worth learning 
to do well.  We believe it is possible to strengthen poor communities and improve outcomes for the 
people who live in them.  And we believe that philanthropy has an important role to play in doing so.   
Several questions especially invite further philanthropic attention: 
 
• Intermediaries—For what kinds of goals and under what conditions can foundations use 
intermediaries most effectively?  Many foundations feel the pressure to stay lean, which makes it 
difficult for them to operate initiatives directly.  Others see their value as providing operational 
leadership and hands-on engagement.  What should a foundation consider as it assesses whether 
and how to work with an intermediary?  And, once the decision is made, how can foundations 
work with intermediaries as partners rather than in the hierarchical relationship of 
funder/grantee? 
 
• Outcomes—What (and whose) targets will the initiative pursue, and how can this be determined 
without fueling unproductive power dynamics?  What promising methods and tools are emerging 
to evaluate progress toward outcomes? 
 
• Learning—No foundation is against learning, but few are satisfied with the structures and 
mechanisms they have put in place to maximize learning in real time. What more can be done to 
identify practical structures and strategies that make learning central to the philanthropic 
enterprise rather than an extra burden? 
 
• Initiatives versus long-term partnerships—Some foundations are finding that they need 
more flexibility to be responsive to the organic nature of community change work than a highly 
defined and structured initiative allows.  What are the implications of this shift in thinking for 
philanthropic strategy and investment? 
 
By commissioning this retrospective analysis of the Neighborhood Improvement Initiative, the Hewlett 
Foundation has demonstrated a desire for critical self-analysis and learning for the field.  Not many 
foundations have been willing to contribute to this level of public dialogue, and we hope that this 
discussion encourages greater accountability for learning and greater effectiveness within the community 
change field. 
 
\ 
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Cindy Ho, Former NII Project Manager (also Former Project Director, Mayfair) 
Kristina Palmer, NII Program Officer 
Alvertha Penny, Former NII Director 
Connie Walker, Former NII Consultant 
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Tanya Clark, Program Coordinator, The San Francisco Foundation 
Marjorie Fujiki, Program Officer, Peninsula Community Foundation 
James Head, Director of Programs, The San Francisco Foundation 
Sandra Hernandez, President, The San Francisco Foundation 
Peter Hero, President, Community Foundation of Silicon Valley  
Grainger Marburg, Former Project Manager for Mayfair (CFSV) 
Mario Paz, Former Project Manager for East Palo Alto (PCF) 
Rhonnel Sotelo, Former Project Manager for West Oakland (TSFF) 
Sterling Speirn, Former President, Peninsula Community Foundation (PCF) 
 
Evaluation and Technical Assistance 
Renee Berger, President, Teamworks 
Nadinne Cruz, former director of Haas Center, Stanford University 
Liz Vasile Galin, Member of Teamworks NII Team 
Rachel Lanzerotti, Rachel Lanzerotti Consulting 
Melanie Moore Kubo, Former Staff, JMPT Consulting  
Esther Morales, Former Staff, JMPT Consulting 
Manuel Pastor, University of California, Santa Cruz 
Omowale Satterwhite, President, National Community Development Institute 
Shiree Teng, Consultant 
Andrew Wong, President, JMPT Consulting 
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Jaime Alvarado, Executive Director, Mayfair 
Jose Cartagena, Former Board Chair, 7th Street McClymonds Corridor 
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Principal, Community Development Associates 
 
Anne Kubisch 
Co-Director, Aspen Institute Roundtable on Community Change 
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Appendix C:  
RESULTS 
 
MAJOR OUTCOMES OF THE MAYFAIR IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE47 
 
I.  Tangible outcomes that reflect improved life circumstances for neighborhood residents 
 
Physical improvements—refurbished community garden with 120 plots; installed/repaired 63 
streetlights; improved 90 sidewalks; beautified neighborhood with clean-ups and murals  
 
Affordable housing—promoted construction of 92 affordable units and 75 below-market units  
 
Neighborhood safety—added crossing guards in front of largest elementary school 
 
Educational improvements—new library built just outside neighborhood 
 
Economic improvements—12 home-based businesses started through a micro-enterprise program 
 
Cultural offerings—new arts and cultural programming created  
 
II.  Greater use of services and entitlements48 
 
• MII’s grassroots health education program, Casa en Casa, enrolled 965 children in health insurance 
• Over 500 adults enrolled in literacy, ESL, high school diploma/GED, and computer classes 
• First Five, a school readiness initiative, targeted 1200 families to prepare their children to enter 
kindergarten ready to learn 
 
III.  More public and private resources being invested in the neighborhood 
 
• Hewlett’s $6.3 million leveraged $9.6 million in additional funds for Mayfair 
• Mayfair received $3 million in public safety enhancements  
• City of San Jose committed $9 million in bond funds to establish new community center in which the 
Mayfair Adult Learning Center will be housed 
• $7.5 million in in-kind support from public sector (e.g., office space, staff, etc.)  
 
IV.  Increased neighborhood capacity 
 
New and strengthened leadership—Teamworks estimates that more than half of Mayfair’s residents 
have been involved in MII in some form; many residents initially engaged with NII through outreach 
services, at community forums and block club activities, or in positions as promotores go on to join MII’s 
board, rise to leadership positions in government and/or assume increasingly active neighborhood 
                                               
47 This summary is not an exhaustive list of every result of every project with which MII has been involved but rather 
highlights MII’s key outcomes from 1998-2004.  MII played various roles (e.g., service provider, implementer, 
advocate, broker, intermediary) in producing these outcomes, often with other partners. Illustratively, MII staff 
directly recruited and enrolled children in health insurance plans while it advocated successfully for more affordable 
housing but did not actually produce it. The information is distilled from Teamworks and JMPT evaluation reports, 
interviews, and additional materials produced by or for MII.  
 
48 These outcomes are presumed over the long run to lead to outcomes described in Category I. 
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leadership roles; at least 3 significant resident leadership groups either started or facilitated by MII now 
operate independently of MII.  
 
New relationships and networks (social capital)—182 house meetings held to recruit children for 
health insurance plans; community calendar and newsletter contributes to shared sense of community 
(somos companeros); popular theater creates civic awareness and connections; multiple advisory groups 
of diverse constituencies formed by MII for its various plans and programs build networks within Mayfair 
and between Mayfair and outside contacts and resources; public dialogues around such issues as 
immigration creates new networks with shared consciousness.  
 
New and strengthened organizations—New organizations include MII, a credible neighborhood 
intermediary with a resident-led board, and the Mayfair Adult Learning Center; MII has also helped 
strengthen other neighborhood organizations (e.g., helping them incorporate key elements of its 
community promotores outreach model).  
 
New organizational partnerships and collaborations—MII stimulated the creation of new 
neighborhood groups such as a Health and Social Services Collaborative and new planning vehicles that 
guided public and private programming strategies in such areas as housing, education, substance abuse, 
and workforce development; MII was increasingly recognized as an effective neighborhood broker and 
facilitator able to develop and support partnerships between organizations in the neighborhood and 
outside initiatives and resources such as the city’s Strong Neighborhood Initiative, the First Five Initiative 
(school readiness), and various public safety activities.   
 
MAJOR OUTCOMES OF ONE EAST PALO ALTO49 
 
I.   Tangible outcomes that reflect improved life circumstances for neighborhood residents  
 
Improved neighborhood safety—Formed block associations that negotiated agreement with police to 
meet quarterly with residents, provide annual training for block club members, and use community 
policing practices.  Consequently, the divide between residents and police is less pronounced than in 
other communities.  Advocated for ordinance to drive out tenants who use or sell drugs; subsequently 
closed at least one “drug house.”  Doubled the number of juvenile probation officers for the area (from 4 
to 8).  Increased county’s attention to the most violent offenders in area.  “OEPA’s leadership in the 
Crime Reduction Task Force…helped make crime in EPA be viewed as countywide rather than a local 
issue, [which] helped attract substantial federal and state law enforcement resources for a major 
crackdown on drug activity in EPA in 2005.” 
 
Educational improvements—OEPA’s “backdoor approach” frames after-school, ESL, and parent 
leadership training as pathways to improved education.  Nuestra Casa now serve 250 parents annually in 
its ESL program.  Among the 101 students who participated in Quest Learning Center’s after-school 
programs in 2005-06, 66% demonstrated an increased level of study skills, and teachers reported that 
33% showed improved literacy skills.  The New Teacher’s Center’s work with Ravenswood City School 
District resulted in 87% of new teachers returning to the classroom in 2005-06, compared to 27% in 
2003-04. 
 
In 2006 and 2007, final NII grants and additional funding from Hewlett’s Education Program built on the 
foundation laid by OEPA to improve in-school and after-school instruction, increase parent engagement, 
and provide summer job training for young people.  For example: 
                                               
49 This summary highlights key outcomes for OEPA from 2000-2006, but it is not an exhaustive list of every result of 
every project with which OEPA was involved.  Our information comes from Teamworks and JMPT evaluation reports, 
interviews, and additional materials produced by or for OEPA.  
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• Grants to the Ravenswood City School District, New Teacher’s Center, and Boys and Girls Club 
support small-group instruction after school and provide coaching for after-school staff.  Hewlett 
credits the New Teacher’s Center’s work, in part, with tripling the percentage of new teachers 
who return to East Palo Alto classrooms from one year to the next.   
 
• Nuestra Casa’s efforts to organize and educate new immigrant parents continue to expand, and 
the parents have launched successful campaigns to improve school grounds and lunch quality.   
 
• A youth employment program co-lead by OEPA and the Opportunity Industrial Center West, and  
involving more than a dozen service providers, teaches basic job-readiness skills to 100 youth 
who face significant barriers (e.g., previous incarceration, placement in foster care, school 
dropout), pays them for their time, and links them with continued education, training, and 
employment support. 
 
• Other summer programs—many of which pay stipends—involve EPA young people in mentoring, 
public art projects, job training, service learning, political education, community organizing, 
academic support, counseling, and leadership development.  
 
Economic improvements—In OEPA’s early years, OICW served 107 clients in 2004; 96 were certified 
(90%) and 61 placed in jobs (57%), of which 82% were still employed after 6 months.  Start Up 
graduated 19 entrepreneurs, enrolled 14 in advanced training, and helped 18 businesses obtain licenses.  
3 new businesses generated an average of $41,666/year.  In 2005-06, the emphasis shifted to 
employment for at-risk youth.  The Sponsored Employment Project (SEP) drew 24 member organizations 
into a network that placed 32 youth in paid internships, supported by community mentors.  SEP is 
scheduled to scale up to 100 positions with 9 other community-based organizations in 2007.  
 
II.  Greater use of services and entitlements50 
 
• OEPA mapped service providers for youth in 2005-06, which improved the ability to match services to 
residents.   
• 1,494 people were served through OEPA partner programs between 2003-06, including 884 families.   
• Service use increased 61% for families and 173% for individuals between 2003 and 2006.  
• Almost 100 parents were referred from the Quest Learning Center’s parent education program to 
Nuestra Casa’s Parent Leadership Institute in 2005-06. 
• By 2004, 21 residents had graduated from the 11-week Spanish-language police academy. 
• Approximately 64 residents participate regularly in block clubs, and 300 to 400 have participated in 
special events.   
 
III. More public and private resources invested in the neighborhood 
  
• Attracted $679,998 for operations in 2004, mostly from Hewlett and Peninsula Community Fndn.   
• Leveraged $104,000/year for three years from school district for Nuestra Casa/Canada College 
project to deliver community-based ESL to Spanish-speaking adults. 
• Families in Motion (OEPA board’s event) raised $9,100 and attracted more than 200 participants and 
20 local agencies. 
• Obtained expertise from Stanford University School of Education, University of California-Santa Cruz’s 
New Teacher Center, Skyline College, OICW, and local research firm ASR. 
 
                                               
50 These outcomes are presumed over the long run to lead to outcomes described in Category I. 
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IV.  Increased Neighborhood Capacity  
 
New and strengthened leadership—OEPA’s board is 80% residents.  Through two block club 
leadership summits in 2004, 21 residents were trained in meeting facilitation, community organizing, and 
cross-cultural recruitment.  Three block club captains initiated significant actions, including a Mother’s 
Against Violence march. 
 
New relationships and networks (social capital)—Nuestra Casa empowered Latino parents to 
advocate for changes in education system.  CLASS sponsored design of template for communication 
between school teachers and afterschool programs.  These projects have brought diverse members of 
East Palo Alto together in a productive way, often for the first time. 
 
New and strengthened organizations—OEPA incubated and nurtured the growth and development 
of Nuestra Casa—“assisting with its first strategic plan, brokering additional support…for it to hire a well-
qualified executive director, and establishing an infrastructure for fundraising.”  OEPA has developed a 
role as neighborhood facilitator, convener, and advocate for change.  OEPA began to manage the after-
school program at Cesar Chavez Academy in 2005, for instance—an expansion of OEPA’s functions in a 
direction that has potential to attract future funding for OEPA. 
 
New organizational partnerships and collaborations— OEPA “commissioned and drew upon data, 
scanned the political landscape to understand how decisions were made…and positioned itself to both 
influence policy changes and ultimately be asked to play a central role in their implementation.”  OEPA 
convened area’s first regional Crime Reduction Task Force and co-chaired its Crime Prevention and 
Alternatives Committee, which produced a Sponsored Employment Project (SEP) for at-risk youth.  
Ravenswood After School Collaborative (formerly CLASS) grew to 27 local agencies.  Developed/piloted 
adult ESL program with Stanford University.  Coordinated content/schedules of ESL classes with Canada 
College.  Created model for job training of hard-to-reach EPA residents through the Gateway network.   
 
The collaborations have produced system-level change.  For example, the schools now have after-school 
providers collaborating around the goals of improving literacy, math skills, and after-school safety.  
“OEPA’s work with the block clubs helped to influence the selection of the new policy chief, a decision 
based significantly on his commitment to community policing.”  The police department now sees OEPA as 
a community organization that has to be at the table when major decisions are made.  He holds “Chat 
with the Chief” events for residents regularly and requires his sergeants to do the same.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
